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Summary	  
 
In recent years, rural areas in the Global South have experienced increased demand for land by 
investors. Private companies acquire farmland in order to make a profit from various 
agricultural commodities including agrofuel and forestry products. Large-scale land deals and 
related investments provoke numerous hopes and concerns regarding rural development and 
local people. Yet established knowledge about the ‘global land rush’ – also referred to as ‘land 
grabbing’ with negative connotations – is still limited. 
This thesis aims to contribute to a differentiated picture of the global land rush by asking four 
main questions: 
1.  How do land acquisition processes take place? 
2.  What are the implications of land deals and related investments for local livelihoods? 
3.  How do local people perceive foreign land investments? 
4.  How are data regarding the global land rush (re)produced and reported? 
The thesis addresses these questions through a case study analysis of two forestry investments 
and through a detailed review of reports and data compilations related to the land deal situation 
in Tanzania. Four Research Papers provide insights into different aspects of these questions. 
They analyse the land deal processes and related power issues, the recognition and violation of 
customary land rights, the implications of the investments and local people’s perceptions 
(Papers I and II). They also discuss the relevance of recognising plural legal orders of land in 
international guidelines on tenure and responsible investment (Paper III) and the challenges of 
data collection as well as flawed research methods in representing the land deal situation in 
Tanzania (Paper IV). 
The study employed a unique combination of conceptual approaches: a critical livelihoods 
perspective, a property concept and legal pluralism perspective, access theory and a bargaining 
power model. This enabled me to (i) focus on local inhabitants’ agency and social 
differentiation among them; (ii) comprehend property and access to land in its full complexity; 
and (iii) analyse power relations from different angles. The papers are based on empirical data 
collected in fieldwork between 2009 and 2013, and analysis of legal documents and reports 
about and from investors. I conducted qualitative interviews with villagers, local, regional and 
national government officials, and representatives of companies, civil society organisations 
and the academia. Further primary data were generated through participatory observation as 
well as group discussions and participatory mapping exercises with affected people. 
The thesis (see Paper IV) illustrates that data collection regarding the land deal situation in 
Tanzania is a challenge because of central government’s limited overview of land deals. But 
also flawed research methods contribute to the problem. Several publications present their 
data sources in aggregated or incomplete ways. Further, data are often derived from media and 
investors’ websites, which in many cases proved unreliable. The flaws result in the 
dissemination of inaccurate information, such as the reporting of land deals that have never 
materialised. Overall, they lead to a blurred picture of the land deal situation in Tanzania, and 
arguably elsewhere too. 
The case studies focus on two European companies that have acquired both individual and 
communal land (see Papers I-III). They illustrate that land deals in Tanzania involve lengthy 
and complex procedures, which are influenced by a combination of ‘power strands’, namely: 
• Land law, which in Tanzania’s case is comparatively favourable in terms of respecting 
customary land rights and requiring local people’s approval to land deals; 
• Unequal knowledge about land rights among local people and compared to investors; 
• (Access to) influential government authorities; 
• National development discourses, which in Tanzania and many other countries legitimise 
and encourage land deals; 
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• Local communities' potential resistance through the threat (or the actual carrying-out) of 
destructive actions such as burning forestry plantations;  
• Unequal resources and alternatives to the deal: the financial resources mobilised by the 
investors and local people’s lack of alternative livelihoods are crucial in bargaining 
situations.  
 
Government officials and politicians at local, district and regional levels play an important 
intermediary role in the villagers’ decision-making, the identification and recognition of local 
land rights, and the settlement of compensation. The way the authorities fulfil their roles – 
whether they support the local population or whether they pursue their own interests or 
national development goals – substantially influences the outcomes of the deals. 
The study demonstrates that the recognition of customary rights is a delicate undertaking. 
Local claims include overlapping and sometimes competing bundles of rights. Further, local 
elites – in Tanzania, these include elected representatives – are not always aware of all the 
flexible tenure arrangements in their constituency and can thus not fully back them towards 
outsiders. Overall, it is virtually impossible to guarantee the full protection of existing land 
rights. The examined international guidelines on tenure and responsible investment do not 
address this complexity of plural land orders in a fully satisfactory manner. 
Local inhabitants benefit and suffer in different ways from positive and negative implications 
of the investments. The companies provided compensation; one in the form of infrastructure, 
the other in cash. They offered labour options that were generally desired by local people, but 
under rather disappointing conditions in terms of salary, working hours and job security. Yet 
some of the poorer households welcomed them as an additional income source. Both land deals 
resulted in many villagers losing land against their will. This happened particularly – but not 
only – in areas where the resettlements under the government’s villagization policy in the mid 
1970s had led to complex local tenure arrangements. In many cases, the compensation was 
inadequate. In the worst cases, the food security of the affected households actually decreased. 
It is not possible to weigh up the positive and negative implications, as they do not necessarily 
affect the same people. 
One must differentiate within local communities in terms of assets and social identity such as 
financial resources, education, gender and livelihood strategy (i.e. farming and pastoralism). 
These factors influence people’s participation in village decision-making, their bargaining 
power vis-à-vis investors and how they experience implications. For example, households in 
adverse economic conditions, be it due to a drought or for personal reasons, suffer most when 
they lose or give away land and are left without a basis for their livelihoods. On the other hand, 
villagers from poor households seem to make use of new labour opportunities more often than 
members of better-off households. 
The perception of the land deals varied among the villagers and changed over time. Many 
local inhabitants deliberately agreed to the forestry investments and saw them as a unique 
opportunity to improve their livelihood situation. The initial positive views were bound to the 
following conditions: (i) a fair land deal process; (ii) the possibility to keep the own land and 
land-based livelihood strategies; and (iii) opportunities to earn additional income. Depending 
on their experiences with the investors, local people’s perceptions remained positive, or 
became more critical or even strongly negative. 
 
In a global comparison, the analysed cases feature relatively favourable conditions due to 
Tanzania’s progressive land laws and because the forestry companies examined strive to have 
good relations with local people as a means of protecting their plantations from fire. 
Nevertheless, the land acquisition processes were conflict-ridden and their outcomes 
ambivalent. It can be assumed that land deals under less favourable conditions have worse 
consequences for local communities. 
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The study concludes that largely positive outcomes for local people can only be expected 
when the following bundle of conditions in the target countries of land deals are met: 
• Land acquisitions need to be restricted to areas with ample land availability so that they 
do not necessarily interfere with existing land-based livelihood strategies; 
• Any land rights including individual and common customary rights must be 
acknowledged by the national government; 
• Decisions regarding land deals should be taken locally. This also requires functioning 
local government structures; 
• There needs to be a political will and a commitment by officials at all levels of 
government to implement the provisions of the law and support the local population in 
their negotiations with investors. Further, strong civil society organisations should watch 
the government and step in in favour of local populations if necessary; 
• All social groups of the local population need to be well informed about their land rights 
and about the potential risks of a land deal; and 
• Governments must maintain a transparent and critical discourse about land deals. 
 
This bundle of conditions is hardly ever met in the target countries. Hence the contemporary 
global land rush poses severe risks to rural people’s livelihoods. The findings of the thesis 
support voices campaigning for alternative pathways of agrarian development in the Global 
South. At the same time, in the absence of any possibility of halting the global land rush for the 
foreseeable future, there is a need for strict regulations on ongoing and forthcoming land deals. 
The thesis provides a range of recommendations based on the aforementioned conditions and 
beyond, and points to related research needs. One example is the participatory land use 
planning at village level that has recently been made a requirement for agrofuel projects in 
Tanzania. More research is needed to understand how this detailed local analysis and planning, 
if implemented beforehand, may influence decision-making on land deals and whether it 
should become a model for other contexts. 
The thesis provides two forms of scientific contribution. First, it enriches empirical 
knowledge about the global land rush in a nuanced manner by analysing cases of investments 
in forestry – a hitherto sparsely researched sector. It sheds light on the complexity of land deal 
procedures, particularly in terms of customary land rights and power relations; it considers 
social differentiation and gives local people a voice. Second, the study adds to the 
methodological discussions about how to conduct research into the global land rush. It 
provides some critical reflections about existing practices and proposes rigorous methods of 
data presentation and reproduction. Finally, the thesis contributes to policy debates by offering 
conclusive arguments against the global land rush and recommendations for how to restrict 
ongoing land deals and thereby encourage more socially acceptable processes and positive 
implications for rural people. 
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Zusammenfassung	  
 
Seit einigen Jahren erfahren rurale Gebiete im Globalen Süden eine zunehmende Nachfrage 
nach Land durch Investoren. Private Firmen erwerben Agrarland, um mit dem Anbau von 
verschiedenen landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugnissen, inklusive Agrartreibstoffen und Forst-
produkten, Gewinne zu erzielen. Die grossflächigen Landdeals und die damit zusammen-
hängenden Investitionen rufen zahlreiche Hoffnungen und Befürchtungen bezüglich der länd-
lichen Entwicklung und der Lokalbevölkerung hervor. Allerdings gibt es bisher nur wenig 
gesichertes Wissen über diesen „globalen Ansturm auf Land“ (global land rush), der mit 
negativer Konnotation auch als „Landraub“ (land grabbing) bezeichnet wird. 
Diese Dissertation hat zum Ziel, einen Beitrag zu einem differenzierten Bild des global land 
rush zu leisten. Sie stellt dazu die folgenden Fragen: 
1. Wie gestalten sich Landerwerbs-Prozesse? 
2. Welches sind die Auswirkungen von Landerwerb und den diesbezüglichen Investitionen auf 
den Lebensunterhalt der Lokalbevölkerung? 
3. Wie nehmen lokale Bewohnerinnen und Bewohner ausländische Landinvestitionen wahr? 
4. Wie werden Daten zum globalen Ansturm auf Land erzeugt und wiedergegeben?  
Die Studie geht diesen Fragen durch Fallstudien zu zwei Forstwirtschafts-Investitionen und 
durch eine Analyse von Berichten und Datenzusammenstellungen zur Landdeal-Situation in 
Tansania nach. Vier wissenschaftliche Artikel beleuchten verschiedene Aspekte dazu: Sie 
analysieren die Land-Transaktionsprozesse und diesbezügliche Machtfragen, die Anerkennung 
und Verletzung von lokalem Gewohnheitsrecht, Auswirkungen der Investitionen und lokale 
Sichtweisen auf dieselben (Artikel I und II). Zudem diskutieren sie die Relevanz der Aner-
kennung von pluralen Landrechtssystemen in internationalen Richtlinien zu Besitz und verant-
wortungsvollen Investitionen (Artikel III) und Herausforderungen bei der Datensammlung 
sowie mangelhafte Forschungsmethoden bei der Darstellung der Landdeal-Situation in 
Tansania (Artikel IV). 
In der Studie wird eine einzigartige Kombination von konzeptionellen Ansätzen angewendet: 
eine kritische Lebensunterhalts-Perspektive (critical livelihoods perspective), ein Eigentums-
konzept und die Perspektive des Rechtspluralismus (property concept und legal pluralism 
perspective), die Zugangstheorie (access theory) und ein Model zu Verhandlungsmacht 
(bargaining power model). Dies hat mir Folgendes ermöglicht: (i) Fokussierung auf die 
Handlungsmöglichkeiten (agency) der lokalen Bevölkerung und differenzierte Betrachtung 
derselben, (ii) ein gutes Verständnis von Besitz und Zugang zu Land in seiner gesamten 
Komplexität, (iii) eine Analyse von Machtbeziehungen unter verschiedenen Blickwinkeln. Die 
Artikel basieren auf empirischen Daten aus Feldforschung zwischen 2009 und 2013 und auf 
der Analyse von Gesetzestexten sowie Berichten über und von Investoren. Ich habe qualitative 
Interviews mit DorfbewohnerInnen, mit BeamtInnen von lokaler bis nationaler Ebene und mit 
Vertretenden von Investoren, Zivilgesellschaftsorganisationen und aus der Forschung durch-
geführt. Weitere Primärdaten wurden durch teilnehmende Beobachtung und durch 
Gruppendiskussionen und partizipatives Kartieren generiert. 
Die Studie (siehe Artikel IV) zeigt auf, dass die Datenerhebung zur Landdeal-Situation in 
Tansania dadurch erschwert wird, dass die nationale Regierung keinen Überblick über die 
Landdeals hat. Aber auch mangelhafte Forschungsmethoden tragen zu den Schwierigkeiten 
bei. Die Quellen der Daten werden in vielen Publikationen in aggregierter Form oder unvoll-
ständig wiedergegeben. Zudem stammen die Angaben oft von Medien oder Homepages der 
Investoren. Diese Quellen haben sich in vielen Fällen als unzuverlässig erwiesen. Diese 
Mängel führen zu einer Verbreitung von unzulänglichen Informationen, wie zum Beispiel der 
Berichterstattung über Landtransaktionen, die nie stattgefunden haben. Insgesamt resultieren 
sie in einem verzerrten Bild zur Landdeal-Situation in Tansania und wohl auch anderswo. 
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Die Fallstudien fokussieren auf zwei europäische Firmen, welche sowohl privates als auch 
Gemeinschaftsland erworben haben (siehe Artikel I-III). Sie illustrieren, dass Landerwerb in 
Tansania langwierige und komplizierte Prozesse mit sich bringt. Diese sind von einer 
Kombination von Machtsträngen (power strands) beeinflusst:  
• Landrecht, welches im Fall von Tansania im Vergleich zu anderen afrikanischen 
Ländern relativ vorteilhaft ist in Bezug auf die Anerkennung von Gewohnheitsrecht 
und aufgrund der Auflage, dass die Lokalbevölkerung einer Landtransaktion zu-
stimmen muss 
• Ungleiches Wissen über Landrechte unter der Lokalbevölkerung und im Vergleich zu 
den Investoren 
• Einflussreiche Regierungspersonen (bzw. Zugang zu ihnen) 
• Nationale Entwicklungsdiskurse, welche in Tansania und in vielen anderen Ländern 
Landdeals legitimieren und fördern 
• Widerstand der Lokalbevölkerung durch Drohung (und Umsetzung) von zerstöreri-
schen Akten, wie zum Beispiel das Abbrennen von Forstplantagen 
• Ungleiche Ressourcen und Alternativen zum Deal: Die finanziellen Ressourcen der 
Investoren und die fehlenden Alternativen seitens der Lokalbevölkerung sind zentral in 
Verhandlungssituationen. 
Regierungsbeamte und PolitikerInnen auf lokaler, Distrikt- und regionaler Ebene spielen eine 
wichtige Rolle bei der Entscheidungsfindung der Dorfbevölkerung, bei der Identifizierung und 
Anerkennung von lokalen Landrechten und bei der Einigung bezüglich Kompensation. Die 
Art, wie die RegierungsvertreterInnen ihre Rollen wahrnehmen – ob sie die Lokalbevölkerung 
unterstützen oder ob sie eigene Interessen oder nationale Entwicklungsziele verfolgen – 
beeinflusst die Auswirkungen der Deals massgebend. 
Die Studie zeigt, dass die Anerkennung von Gewohnheitsrechten ein heikles Unterfangen ist. 
Lokale Ansprüche beinhalten überlappende und manchmal sich widersprechende Rechts-
bündel. Zudem sind lokale Eliten – in Tansania unter anderem gewählte Dorfabgeordnete – 
nicht immer im Bild über alle flexiblen Besitzverhältnisse in ihrem Gebiet und können diese 
deshalb nicht hinreichend gegen aussen vertreten. Insgesamt ist es nahezu unmöglich, 
bestehende Landrechte vollumfänglich zu schützen. Die untersuchten internationalen Richt-
linien zu Besitz und verantwortungsvollen Investitionen befassen sich nur unzureichend mit 
dieser Komplexität von pluralen Landrechtssystemen.  
Die ansässige Bevölkerung erfährt positive und negative Auswirkungen der Investitionen auf 
unterschiedliche Weise. Die Firmen haben Kompensationen in Form öffentlicher Infrastruktur 
beziehungsweise in Bargeld bezahlt. Sie bieten Arbeitsmöglichkeiten, wie von vielen 
Menschen erhofft, allerdings zu enttäuschenden Bedingungen was Lohn, Arbeitszeit und 
Jobsicherheit betrifft. Dennoch begrüssen einige der ärmeren Haushalte diese Arbeitsmöglich-
keiten als zusätzliche Einkommensquelle. Beide Landdeals haben zu Fällen geführt, in denen 
zahlreiche DorfbewohnerInnen Land gegen ihren Willen verloren haben. Dies geschah haupt-
sächlich – aber nicht nur – in Gebieten, in denen die Umsiedlungen während des nationalen 
Dorfentwicklungsprogramms (villagization policy) Mitte der 1970er-Jahre zu komplizierten 
Landbesitz-Verhältnissen geführt haben. In vielen Fällen wurde unzureichende Kompensation 
bezahlt. In den gravierendsten Fällen hat sich die Ernährungssicherheit der betroffenen Haus-
halte verschlechtert. Die negativen und positiven Auswirkungen können nicht gegeneinander 
abgewogen werden, da sie nicht unbedingt dieselben Personen betreffen.  
Die lokalen Bewohnerinnen und Bewohner müssen differenziert betrachtet werden. Assets 
und Aspekte von sozialer Identität wie finanzielle Ressourcen, Bildung, Geschlecht und 
Lebensunterhaltstrategie (Landwirtschaft oder Pastoralismus) sind relevante Faktoren. Diese 
beeinflussen die Teilnahme an Dorfentscheidungen, die Verhandlungsmacht gegenüber 
Investoren und die Art, wie Auswirkungen erfahren werden. Zum Beispiel leiden Haushalte, 
die sich wegen einer Dürre oder aus persönlichen Gründen in widrigen wirtschaftlichen Um-
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ständen befinden, am meisten, wenn sie Land verlieren oder weggeben und ohne Grundlage für 
ihren Lebensunterhalt verbleiben. Andererseits scheinen Mitglieder von armen Haushalten die 
neuen Arbeitsmöglichkeiten mehr zu nutzen als Personen aus wohlhabenderen Familien.  
 
Die Wahrnehmung der Landdeals variiert innerhalb der Bevölkerung und veränderte sich mit 
der Zeit. Viele DorfbewohnerInnen haben den Forstinvestitionen bewusst zugestimmt und 
sahen sie als einzigartige Chance, ihre Lebenssituation zu verbessern. Die anfänglich positive 
Sichtweise war an folgende Bedingungen geknüpft: (i) ein fairer Land-Transaktionsprozess, 
(ii) die Möglichkeit, das eigene Land und landbasierte Lebensunterhaltsstrategien beizube-
halten, und (iii) die Gelegenheit, zusätzliches Einkommen zu verdienen. Je nach ihren Erfah-
rungen mit den Investoren ist die Ansicht der Menschen positiv geblieben oder wurde 
kritischer bis stark negativ. 
 
Die untersuchten Fälle weisen verhältnismässig vorteilhafte Bedingungen auf – dies aufgrund 
Tansanias fortschrittlichem Landrecht und weil die untersuchten Forstunternehmen sich um 
gute Beziehungen zur Lokalbevölkerung bemühen als Strategie, ihre Plantagen vor Feuer zu 
schützen. Trotzdem waren die Land-Transaktionsprozesse stark von Konflikten geprägt und 
die Auswirkungen ambivalent. Es kann angenommen werden, dass Landdeals unter weniger 
günstigen Bedingungen schlimmere Konsequenzen für DorfbewohnerInnen haben. 
 
Die Dissertation kommt zum Schluss, dass mehrheitlich positive Auswirkungen für die 
Lokalbevölkerung nur dann erwartet werden können, wenn folgende Bedingungen in den 
Zielländern von Land-Investitionen erfüllt sind: 
• Landerwerb muss auf Gebiete mit ausreichender Landverfügbarkeit limitiert werden, 
so dass er nicht zwingend in existierende landbasierte Lebensunterhaltsstrategien 
eingreift. 
• Alle Landrechte, inklusive private und gemeinschaftliche Gewohnheitsrechte, müssen 
staatlich anerkannt sein. 
• Entscheidungen bezüglich Landtransaktionen sollten auf lokaler Ebene getroffen 
werden. Dies bedingt auch eine funktionierende lokale Regierungsstruktur. 
• Es braucht politischen Willen und Engagement von Regierungsbeamten auf allen 
Ebenen, die Gesetzesgrundlagen umzusetzen und die lokale Bevölkerung in ihren 
Verhandlungen mit Investoren zu unterstützen. Zusätzlich müssen starke Zivilgesell-
schaftsorganisation die Regierung beobachten und wenn nötig für die Bevölkerung 
einstehen. 
• Alle Bevölkerungsgruppen müssen gut über ihre Landrechte und über mögliche 
Risiken von Landtransaktionen informiert sein. 
• Die Regierungen müssen transparente und kritische Diskurse über Landdeals führen. 
Dieses Bündel an Bedingungen ist kaum je erfüllt in den Zielländern. Der aktuelle globale 
Ansturm auf Land stellt folglich ein erhebliches Risiko für die Lebensgrundlagen der länd-
lichen Bevölkerung dar. Die Resultate dieser Arbeit unterstützen Stimmen, die sich für 
alternative Wege der ländlichen Entwicklung in Ländern des Südens einsetzen. Gleichzeitig – 
da der global land rush in absehbarer Zukunft nicht aufgehalten werden kann – sind strenge 
Regeln für laufende und bevorstehende Landdeals nötig. Die Studie bietet eine Auswahl an 
Empfehlungen, die auf den obengenannten Bedingungen basieren und drüber hinausgehen. 
Zudem weist sie auf entsprechenden Forschungsbedarf hin. Ein Beispiel ist die partizipative 
Landnutzungsplanung auf Dorfebene, die in Tansania kürzlich zur Bedingung für Investitionen 
in Agrartreibstoffprojekte gemacht wurde. Es braucht mehr Forschung um zu eruieren, wie 
diese detaillierte lokale Analyse und Planung die Entscheidungsfindung beeinflusst, wenn sie 
vorgängig zu einem Landerwerb durchgeführt wird, und ob diese Vorgabe ein Vorbild für 
andere Gebiete werden könnte. 
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Die vorliegende Studie trägt auf zwei Arten zu wissenschaftlichem Wissen bei. Erstens 
ergänzt sie empirisches Wissen über den globalen Ansturm auf Land in einer differenzierten 
Weise, und zwar durch die Analyse von Forstinvestitionen – einem bisher wenig untersuchten 
Sektor. Sie gibt Aufschluss über die Komplexität von Land-Transaktionsprozessen, vor allem 
in Bezug auf Gewohnheitsrechte und Machtbeziehungen, sie berücksichtigt soziale Differen-
zierung und gibt den betroffenen Bewohnern und Bewohnerinnen eine Stimme. Zweitens trägt 
die Studie zur methodologischen Erörterung darüber bei, wie der global land rush erforscht 
werden soll. Sie bietet eine kritische Betrachtung bestehender Forschungspraktiken und schlägt 
Methoden zur präzisen Darstellung und Weiterverwendung von Daten vor. Schlussendlich 
trägt die Arbeit zu politischen Debatten bei, indem sie schlüssige Argumente gegen den 
global land rush und gleichzeitig Empfehlungen vorbringt, wie bestehende Landdeals einge-
schränkt werden sollen, damit eher sozialverträgliche Prozesse und günstigere Auswirkungen 
für ländliche Bewohnerinnen und Bewohner erreicht werden können. 
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1	   Introduction	  
 
The terms ‘global land rush’ or ‘land grabbing’ refer to a multi-facetted phenomenon that takes 
place mainly in rural areas in the Global South. In short, it can be defined as an increase in 
large-scale land acquisition by (foreign) investors in recent years. The land deals covered by 
these terms are conducted by differing private and public actors for a variety of purposes, 
including the production of food crops, agrofuel or forestry products, or for speculative 
reasons. The land acquisitions – be they in the form of long-term leases, concessions or 
outright purchase – and related land investment have led to controversial debates. The potential 
advantages for rural areas include new income opportunities, improved infrastructure and 
technologies. Concerns are related to violations of local people’s (often customary) land rights, 
the loss of access to and degradation of natural resources, and ultimately decreased food 
security in the respective areas.   
This PhD thesis aims to contribute to a differentiated view of large-scale land deals in rural 
areas. Through a case study analysis, it sheds light on detailed land acquisition procedures and 
decision-making processes, and on the implications of transnational land deals for local people 
and their livelihoods. The conceptual and methodological approaches applied focus on 
acknowledging different social groups among local communities, on their perceptions of the 
foreign land deals and on power relations among different stakeholders. The empirical data for 
this PhD study were1 collected and generated in Tanzania. Tanzania – which has an apparent 
abundance of land, and attractive investment policies – is one of the typical target countries for 
foreign investors searching for land. Tanzania has comparatively progressive land laws in 
terms of respecting customary land rights. This makes it an interesting country in which to 
analyse the acknowledgment of local land tenure during land deal processes. The case studies 
analyse two European companies investing in tree plantations. Forestry is a sparsely researched 
sector in the context of the recent land rush, compared to investment for food and agrofuels. It 
is a sector with presumably growing global relevance that deserves greater attention.  
Part I – Frame and Synopsis of this thesis is structured as follows. First, I give an overview of 
the recent land rush debate, including discussions of its characteristics, actors, related 
discourses, processes and outcomes. Further, I provide insights into forestry as a specific 
investment sector. The introduction also presents the objectives and research questions of this 
thesis and concludes with the research design. In the two subsequent sections I illustrate the 
conceptual and methodological approaches that were applied in this study. In the fourth 
section, on Tanzania, relevant information regarding land laws, investment policies and the 
situation of foreign land deals is provided. The next section describes the case study sites and 
investment projects analysed in this research. The results of the PhD thesis as published in four 
research papers are summarised in section six. Finally, section seven provides some reflections 
on the research procedure, findings and conclusions regarding the main research questions, and 
recommendations for further research and policy. 
Part II – Research Papers contains the four research papers that form the core of this thesis: 
Paper I:  Locher M., Müller-Böker U. 2014: “Investors are good, if they follow the rules” 
– Power relations and local perceptions in the case of two European forestry 
companies in Tanzania. Geographica Helvetica, 69(4), 249-258. 
Paper II:  Locher M. submitted: “How come others are selling our land?” – Customary land 
rights and the complex process of land acquisition by a UK-based forestry 
company in Tanzania. Submitted to: Journal of Eastern African Studies.  
                                                      
1	  I	  use	  the	  word	  ‚data’	  as	  a	  plural,	  despite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  usage	  as	  a	  singular	  („data	  is...“)	  has	  become	  more	  
common.	  See	  related	  considerations	  about	  the	  epistemology	  of	  land	  rush	  data	  in	  Edelman	  (2013,	  p.	  489).	  
  
5 
Paper III:  Locher M., Steimann, B., Bishnu, R. U. 2012: Land grabbing, investment 
principles and plural legal orders of land use. Journal of Legal Pluralism, 65, 31-
63. 
Paper IV:  Locher M., Sulle E. 2014: Challenges and methodological flaws in reporting the 
global land rush: observations from Tanzania. Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(4), 
569-592. 
The first paper focuses on the land deal processes and outcomes in the two case studies. It 
sheds light on power relations between investors and villagers and on the views of local 
people. The second paper zooms in on the recognition of contested customary land rights and 
statutory law in a complex land tenure situation, where the investor’s land acquisition has 
generated considerable conflict. In the third paper, the relevance of customary land laws and 
plural legal orders of land in international guidelines for land tenure and responsible 
investment is discussed. Finally, in the fourth paper, an analysis of methodological challenges 
and shortcomings in researching the global land rush is provided and their consequences for 
the picture of contemporary land deals in Tanzania are displayed. 
1.1	   The	  ‘global	  land	  rush’	  
1.1.1	   Definitions,	  drivers,	  scale	  and	  data	  quality:	  what	  do	  we	  mean?	  
The most widely used term in the debate about contemporary land acquisitions has been ‘land 
grabbing’. For my research, however, I have increasingly preferred to use other terms. I argue 
that the term ‘land grabbing’ is not a particularly suitable analytical term because of its implicit 
connotation of illegality and force (D. Hall 2013, p. 1600; Taylor and Bending 2009; Zoomers 
and Kaag 2014, p. 201). Smalley and Corbera (2012, p. 1040) point out that ‘land grabbing’ 
excludes the “possibility of a just transfer of land”. I reason that this possibility should at least 
not be ruled out from the outset of a study. While I recognise the political power of the term 
‘land grabbing’ and the importance of activists’ and other critics’ work in this regard, I prefer 
less confusing and emotionally loaded expressions for academic purposes. Hence, I have 
mainly used ‘land rush’ and terms such as ‘land deals’ or ‘land acquisitions’ in my research. In 
my opinion, ‘land rush’ is less misleading than ‘land grab’, but portrays some of the scale and 
urgency of the phenomenon.2 
The phenomenon under study actually represents not one land rush, but consists of “multiple 
converging processes” (Cotula 2013, p. 173) that can also be termed “commercial pressures on 
land”, as the International Land Coalition (ILC 2014) calls it (Peluso and Lund 2011, p. 669; 
Zoomers and Kaag 2014, p. 207). Scholarly literature shows great variance in what is 
considered ‘land grabbing’ or land rush. This variety is demonstrated along the characteristics 
listed below that are deemed relevant by most definitions in some form, but in differing ways3. 
                                                      
2	  The	  term	  ‘land	  rush’	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  encompassing	  a	  broader	  phenomenon	  than	  ‘land	  grabs’,	  based	  on	  
definitions	  that	  distinguish	  between	  ‘land	  grabs’	  and	  other	  large-­‐scale	  land	  deals.	  According	  to	  these	  definitions,	  
land	  deals	  are	  considered	  as	  grabs	  when	  they	  feature	  specific	  characteristics,	  for	  example	  when	  the	  investment	  
has	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  food	  security	  of	  the	  recipient	  country	  (a	  definition	  used	  by	  17	  studies	  on	  land	  grabbing	  in	  
Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean,	  conducted	  by	  the	  Agriculture	  Organization	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  (FAO),	  available	  
in	  Spanish	  only,	  quoted	  by	  Borras,	  Kay,	  et	  al.	  2012,	  p.	  403),	  when	  the	  land	  acquisition	  process	  displays	  certain	  
negative	  criteria	  such	  as	  violation	  of	  human	  rights	  or	  not	  being	  based	  on	  free,	  prior	  and	  informed	  consent	  of	  the	  
affected	  land-­‐users	  (ILC	  2011,	  p.	  2)	  or	  “when	  land	  is	  expropriated	  using	  means	  other	  than	  voluntary	  market	  
purchase”	  (Levien	  2012,	  p.	  941).	  Yet,	  these	  explicit	  definitions	  of	  the	  term	  ‘land	  grab’	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  prevail.	  For	  a	  
critical	  reflection	  (in	  German)	  on	  the	  analytically	  diffuse,	  but	  politically	  useful	  term	  see	  Ouma	  (2012).	  
3	  This	  compilation	  is	  based	  on	  Derek	  Hall	  (2013,	  pp.	  1584f),	  but	  I	  have	  adapted	  his	  list	  and	  quoted	  other	  authors	  
accordingly.	  The	  definitions	  Hall	  draws	  on	  can	  be	  found	  in:	  Akram-­‐Lodhi	  (2012,	  p.	  126),	  Arduino	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  
Borras,	  Franco,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  Margulis	  et	  al.	  (2013,	  p.	  2),	  White	  et	  al.	  (2012).	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• Scale of land deals: Most definitions require that land acquisitions be large in order to 
count, often setting a lower limit of, for example, 1,000 hectares (e.g. Cotula et al. 2009) 
or 200 hectares (Land Matrix 2015; Locher and Sulle 2013; Messerli et al. 2014).  
• Foreign vs. domestic origin of investors: Some research (e.g. Daniel and Mittal 2009; 
Arduino et al. 2012; a set of FAO studies quoted by Borras, Kay, et al. 2012, p. 4034) and 
much of the media coverage focus exclusively on land acquisitions by foreign investors. 
More recent definitions implicitly or explicitly include domestic investments (e.g. White 
et al. 2012). Though domestic deals are usually smaller in scale and there is (even) less 
systematic knowledge about them, anecdotal evidence suggests that, taken together, they 
are of considerable relevance – potentially similar or greater in impact than transnational 
land deals (Deininger and Byerlee 2011, p. xiv; Cotula 2012). 
• Target countries: Research that employs the terms ‘land grab’ or ‘land rush’ focuses 
almost exclusively on land deals in the Global South, thus implicitly making this part of 
the definition. Some definitions also explicitly mention target countries being ‘poor’ or 
‘developing countries’ (e.g. Daniel and Mittal 2009). Only a few publications (e.g. Englert 
and Gärber 2014) see land investments in Western countries as part of the same 
phenomenon.  
• Purpose of land deals: Agricultural production, resource extraction and speculation are 
named as specific purposes of ‘land grabbing’. There is disagreement over whether 
acquisitions for urban development and industry should be considered as part of the same 
phenomenon. A particular category of land deals is summarised under the term ‘green 
grabs’. Green grabs are defined as “the appropriation of land and resources for 
environmental ends” (Fairhead et al. 2012, p. 237) and include land deals for biodiversity 
conservation, carbon sequestration and ecotourism, for example (Fairhead et al. 2012; 
Corson et al. 2013). 
• Temporal criteria: Some specify ‘current’ or ‘contemporary’ land grabbing, while others 
make no reference to time, or explicitly state that the current phenomenon is part of a 
long-term historical process (e.g. Alden Wily 2012; Cotula 2013, p. 173; P. E. Peters 
2013a, 2013b). 
Besides these characteristics used to define the land rush, land deals also vary regarding other 
criteria such as the duration of investment, the business models (estates, outgrowers), the 
resources accessed (land, water, minerals, forests) and the degree of interference in existing 
uses (R. Hall 2011b, p. 203). There are both export-oriented ventures and ones that sell 
agrarian products on domestic markets (Borras and Franco 2010; Schoneveld 2014). One new 
analytical term coined in the context of the land rush is ‘flex crop’ (Borras, Franco, et al. 2012, 
p. 846). Flex crops are plants with multiple uses that can be sold as food, feed, fuel or an 
industrial raw material, depending on market developments. Examples are soy, sugarcane and 
oil palm. Cultivation of flex crops is reported to be expanding (ibid., p. 847, 851).  
Foreign land acquisitions in developing countries have been taking place for a long time, 
particularly for the establishment of large plantations in colonial and post-colonial times 
(GRAIN 2008; Kugelman 2009; Songwe and Deininger 2009; Taylor and Bending 2009). 
However, there is a common understanding that the number and size of international land 
investments in countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America has considerably increased over the 
last decade. The major reason is a growing demand for agricultural products and a continuing 
surge in the prices of agricultural commodities and land in a situation where natural resources 
are becoming more and more scarce (Deininger and Byerlee 2011, p. 7; Rauch 2014, p. 227). 
More specifically, a combination of global crises is generally cited as the immediate drivers of 
the recent global land rush (Borras and Franco 2012, p. 36; White et al. 2012). These crises 
involve food, energy, climate change and finance. In this context, Ruth Hall (2011a, p. 1) has 
coined the term “triple-F crisis: food, fuels and finance”. Food prices peaked – partly as a 
                                                      
4	  See	  Footnote	  2	  for	  more	  information	  on	  the	  FAO	  studies.	  
  
7 
result of the agrofuel boom, but also due to food speculations – in 2007-08 and again in 2010, 
after three decades of relatively stable or declining agricultural commodities prices (De 
Schutter 2011, p. 251; Woodhouse 2012, p. 778). The food price inflation has drawn investor 
attention to agrarian land. Yet, for Southern Africa, R. Hall (2011, p. 202) found that large land 
deals for food production seem to be rare; agrofuel plantations are more common in this 
region. Worldwide production of agrofuels has grown rapidly since the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, driven by the increasing attention of policy makers to climate change, 
energy supply concerns and rising oil prices5 (Cotula et al. 2008; Daniel and Mittal 2009; Zah 
and Ruddy 2009). Ethanol production (e.g. from sugar cane or maize) and biodiesel production 
(e.g. from palm oil, soy or jatropha6) first exploded in the US and Germany, but from around 
2005 onwards increasingly spread to tropical regions (Cotula et al. 2008; J. Peters and 
Thielmann 2008, p. 1538). Finally, the subprime crisis of 2007-08 is considered to have 
attracted speculative interests to land as a comparatively stable financial asset. Investors are 
allured by the low price of arable land in target countries, particularly in Africa (P. E. Peters 
2013b, p. 18).7 Overall, McMichael (2012, p. 690) argues that during “the conjunction of food, 
energy and financial crises”, international capital markets have gravitated “towards agriculture 
as a relatively safe investment haven for the relatively long-term“. 
Data on the global land rush so far are of limited quality (Cotula 2013; Schoneveld 2013, p. 
21f, 2014; see also Research Paper IV). This is partly due to the dynamic and opaque nature of 
the land acquisitions. The available information has relied – particularly in the early years of 
the debate – on media articles and single case studies, often conducted by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) initially. Recently, more academic knowledge has become available. 
There are arguably both over- and underestimates of land deals. The media, for instance, tend 
to exaggerate the extent of the phenomenon (Cotula 2013, p. 128; Deininger and Byerlee 2011, 
p. 50; Friis and Reenberg 2010, p. 9), and some investors seem to mask failed investments 
(Hanlon 2011 in Baglioni and Gibbon 2013, p. 1561). On the other hand, investors and 
involved governments of host countries rarely provide transparent information about ongoing 
negotiations or concluded land deals, and thus contribute to an underestimation of land deals 
(Cotula 2012, 2013, p. 128; Pearce 2013). Part of the uncertainty about land deals can also be 
attributed to flawed research methodologies, such as aggregating data of uneven quality 
(Edelman 2013; Oya 2013a; Scoones et al. 2013). The thesis addresses these methodological 
challenges, among other things (see Research Paper IV).  
The Land Matrix, a large open-source database run by the International Land Coalition (ILC), 
in partnership with research institutes and donor organisations, provides information about 
more than 1,000 concluded land deals totalling nearly 38 million hectares (Land Matrix 2015, 
in March 2015). For the share of different purposes of land deals as reported in the Land 
Matrix see Figure 2 in Section 1.1.7. 
Researchers from a broad range of academic subjects using varying approaches have described 
and analysed different aspects of the global land rush (see also Section 3.1 on the fast accruing 
evidence). Main findings are summarised in the following, with a particular focus on Africa. 
                                                      
5	  Binding	  targets	  set	  by	  the	  European	  Union,	  which	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  early	  2009,	  demand	  that	  20%	  of	  all	  energy	  
used	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  10%	  of	  each	  Member	  State’s	  transport	  fuel	  must	  come	  from	  renewable	  sources	  by	  the	  year	  
2020	  (Franco	  et	  al.	  2010).	  
6	  Jatropha,	  more	  precisely	  Jatropha	  curcas,	  is	  a	  poisonous	  and	  thorny	  shrub	  with	  oil-­‐bearing	  nuts	  that	  grows	  in	  
tropical	  areas	  and	  is	  highly	  drought-­‐resistant.	  It	  is	  sometimes	  planted	  in	  Tanzania	  as	  hedges	  to	  mark	  boundaries	  
and	  to	  protect	  livestock	  and	  crops	  (Gmünder	  2010,	  p.	  3;	  Mitchell	  2008,	  p.	  15).	  	  
7	  Daniel	  (2012,	  p.	  716)	  quotes	  the	  CEO	  of	  a	  private	  equity	  group	  enthusing	  about	  the	  prices	  of	  agricultural	  land	  
available	  in	  Southern	  Africa	  at	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  prices	  in	  North	  and	  South	  America:	  “That	  alone	  is	  an	  arbitrage	  
opportunity.	  We	  could	  be	  moronic	  and	  not	  grow	  anything	  and	  we	  think	  we	  will	  make	  money	  over	  the	  next	  
decade.”	  
  
8 
1.1.2	   Actors	  in	  the	  global	  land	  rush	  
Investors are usually seen as the primary actors in the global land rush, so this section starts by 
exploring the different types of investors. It goes on to describe the role international 
organisations play, before it turns to the actors in the countries targeted by investors, as far as 
discussed in literature. 
Private investors have conducted most of the recent land deals. This includes big food 
agribusinesses, agrofuel firms (a considerable number of them start-up companies) and energy 
giants (Cotula 2013, p. 173). Increasingly, private institutional investors are also involved. 
They can be defined as “financial organizations that invest large sums of money in securities, 
real estate, and other assets on behalf of third parties” (Daniel 2012, p. 704; see also White et 
al. 2012, p. 629), such as mutual funds, investment banks (e.g. Goldman Sachs), pension funds, 
private equity funds (e.g. Carlyle Group) and hedge funds8 (McMichael 2012, p. 686). In terms 
of geographical origin of the investors, Schoneveld (2013, p. 29; see also Schoneveld 2014, p. 
40), who examined data on more than 500 farmland investments in sub-Saharan Africa 
between 2008 and 2012, found that investors from Europe were dominant (particularly the UK, 
Norway and Germany), followed by investors from the US, India and Malaysia (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure	  1:	  Origin	  of	  transnational	  investments	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  by	  total	  area	  acquired;	  Source:	  
simplified	  own	  representation	  based	  on	  Schoneveld	  (2013,	  pp.	  29,	  262);	  only	  data	  of	  “Category	  I”	  in	  
terms	  of	  reliable	  data	  resources	  were	  included;	  top	  17	  countries	  of	  origin	  are	  displayed	  out	  of	  totally	  47	  
countries	  of	  origin	  in	  526	  analysed	  investments	  in	  36	  countries	  of	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  
Governments can become direct investors through state-owned firms and sovereign wealth 
funds. Yet they seem to do so relatively rarely. There are only a few cases of land deals 
reportedly having been signed directly between two states, e.g. between the governments of 
Syria and Sudan. Thus, the predominant view, which is often presented in the media, that the 
investors are food-insecure states might need to be revised. However, governments might 
support investments through other means such as guarantees or bilateral agreements (Cotula et 
al. 2009, pp. 35–37; Daniel 2012, p. 703). 
                                                      
8	  The	  role	  of	  private	  equity	  funds	  in	  the	  global	  land	  rush	  is	  comprehensively	  discussed	  by	  Daniel	  (2012).	  Private	  
equity	  fund	  managers	  collect	  funds	  from	  limited	  partners	  and	  invest	  them	  in	  ‘target	  companies’	  in	  order	  to	  make	  
profit	  for	  their	  limited	  partners	  and	  themselves.	  According	  to	  McNellis	  (2009,	  p.	  10),	  “fund	  managers	  have	  the	  
mandate	  to	  invest	  in	  almost	  any	  asset	  class	  in	  any	  location	  provided	  the	  return	  potential	  makes	  investment	  sense”.	  
Their	  activities	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  even	  less	  transparent	  and	  less	  regulated	  than	  those	  of	  other	  investors,	  as	  they	  
operate	  with	  little	  regulatory	  oversight	  (Daniel	  2014,	  p.	  714;	  McNellis	  2009,	  pp.	  2f).	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Land investments are supported by certain international development organisations, such as 
various members of the World Bank Group, in particular the International Finance Corporation 
and the Foreign Investment Advisory Service, and others such as the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the International Rice Research Institute (Daniel and 
Mittal 2009; McMichael 2012, p. 696). These donor organisations facilitate land deals in two 
main ways. First, they support the creation of favourable investment conditions in host 
countries (as described in Section 1.1.5). Second, some of them provide direct funding for land 
investments “[d]efined as multilateral institutions providing long-term finance for private 
sector enterprises in developing and reforming economies” (Daniel 2012, p. 721). According to 
McMichael (2012, p. 686), the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) facilitate land deals dedicated to food production, with the aim of 
mitigating the world food price crisis. These investments are strongly criticised. Daniel (2012, 
p. 725) disapproves the non-transparent and uncompromisingly profit-oriented activities of 
private equity fund managers and states: “It is into such hands that the World Bank Group 
places funds while claiming to further its mission of global poverty reduction.” 
National governments of host countries are involved in land deals in two major ways: First, 
many of them attract and encourage land investments through specific investment incentives 
and more generally by seeking to provide a convenient business climate. Their potential 
motivations for doing so are displayed in Section 1.1.4. Second, national governments govern 
the process of land deals through legal regulations regarding land and (foreign) investment. 
These issues are taken up in Section 1.1.5. 
The literature on the role and intentions of individual actors in the land deal processes is rather 
limited. It suggests that government officials and local elites including local chiefs influence 
land deals for a variety of reasons, reportedly often in favour of the investors. Potential motives 
are personal benefits including rent-seeking, but also predominant discourses regarding 
national development, as will be described in more detail below. 
Lastly, we should not ignore agency on village level. Local people may support or oppose 
foreign investments. While their scope for intervention may be limited (German et al. 2013, p. 
15; Nolte and Väth 2015; Vermeulen and Cotula 2010), they may have considerable influence 
on the outcomes of land rush processes in some contexts (e.g. Smalley and Corbera 2012 for 
two cases in Kenya; Evers et al. 2013a, p. 6). However, with some exceptions in more recent 
literature, there has been little focus on local people’s role and perceptions (Evers et al. 2013a, 
p. 4). This thesis makes a contribution in this regard. 
1.1.3	   Explanatory	  approaches	  from	  Marxist	  perspectives	  
Much research into the global land rush has been undertaken from theoretical perspectives 
inspired by Marx, involving fundamental criticism of the capitalist economy. Studies using 
these perspectives provide prominent conceptualisations of the land rush in different ways, as 
elaborated by Derek Hall (2013). Yet, the approaches used also have their limitations in 
grasping the phenomenon. 
Some proponents of Marxist perspectives portray land deals as an extension of capitalist 
relations through the commodification of land and labour. For their analysis, they use Marx’s 
‘primitive accumulation’ (Marx 1976), Harvey’s ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 
2003) and variations of these concepts (summed up in D. Hall 2013) to focus on processes of 
the enclosure of the commons and the privatisation of public assets for capitalist purposes 
respectively (e.g. Baird 2011; Borras and Franco 2012; Kröger 2014; White et al. 2012; 
Wolford et al. 2013). Studies using these approaches provide theoretically informed 
representations of the recent land acquisitions, linking them to earlier processes of the creation 
and reproduction of capitalist social relations as analysed by Marx. However, the approaches 
inspire problematic assumptions about the recent land rush, namely that the targeted natural 
resources and the affected people “were previously and straightforwardly ’outside’ capitalism” 
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(D. Hall 2013, p. 1596) and that land deals necessarily involve dispossession (ibid., p. 1588) – 
assumptions that might hold true for many, but definitively not for all recent land acquisitions.  
Another concept used by Marxist scholars is ‘accumulation by extra-economic means’ (e.g. 
Akram-Lodhi 2012). This approach is helpful for the analysis of political force and other forms 
of coercion used in land acquisitions. Yet, it is important to notice that common definitions of 
the global land rush are not limited to land deals involving some form of force, but include 
market transactions between willing sellers and buyers of land (D. Hall 2013, p. 1591f).  
Finally, some publications drawing on Marxist traditions focus on the drivers of the land rush. 
The ‘triple F-crisis’ is considered part of a general crisis of neoliberal capitalism (Borras, 
Franco, et al. 2012; McMichael 2012; White et al. 2012). According to this view, in the 
twenty-first century accumulation strategies inherent to the capitalist economy have been 
confronted with an “accumulation crisis” (McMichael 2012), i.e. with shrinking opportunities 
for profitable investments9. Thus, in order to overcome this obstacle, investors are said to 
resort to ‘idle’ land in the Global South in a temporary attempt to solve the crisis through 
geographical expansion (Baglioni and Gibbon 2013, p. 1561). In sum, land deals are seen as 
“spatial fixes for over-accumulated capital” (Corson and MacDonald 2012, p. 268) and 
“symptomatic of a crisis of accumulation in the neoliberal globalization project” (McMichael 
2012, p. 681). Framing the recent land rush as a result of crises inherent in the capitalist 
economy allows critics of the land rush to subsume a range of land-related dynamics into one 
term. However, some scholars stress that it is not sufficient to look only at the investor side for 
an understanding of the phenomenon, because “as the demand for land has increased, so has 
the supply” (Baglioni and Gibbon 2013, p. 1562). In the next sections I thus shed light on the 
agrarian development in the targeted countries and on influential discourses, policies and 
institutions. 
1.1.4	   Agrarian	  development	  in	  the	  Global	  South	  
In recent years, governments in the Global South have increasingly encouraged land deals as a 
form of investment in their countries’ agrarian sector. This comes after governments and 
donors alike have seriously neglected agricultural and rural development, particularly in 
Africa (Cotula 2013, p. 174; Rauch 2014, pp. 229f; Zoomers and Kaag 2014, p. 205). As 
Rauch (2014, p. 233) formulates it, “[r]ural development has been entrusted to inadequately 
capacitated local governments on the one hand, and to the commercial interests of private 
business on the other”. Consequently, agrarian areas lack functioning rural markets and 
adequate infrastructure and suffer from reduced agricultural research and advisory services. At 
the same time, environmental conditions pose increasing constraints to agricultural activities in 
the form of soil degradation, water limitations and climate change (IAASTD 2009a; Rauch 
2014, p. 232f). As a result, many marginal farm households had to put up with decreased 
incomes and have been forced to diversify their livelihood strategies. In often vulnerable 
situations, they depend on external sources of income and subsistence agriculture at the same 
time (Bryceson 2002; P. E. Peters 2013a, p. 551f; Rauch 2014, p. 229f). In more recent years, 
many researchers, governments and development agencies agree that some form of investment 
in the agrarian sector is urgent to achieve and maintain food security and combat poverty 
(HLPE 2013; IAASTD 2009a; Liu 2014; Woodhouse 2012, p. 791). Yet, there is less 
agreement on the desired kind of agrarian development. Two conflicting perspectives dominate 
on this issue. 
The first perspective favours large-scale over small-scale farming. Proponents of this discourse 
promote a large-scale industrialised agriculture with input- and capital-intensive production 
and call for a new green revolution. They claim that this farming model is more efficient than 
                                                      
9	  McMichael	  (2012,	  pp.	  68f)	  describes	  the	  roots	  for	  the	  accumulation	  crises	  as:	  “rising	  ecological	  contradictions	  
(anthropocentric	  climate	  change,	  fossil	  fuel	  depletion),	  which,	  combined	  with	  rising	  food	  prices,	  increase	  the	  
reproductive	  costs	  of	  capital”.	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small-scale agriculture due to economies of scale, which are based on a division of labour, the 
economical use of equipment, and technical superiority (Baglioni and Gibbon 2013, pp. 1570f; 
Cotula 2013, p. 173; German et al. 2013, p. 14; McMichael 2012, p. 694). Representatives of 
this perspective are among others global food empires (see Van der Ploeg 2010a) and some 
international organisations and research institutes (e.g. the International Food Policy Research 
Institute, see Borras and Franco 2010, p. 509). The World Bank argues that there is ample 
unproductive arable land and a high ‘yield gap’ in many regions of the world (Deininger and 
Byerlee 2011). These areas are considered favourable investment targets for large mechanised 
farms (McMichael 2012, p. 683; White et al. 2012, p. 632). The modernisation discourse in 
agriculture usually goes hand in hand with demands for neo-liberal trade models (White et al. 
2012, p. 626; see below). 
The presented view is criticised by proponents of the second perspective, who stress the 
importance of low-external-input small-scale farms for food security and poverty reduction 
in rural areas. Small farms are considered to be more productive than large farms, because of 
their use of family labour and adequate farming practices adapted to local environmental 
conditions. Proponents of this view argue that small producers contribute a considerable share 
of world food production (Baglioni and Gibbon 2013, pp. 1572–1574; GRAIN 2014; HLPE 
2013; Van der Ploeg 2010b). However, Rauch (2014, p. 233) points out that the capacity of 
small-scale farmers to produce efficiently and to react to market dynamics has been reduced 
due to the neglect of this sector in recent decades. Advocates of small-scale agriculture further 
stress the multifunctionality of agriculture, arguing that it produces not only commodities, but 
can and should also fulfil ecological and cultural functions and provide livelihoods to rural 
poor (HLPE 2013, p. 45; IAASTD 2009b, p. 4). Thus, smallholdings are considered to stand 
for a more ecologically sustainable and socially equitable form of agriculture than large farms10 
(Bernstein 2014, p. 2). The small-scale farming model is promoted by some researchers, 
peasant organisations such as La Via Campesina and overall by proponents of the food 
sovereignty concept11 (e.g. GRAIN 2015; HLPE 2013; Van der Ploeg 2010b). 
Baglioni and Gibbon (2013, p. 1575f) argue that the dichotomy between the two positions has 
softened in recent times, giving way to a more nuanced debate that allows for context-specific 
arguments. Accordingly, the co-existence and combination of both farming models is 
increasingly being recognised and promoted as a third possible pathway for agrarian 
development (e.g. Bernstein 2014; Collier and Dercon 2014; IAASTD 2009a; for a description 
of several possible pathways of agrarian development see HLPE 2013, pp. 55-57). 
Proponents of all described trajectories for agrarian development consider investment in rural 
infrastructure a necessity. In Woodhouse’s view this imperative is “an inescapable part of the 
context for land deals with foreign investors” (Woodhouse 2012, p. 781), as most African 
governments seem to assert that they do not have the necessary means to provide the requisite 
infrastructure. Further, the governments of many African countries seem to be sceptical about 
the potential of small-scale farmers and hence favour the large-scale farming model, 
sometimes combined with the integration of smallholders (Cotula 2013, p. 173; German et al. 
2013, p. 14; Schoneveld 2013, p. 195f). From this perspective, large-scale land deals and 
related investments are inherently welcome. They are expected to create a win-win scenario for 
investors and host countries, leading to agrarian development through a transfer of skills and 
technology, infrastructural improvements, and income options for rural populations (Azadi et 
                                                      
10	  White	  et	  al.	  (2012,	  p.	  626)	  highlight	  that	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  not	  the	  scale	  of	  a	  farm	  that	  is	  relevant	  for	  socially	  and	  
ecologically	  responsible	  farming,	  but	  its	  orientation	  in	  terms	  of	  low-­‐input,	  labour	  intensive	  and	  sustainable	  farming	  
techniques.	  They	  argue,	  however,	  that	  business	  companies	  seldom	  promote	  these	  techniques.	  
11	  The	  concept	  of	  food	  sovereignty	  is	  promoted	  by	  the	  global	  peasants’	  movement	  La	  Vía	  Campesina,	  among	  
others,	  and	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  “the	  right	  of	  peoples	  and	  sovereign	  states	  to	  democratically	  determine	  their	  own	  
agricultural	  and	  food	  policies“	  (IAASTD	  2009b,	  p.	  5).	  It	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  “a	  critical	  alternative	  to	  the	  dominant	  
neoliberal	  model	  for	  agriculture	  and	  trade”	  (Wittman	  et	  al.	  2010,	  p.	  2,	  in	  Bernstein	  2014,	  p.	  2).	  For	  critical	  
reflections	  on	  the	  concept	  see	  Edelman	  et	  al.	  (2014).	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al. 2013; Borras and Franco 2012, p. 35; Daniel 2012, p. 716). Accordingly, national 
politicians shape the land deal processes with their visions of national development. For 
example, Fairbairn (2013, p. 350) found that government officials in Mozambique were 
dismissive of peasant agriculture and therefore did not support local consultations, as they 
considered them obstacles to investment. P. E. Peters (2013b, p. 18) also claims that the land 
prices in Africa are low due to African politicians’ not considering customary land rights to be 
full property rights; they would prefer to set aside such land for their ideas of national 
development. 
The presented dominant view about (agrarian) development has also shaped policies and 
institutions such as legal regulations in land deal processes as outlined in the next section. 
1.1.5	   Policies,	  institutions	  and	  processes	  in	  target	  countries	  of	  the	  land	  rush	  
In order to understand the nature and outcomes of the land rush, I argue that it is necessary to 
look at how land deals take place. The processes of acquiring land in Africa are manifold, but 
they have not yet been fully or adequately researched (Nolte and Väth 2015, p. 71). This PhD 
thesis adds to the existing knowledge about the factors that influence land deal processes. 
These include investment policies and institutions such as land-related legal provisions, and the 
way in which regulations are implemented. 
Numerous authors espouse the view that neo-liberal development discourses of the past few 
decades – translated into policies – have established conditions that have enabled and 
stimulated the recent land deals (Evers et al. 2013a, pp. 1ff; Fairhead et al. 2012; White et al. 
2012, pp. 630f). Promoted and supported by the World Bank Group (WBG), the business 
environment in the target countries is said to have improved latterly and to have encouraged 
increasing foreign investment. For example, governments introduced regulatory and legal 
frameworks that provide the requisite investor protection and accounting standards. In many 
countries, the improvement of the business climate also first required the creation of modern 
land markets and a switch from a traditional system of land tenure to Western concepts of 
property. This was supported by donor-funded land titling programmes (Daniel 2012, p. 721f; 
Evers et al. 2013a, p. 5; P. E. Peters 2013a, p. 541; Zoomers and Kaag 2014, pp. 205f). 
Further, particular investment policies seem to play an important role in the land rush. In many 
African countries, including Tanzania, specific agencies are responsible for investment 
promotion, and policies are designed to attract foreign investors by offering financial 
incentives such as duty exemptions or tax holidays (Daniel and Mittal 2010; Evers et al. 2013a, 
p. 5; German et al. 2013, p. 14; Vermeulen and Cotula 2010, p. 910). 
Land property concepts, and thus regulations regarding land deals, vary from country to 
country. In most African countries – unlike in Western Europe with its concepts of private land 
ownership – central governments have legal control over all or most land, and citizens can only 
hold land-use rights (Polack et al. 2013, p. 19). The exceptions are Ghana and Sierra Leone, 
where land is legally held by local chiefs. In practice, landholders in rural areas in most 
African countries base their individual and common rights on custom law. According to World 
Bank estimates, only between two and ten percent of the land in Africa is held under formal de 
jure land tenure, and this is mainly in urban areas (Deininger 2003, in Vermeulen and Cotula 
2010, p. 905). The legal status of customary land rights differs in each country and ranges 
from being unrecognised and mostly ignored (e.g. Ethiopia, Cameroon, Senegal, Mauretania) 
to being almost fully recognised and protected (e.g. Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda) 
(Alden Wily 2011; German et al. 2013, p. 5; Polack et al. 2013, pp. 12–14; Schoneveld 2013; 
Vermeulen and Cotula 2010, p. 905). The laws of Mozambique and Tanzania even recognise 
customary land rights without formal documentation. However, for Mozambique, Fairbairn 
(2012, p. 347) found that the status of unregistered land rights is weaker than that of land rights 
with titles. Further, where the registration of customary rights is legally possible (e.g. 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda), its implementation progress tends to be very slow (Cotula 
and Mathieu 2008, p. 23; Polack et al. 2013, p. 20). 
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Regulations regarding land transfers allow the central governments of almost all African 
states to issue long-term lease titles for up to 99 years to investors (Polack et al. 2013, p. 20; 
German et al. 2013, p. 5). Whether local landholders need to be consulted or need to give their 
approval to a land deal depends on the recognition of individual and common customary land 
rights. In Ethiopia and Cameroon, for example, the law does not foresee any consultation with 
the affected people. The laws of several countries require at least some sort of consent from the 
affected communities as a step in the land transfer process. The laws in Tanzania, Ghana and 
Mozambique prescribe that all land transfers must be approved by the respective landholders 
or by customary leaders. Further, the laws feature stipulations protecting access rights and 
granting compensation (German et al. 2013, p. 9; Polack et al. 2013, pp. 12–14; Vermeulen 
and Cotula 2010, p. 907). Yet, even in these countries, involuntary expropriation of land is 
legally possible in the name of ‘public interest’. However, according to German and her 
colleagues (2013, p. 7) this “was not observed in practice in the context of large-scale 
agricultural investments”. In numerous countries, including Tanzania and Zambia, the land 
acquisition process entails a reclassification of the given land plot, turning it into land under 
central government control, and thus permanently erasing customary rights. This is in contrast 
to Ghana, where the land remains under customary control, i.e. under local chiefs, during the 
leasehold period (German et al. 2013, p. 7; Zoomers and Kaag 2014, p. 203). 
The relevance of the legal basis is challenged by recent research that compared land deal 
processes and outcomes in different African countries. Flaws in implementation and 
monitoring seem to be common in countries with differing laws and raise questions regarding 
informal institutions and governance. Schoneveld (2013) analysed the situation in four sub-
Saharan countries with different legal frameworks in terms of respecting customary land rights. 
He found that the processes of land deals did not considerably vary among the four countries 
regarding consultation with local communities and compensation payments, despite the 
diverging legal situations. He observed that host states’ legal safeguards are often ignored or 
interpreted differently and thus are not effective. German et al. (2013) explored the situation in 
four countries – three of which are considered ‘best practice’ cases in terms of legal provisions 
(Alden Wily 2011) – and concluded that it was not the law, but the actors in the land transfer 
process that are of relevance for the protection of customary rights (German et al. 2013, p. 14). 
For example, Burnod and her colleagues (2013) have shown that state representatives in 
Madagascar, in a competition over authority, ignored the progressive land laws that recognise 
and protect local land rights. By simply claiming that untitled land was by default state land, 
they denied the legal rights of local land users. Further, there are suspected cases of rent-
seeking by land officers and local elites in several places, including reports of customary 
leaders such as local chiefs personally pocketing compensation (Cotula 2013, p. 131; Fairbairn 
2013, pp. 344ff; German et al. 2013, p. 11; Nolte and Väth 2015). Finally, former and actual 
officials, and local elites sometimes collaborate with companies as consultants or on a more 
informal basis. They contribute their local knowledge about land governance and their 
networks to the investors’ land. This co-optation frequently leads to conflicts of interest when 
officials or local representatives, who are supposed to safeguard the local population’s 
customary rights, are simultaneously offered incentives to support the investors’ claims. 
However, despite the disappointing findings regarding the implementation of regulations, 
Vermeulen and Cotula (2010, pp. 912f) argue that strong land laws are essential, though not 
sufficient, to protect local people’s land rights. 
1.1.6	   Known	  and	  expected	  outcomes	  
Land deals are expected to have diverse implications, in relation to local people’s access to 
land and land-based resources, regarding labour and other income opportunities, in terms of 
new infrastructure, the modernisation of agricultural technologies and knowledge transfer, and 
also regarding social dynamics and conflicts. Environmental concerns have also been raised 
about monoculture plantations, but this PhD study does not look into these. Findings so far 
appear to show that the impacts are similar among different countries and settings, as argued 
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by Schoneveld (2013) who has analysed 38 projects in four African countries, and by Kaag 
and Zoomers (2014, pp. 202f) who edited a compilation of case studies from twelve countries 
in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Several studies – including research conducted by the FAO 
(Liu 2014) in five countries – suggest that the negative effects of land deals often outweigh the 
positive effects in target countries (see also Schoneveld 2013, p. 283; White et al. 2012, p. 
633). Yet we need to differentiate between local impacts: there are often both winners and 
losers (Cotula 2013, p. 133f; Oya 2013b, p. 1535). Furthermore, according to Evers and her 
colleagues (2013a, p. 16) not all land deals lead to negative implications for local people. 
Some of the reported and expected outcomes are further elaborated in this section. However, 
all findings need to be treated with due care, because there is still only limited and sometimes 
biased evidence on the impact of land deals on the host countries (Liu 2014; Nolte and Väth 
2015, p. 70; Oya 2013b, p. 1545). According to Cotula (2013, p. 127) and Oya’s review of 
socio-economic impacts of the land rush (2013b, p. 1536), this is partly due to limited quality 
research on the subject. This thesis contributes sound empirical evidence to the existing 
knowledge – while being aware of the following issue brought up by Cotula. He emphasises 
that  
“…the time distribution of costs and benefits in large-scale investments is often uneven, so 
looking at short-term outcomes alone may result in a skewed picture: negative impacts – 
loss of land, for instance – are often felt first, while jobs, opportunities for local businesses 
and government revenues may only fully materialize at a later stage. For many recent 
agricultural investments in Africa, it is just too early to tell” (Cotula 2013, p. 127). 
The most commonly reported result of land deals is local people’s loss of access to land and 
land-based resources such as farmland, forest or pastureland (Cotula 2013; Kaag and 
Zoomers 2014 p. 203; Schoneveld 2013 p. 186) When investors acquire land, this is usually for 
long periods of time (up to 99 years) and the process is often irreversible, in the sense that the 
land may be returned to the state but not to the former local landholders (Kaag and Zoomers 
2014, p. 203). For reasons I highlighted in the previous section, customary tenure rights are 
often not properly respected or even completely ignored (Alden Wily 2011; Anseeuw, Alden 
Wily, et al. 2012). As a consequence, former landholders lose the basis for their subsistence or 
other land-based livelihood strategies, sometimes along with ancestral and spiritual values 
(McMichael 2012, p. 693). There are concerns about reduced local food security as a result of 
former landholders’ limited or lack of access to land and the export-oriented enterprises of the 
investors. These concerns are even graver for target countries already suffering from food 
insecurity (Liu 2014, p. 11; Mann and Smaller 2010, p. 6). 
In many cases, people are not only dispossessed of their land, but are also displaced (Kaag and 
Zoomers 2014, p. 203; Schoneveld 2013, p. 289). They are expected to find land elsewhere, 
but due to the increasing land scarcity it is feared that people often only find land that is less 
fertile or less accessible. Sometimes they might have no other choice than to move to urban 
areas (Cotula 2013, p. 131; Kaag and Zoomers 2014, p. 203). In the worst cases, land 
dispossession and evictions involve physical violence. For example villagers in Mali claim to 
have been beaten by the police (Oakland Institute 2011, in Cotula 2013, p. 130). 
It seems that local landholders or land users are often not compensated for their loss (Cotula 
2013, pp. 131f; Kaag and Zoomers 2014, p. 203). Particularly where the legal setting foresees 
compensation only for crops or other ‘visible improvements’, not for the land itself, people 
may lose grazing land, forests or farmland without standing crops (e.g. during dry season) 
(Cotula 2013, p. 131). Also, where land is owned by the state, the national authorities allegedly 
often seize lease payments (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010, p. 910).  
When land investments require labour, part of the population is brought in either as plantation 
workers or as contracted farmers (Borras, Kay, et al. 2012, p. 412). According to a World Bank 
report, “for bulk commodities, it is at the production, rather than the processing stage that 
employment is generated” (Deininger and Byerlee 2011, p. 38). The amount of labour needed 
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per hectare varies considerably depending on the crop and the production technologies. It 
ranges from ten jobs per 1,000 hectares for grain to 700 jobs per 1,000 hectares for sugarcane, 
when it is irrigated and manually harvested (Deininger and Byerlee 2011, p. 38). This might be 
part of the reason why, as stated by Daniel (2012, pp. 718f), the extent of employment creation 
and its impact is so controversial. Liu (2014, p. 12) found in case studies in five countries that 
the number of jobs created was always smaller than initially announced by the investors, and in 
many cases decreased over time (see also Deininger and Byerlee 2011, p. xiv; Zoomers and 
Kaag 2014, p. 216). Critical analysts doubt the employment effects of large-scale investment 
for structural reasons, as “the primary objective of public and private companies is to increase 
shareholder value, not to increase employment” (Mathis 2008, p. 10 in Daniel 2012, p. 719; 
see also Li 2011).  
The data are also ambiguous regarding the type of employment created. Some argue that 
large-scale investments need better-educated workers with improved skills, who often cannot 
be found among the local population (Daniel 2012, p. 719; Kaag and Zoomers 2014, p. 203; 
Liu 2014, p. 12). But there is also evidence for the opposite to happen, where large plantations 
require low-skilled labour (see Daniel 2012, p. 718). In these cases, labour opportunities may 
benefit poor and marginalised groups and “can make a real difference to their lives” (Cotula 
2013, p. 135), for example for women formerly depending on the land of their husbands in 
Ghana and for landless men in Senegal, who appreciated earning a salary (Cotula 2013, p. 137; 
Maertens and Swinnen 2009). Yet, overall, Li (2011, p. 294) and Zoomers and Kaag (2014, p. 
203, 216) consider the benefits of labour opportunities to be fairly small and disappointing. 
Gibbon (2011, p. 45) analysed literature regarding large-scale plantations in Africa in the 
twentieth century and found that they offer „low quality jobs“ in terms of salary, health, safety 
and other conditions.  
Some authors highlight social issues and tensions that are caused or exposed by land deals. 
Several case studies in Madagascar found that the emergence of investors triggered 
competition over the control of land rights among local elites and exacerbated land-related 
tensions (Burnod et al. 2013, p. 375). Some authors raise the question as to whether former 
land users are at all interested in receiving new labour opportunities. Such a transformation in 
livelihood strategies entails not only changes in an economic sense, but also in terms of 
identity, for example in the case of pastoralists or owners of successful small-scale farms who 
may not want to give up their lifestyles (Cotula 2013, p. 135; Keeley et al. 2014, p. 3). Cotula 
(2013, p. 127) warns that one should not see the two outcomes – loss of land, but gain in 
income opportunities – as the trade-off between land and labour that it might appear to be at 
first sight. The problem is “...that the people suffering adverse impacts and those reaping the 
benefits do not necessarily coincide” (ibid.). Examples of this might be cases where the elderly 
people who usually control the land lose some of it, but young people get the jobs; or where 
one village loses land, but people from another village get the jobs (Cotula 2013, p. 135; see 
also Kaag and Zoomers 2014, p. 203; Liu 2014, p. 13). Keeley et al. (2014, pp. 2f) report that 
new jobs in Ethiopia have often been taken by workers migrating there from another region, in 
some cases fostering conflicts with the resident ethnic groups. 
The infrastructure support promised by investors includes health or education facilities, 
roads and local markets. It is often argued that investors do not deliver on their promises (e.g. 
Azadi et al. 2013, pp. 21f; Schoneveld 2013, p. 289). There are no reliable data for the 
proportion of projects that genuinely provide such benefits. Of the 117 projects in the Land 
Matrix where information regarding benefits is available at all, around 77% of the projects 
showed some kind of infrastructure improvement. Other benefits, but in smaller numbers, 
were financial support and capacity building (Anseeuw, Boche, et al. 2012, p. 44). In terms of 
technology transfer, Zoomers and Kaag (2014, p. 216) indicate disappointing results, while Liu 
(2014, p. 13) published mixed findings but suspects that it is too early to analyse these effects. 
Besides the more or less spatially limited outcomes of single land deals discussed above, there 
are also worries about global changes due to the land rush. One major concern is an overall 
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restructuring of the agrarian sector in favour of large-scale plantations along with a “wide-
ranging global ‘land reform’ – in this case a regressive land reform where governments take 
land from the poor and give (or sell or lease) it to the rich” (White et al. 2012, p. 620). 
McMichael (2012, p. 693) fears that “[o]nce the concept of a ‘global commons’ becomes the 
modus operandi […] [e]viction of ‘unproductive’ populations becomes the basis of ‘rational 
planning’ – driven by claims for increased productivity, debt-reduction, export enhancement 
and rural development“. This would have implications for labour too. Labour requirements for 
small-scale farming are indicated as around 1’000 per 1,000 hectares in a study in Indonesia 
(Milieudefensie et al. 2007, in Li 2011, p. 284), compared to 10-700 for large plantations as 
indicated in the World Bank’s global report (Deininger and Byerlee 2011, p. 39). As a 
consequence, for certain crops and production systems such an agrarian transition would result 
in “large ‘surplus populations’ of the dispossessed”12 (White et al. 2012, p. 624; see also Li 
2011) and thus to ‘de-agrarianisation’ (Bryceson 1999; Bryceson et al. 2000). Landless 
people lacking other options to access land would migrate to urban areas, but their labour 
could not be absorbed by the urban economy (Cotula 2013, p. 131; Li 2011; Zoomers and 
Kaag 2014, p. 203). This would lead to large increases in the number of impoverished former 
rural inhabitants, with far-reaching consequences for the whole society.  
There are additional concerns about global food security. These are based on the argument, 
presented above, that smallholders are more efficient and more sustainable producers of food 
than large-scale plantations. Hence, the overall replacement of small-scale with large-scale 
farms would lead to a decrease in food availability. Yet, on the other hand, the view that small-
scale producers could feed the world is contested and needs more differentiated analysis, 
focusing on food availability as well as questions of access to food for non-farmers (Bernstein 
2014, pp. 1051-1053; Woodhouse 2012, p. 791). 
A differing type of agrarian transition is portrayed by R. Hall (2011b, p. 206f) for Southern 
Africa. Hall believes that mega land deals will decrease in number and make way for 
investments that incorporate smallholders in value chains to their detriment, for example as 
contract farmers with unfavourable conditions. As a consequence, she is not primarily worried 
about de-agrarianisation, but instead fears rural proletarianisation. 
1.1.7	   Forestry	  as	  a	  specific	  sector	  in	  the	  global	  land	  rush	  
Large-scale forestry plantations seem to account for a substantial share of the global land 
rush, although the figures are somewhat contested. According to the analysis of the purposes of 
980 concluded land deals registered in the Land Matrix in September 2014 (see Figure 2; Nolte 
2015, p. 7), land deals for forestry rank in fifth position in terms of the number of projects 
(making up around 10% of all projects), but second in terms of acquired area, reaching around 
22% of the totally acquired area of 37.3 million hectares. Accordingly, it can be concluded that 
forestry investments are on average comparatively large land deals. However, Schoneveld  
(2013, p. 30) found in his analysis of around 500 investments in sub-Saharan Africa between 
2008 and 2012 that only about 10% of the acquired area was dedicated to wood products.13 
There is evidence that the area of forest plantations has grown considerably over the last two 
decades. Between 1990 and 2010, ‘planted forests’ increased by 48.1% (by 32.1% in Africa) to 
around 264 million hectares worldwide (around 15 million hectares in Africa).14 This immense 
                                                      
12	  The	  term	  ‘surplus	  populations’	  refers	  to	  populations	  being	  ‚surplus’	  „to	  capital’s	  requirements	  for	  labour“,	  not	  to	  
a	  general	  overpopulation	  (White	  et	  al.	  2012,	  p.	  625).	  
13	  The	  divergence	  between	  the	  figures	  might	  be	  partly	  explained	  by	  the	  geographical	  range	  of	  the	  data	  sets	  (global	  
vs.	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa),	  by	  the	  temporal	  difference	  and	  by	  different	  definitions	  of	  what	  is	  considered	  forestry	  
investment.	  
14	  Kröger	  highlights	  that	  there	  are	  many	  methodological	  problems	  in	  compiling	  and	  comparing	  tree	  plantations	  or	  
‘planted	  forests’	  due	  to	  different	  conceptualisations,	  which	  are	  also	  politically	  influenced.	  His	  compilation	  is	  based	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expansion stems not only from foreign, industrial large-scale plantations, but also from large-
scale plantations established by domestic investors or by the government, and small-scale tree 
plantations run by smallholders or local communities (Kröger 2014, p. 244; see also Gerber 
2011; Deininger and Byerlee 2011, p. 12). It is predicted that demand for land for industrial 
forestry is likely to increase further in the next two decades (Kröger 2012a; Lambin and 
Meyfroidt 2011). Yet, only a limited number of scientific studies on foreign investment in 
forestry plantations have been conducted so far (Cotula 2012, p. 651; Kröger 2014, p. 236; 
examples are Bozmoski and Hultman 2010; Gerber and Veuthey 2010; Kröger 2012b). This 
study partly fills this gap.	  
Figure	  2:	  Main	  purposes	  of	  concluded	  transnational	  land	  deals	  worldwide,	  by	  area	  and	  by	  number	  of	  
deals;	  Source:	  own	  representation	  based	  on	  Nolte’s	  (2015,	  p.	  7)	  compilation	  of	  data	  on	  980	  land	  deals	  
from	  the	  Land	  Matrix,	  as	  of	  1	  Sep	  2014.	  
Forestry plantations are established for several often combined purposes: for producing 
traditional industrial products such as timber or pulp (often in an integrated mill); for energy 
generation such as woodchip- and pulp-based diesel; and for conservation and climate change 
mitigation initiatives.15 In the latter case, trees are planted as providers of carbon sequestration 
certificates that can be sold on the global market for greenhouse gas emission reductions. Such 
plantations are often established under development cooperation agendas (Overbeek et al. 
2012), e.g. as part of the REDD+ initiative (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation ‘plus’ conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks)16 (Kröger 2014, pp. 236, 243). As promoters of climate change mitigation, tree 
plantations are part of the emerging green economy (Kröger 2014, p. 236). They are also 
                                                                                                                                                             
on	  data	  by	  the	  FAO,	  which	  applies	  a	  quite	  broad	  definition	  of	  ‘planted	  forests’	  and	  uses	  statistical	  data	  provided	  by	  
national	  governments	  (Kröger	  2014,	  p.	  240f).	  
15	  The	  term	  ‘forestry	  plantation’	  has	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  ‘tree	  plantation’.	  The	  latter	  also	  includes	  rubber	  and	  
palm	  oil	  plantations	  (Gerber	  2011).	  	  
16	  The	  conceptualisation	  of	  tree	  plantations	  as	  carbon	  sinks	  as	  promoted	  by	  companies	  is	  contested.	  Critics	  argue	  
that	  the	  carbon	  is	  not	  fixed	  for	  a	  long	  enough	  time	  in	  the	  trees,	  as	  the	  plantations	  are	  often	  producers	  of	  paper	  
and	  cardboard,	  which	  is	  soon	  consumed	  and	  burned	  (Kröger	  2014,	  p.	  243).	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labelled as ‘green grabs’, which are estimated to be increasing worldwide (Fairhead et al. 2012, 
p. 238; see also Corson et al. 2013). When plantations are established for combined purposes, 
the trees can be considered as flex crops (see Section 1.1.1). According to Kröger (2014, p. 
236) ‘flex trees’ will probably contribute to a future increase in tree planting. 
Compared to other crops, forestry 
plantations are long-term endeavours 
because it takes at least 10-15 years 
until the trees can be harvested. At 
the same time, they are highly 
vulnerable investments, prone to 
accidental or deliberate fires and 
logging. The large plantations are 
difficult to protect (Kröger 2014, p. 
245). Fairbairn (2013, p. 338) for 
example reports uncontrolled fires in 
forest plantations as a local means of 
resistance in Mozambique. There-
fore, I argue, forestry companies 
depend to a greater extent on the 
acceptance of the local population 
than other companies. Applying 
Corporate Social Responsibility is a 
worthwhile strategy for these 
companies, as they intend to gain the 
local population’s goodwill in order 
to reduce their risks (see Figure 3). 
This might be even more relevant for 
investors like the examined ones (see 
Section 5) that need to observe 
international social and environ-
mental standards, either to engage in 
the trade of carbon credits or to 
obtain specific certificates. I therefore assume that forestry plantations have potentially more 
favourable outcomes for local people than investments in other sectors.	  
1.1.8	   Summing	  up:	  Knowledge	  and	  knowledge	  gaps	  on	  the	  global	  land	  rush	  
Global overviews on the land deal situation remain rather vague estimates due to the 
intransparent nature of single land deals. Further, there is no standard definition of the global 
land rush. However, a fast growing body of literature from varying perspectives has been 
coming up with findings on the different dynamics, processes and actors that make up the 
phenomenon. Yet, the quality of literature must be carefully assessed (Oya 2013b, p. 1536). 
On the investment side of the global land rush, a broad range of mainly private actors is 
engaged, partly supported by governments and international organisations. Proponents of 
Marxist perspectives have provided compelling explanations for investors’ increased demand 
for land, ascribing the commonly named drivers of the land rush (e.g. food, fuel, finance) to a 
fundamental crisis of the capitalist economy. Further, the outline of discourses on different 
agrarian pathways and the powerful neo-liberal development model provides a better 
understanding of the potential motives of host country governments that welcome land 
investments and of supportive international donors that promote favourable business 
conditions. Yet, framing the land rush in such global economic processes and discourses tends 
to underestimate the influence of institutions and the agency of specific actors, particularly in 
the states that host land deals (see also Smalley and Corbera 2012, pp. 1041f). 
Figure	  3:	  Sign-­‐board	  of	  forestry	  company	  in	  Tanzania	  with	  
an	  appeal	  to	  prevent	  fires;	  photo	  by	  M.	  Locher	  (2011). 
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In the target countries, the land deals are to a certain extent shaped by investment policies – 
influenced by the above mentioned development discourses – and by land laws; African laws 
vary considerably regarding the recognition of customary land rights and local people’s 
decision-making. Strong regulations were found to be necessary but by far not sufficient to 
protect local people’s land rights. In order to understand the processes and outcomes of land 
deals, it is equally important to focus on involved stakeholders and their relations among each 
other. Land deals are often pictured as processes of investors allied with domestic elites against 
local people, while local people are portrayed as homogenous groups with the same stakes. 
There has not yet been sufficient research into the crucial role and motives of different actors 
among these groups in negotiating or regulating land deals. More in-depth case studies are 
needed to provide a nuanced analysis of the stakeholders and their interaction (Edelman 2013; 
Evers et al. 2013a, p. 4; R. Hall 2011b; Smalley and Corbera 2012, p. 1042). 
When conceptualizing the global land rush and its outcomes, one should be careful to avoid 
over-simplified representations of the phenomenon as either “providing much-needed capital 
and technology for third world agricultural production, food security and employment” or as 
“neo-colonial scrambles for land and resources conducted by predatory investors at the 
expense of marginal populations abroad” (Wolford et al. 2013, p. 191f; see also R. Hall 2011, 
p. 195; White et al. 2012, p. 638). Some studies from Marxist perspectives run the risk of 
overemphasising the negative effects of the global land rush. As Borras and Franco (2012, p. 
47, emphasis in the original) state: “It is often taken for granted, rather than empirically 
demonstrated, that such mega land deals are ‘bad’ for the ‘local people and communities’ and 
are, or ought to be, opposed by them.” Research so far reports a range of economic and social 
impacts on local people. Yet the outcomes of large-scale investment are not clear overall. 
Studies often offer an overview but do not provide a detailed and differentiated view of intra-
community differences. Also, local people’s perspectives are rarely portrayed. Context-specific 
evaluation is needed in order to bring up a more differentiated picture of the land rush’s 
outcomes and to bring in local views (Edelman et al. 2013, p. 1528; White et al. 2012, p. 633; 
Woodhouse 2012, p. 791). In Oya’s (2013b, p. 1536) words: “there is no shortcut for good 
quality evidence”. 
Finally, little attention has been paid to foreign investment in forestry plantations yet, despite 
its global reach and growing relevance in light of energy and climate concerns (Cotula 2012, p. 
651; Kröger 2014, p. 236). Further research on forestry investments is important not only 
considering the pivotal share they account for in the global land rush, but also because of their 
specific characteristics due to their slow growing and vulnerable produce, making them 
particularly dependent on local goodwill and thus potentially more positive examples of land 
deals compared to others. 
1.2	   Research	  objectives	  and	  research	  questions	  
Rural livelihoods are changing in many areas due to population growth, climate change, 
resulting pressure on natural resources and economic globalisation processes. Non-land-based 
livelihood strategies are gaining in importance. However, many rural livelihoods are still 
mainly based on access to land and land-based resources (Bah et al. 2003; Bryceson 2002; 
IAASTD 2009b; Östberg and Sledgers 2010; Rauch 2014; Rigg 2006). In this regard, 
transnational land deals may have a disruptive influence on rural livelihoods. 
As demonstrated in the previous sub-sections, the literature on the global land rush lacks 
comprehensive evidence on the details of land deal processes, including the role of actors at 
different levels and different groups within communities. Furthermore, the overall outcomes of 
large-scale investment are not clear, and context-specific evaluation is needed. Finally, the 
views of local people are often absent from research. These shortcomings call for more in-
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depth case studies. Evidence on cases of land deals for forestry plantations is lacking in 
particular. 
This study therefore aims to contribute to a more nuanced picture of land acquisition 
procedures and the implications of transnational land deals for local livelihoods. It does this 
while also taking account of social differentiation among rural people and articulating their 
perspectives, in a case study on forestry investments. In a broader sense, I would like this PhD 
thesis to contribute to the understanding of transforming rural livelihoods in a context of a 
globalised economy and increasing pressure on land and land-based resources (see also Rauch 
et al. 2014).   
On this basis, I formulated the following three research questions and sub-questions at the 
outset of this study. A fourth, methodological question was added during the research process 
when I faced challenges to acquire reliable information on the land deal situation in Tanzania.  
1.  How do land acquisition processes take place? 
- What institutions (and at what scales) govern the process when an interested foreign 
investor seeks to acquire land?  
- Which actors and social groups are included or excluded from the decision-making 
process? 
- What power relations shape the decision-making process? 
- Whose land is transferred to investors?  
- Which social groups have to give up their land use rights?  
- Who is compensated for land deals, for what exactly, and how? Who is not 
compensated? 
Research question 1 is addressed in Research Papers I, II and III. 
 
2.  What are the (immediate) implications of land deals and related investments for local 
livelihoods? 
- What are the implications in terms of lost or reduced access to land and land-based 
resources? 
- What are the implications in terms of compensation for land and land-related 
resources? 
- What are the implications in terms of new labour opportunities and potential benefits 
(such as public infrastructure) assured by investors?  
- Which social groups benefit from opportunities such as new income possibilities and 
public infrastructure and which do not? 
Research question 2 is addressed in Research Papers I and II. 
 
3.  How do local people perceive foreign land investments? 
- Who has which expectations and concerns vis-à-vis foreign land investments? 
- How do different social groups see their role in land transition processes? 
- How do local people value the implications of foreign land investments? 
Research question 3 is addressed in Research Paper I and to a limited extent in Research 
Paper II. 
 
4.  How are data regarding the global land rush (re)produced and reported?  
- What are the challenges for data collection and data generation?  
- What are the practices of data reproduction and reporting? 
- What are the consequences of these challenges and practices for the knowledge about 
the global land rush? 
Research question 4 is addressed in Research Paper IV. 
 
The following sections display at which stages of field research the research questions were 
tackled, and present in more detail the conceptual approaches and methods that were employed 
to answer them. For an overview see Table 1. 
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Table	  1:	  Overview	  on	  research	  questions,	  approaches,	  methods	  and	  papers	  
	   	   Case	  study*	  
Research	  questions	  
	   	  
1	  	  Pro-­‐
cesses	  
2	  	  Impli-­‐
cations	  
3	  	  Per-­‐
ceptions	  
4	  	  	  
Data	  
Conceptual	  approaches	  
	   	   	   	   	  Critical	  Livelihoods	  Perspective	   	   (x)	   x	   x	   	  
Property	  and	  Legal	  Pluralism	   	   x	   (x)	   (x)	   	  
Theory	  of	  access	   	   x	   	   	   	  
Bargaining	  model	   	   x	   	   	   	  
Methods	  for	  data	  generation	   	   	   	   	   	  
Semi-­‐structured	  
interviews	  
-­‐	  with	  local	  inhabitants	   	   x	   x	   x	   	  
-­‐	  with	  key	  persons	   x	   x	   x	   x	   	  
	   -­‐	  with	  investors	   	   x	   x	   	   x	  
Expert	  interviews	   -­‐	  explorative	   x	   x	   x	   	   x	  
	   -­‐	  systematizing	  	   	   x	   	   	   	  
	   -­‐	  theory-­‐generating	  	   	   (x)	   	   	   	  
Group	  discussions	   (x)	   (x)	   (x)	   x	   	  
Participatory	  mapping	   	   x	   	   	   	  
Participatory	  observation	   x	   (x)	   (x)	   	   	  
Review	  of	  documents	   -­‐	  legal	  documents	   	   x	   	   	   	  
	   -­‐	  reports	  on	  land	  deals	   x	   	   	   	   x	  
	   -­‐	  investors'	  webpages	   x	   	   	   	   x	  
Research	  Papers	   	   	   	   	   	  
Paper	  I	   	   	   x	   x	   x	   	  
Paper	  II	   	   	   x	   x	   (x)	   	  
Paper	  III	   	   	   x	   	   	   	  
Paper	  IV	   	   	   	   	   	   x	  
*	  Selection	  of	  case	  studies	  and	  background	  information	  to	  case	  study	  sites	  
1.3	   Research	  design	  
1.3.1	   Framework	  of	  the	  research	  project:	  the	  NCCR	  North-­‐South	  
The thesis was embedded in the interdisciplinary research programme ‘Swiss National Centre 
of Competence in Research North-South’ (NCCR North-South) with the subtitle ‘Research 
Partnerships for Sustainable Development’. The twelve-year programme was funded by the 
Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) and the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC), and ended in June 2014. It consisted of different interlinked research 
projects and built up a network of research partners in over 40 countries (NCCR North-South 
2014). 
This PhD study was associated with the Research Project 2 on livelihood futures of 
marginalised groups in resource-scarce areas in Pakistan, Nepal and Tanzania (Shahbaz and 
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Sharma 2009). In Tanzania, the NCCR North-South had established long-term collaboration 
with the University of Dar es Salaam and with the Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) in 
Morogoro. The formal and informal collaboration with several NCCR North-South members 
in Tanzania and elsewhere formed an important basis for the fieldwork of this study. My 
association with SUA was a prerequisite for obtaining a Tanzanian research permit. Just as 
important as the institutional tie was the informal support I received in the form of scientific 
exchange, sharing networks and practical information. 
1.3.2	   Methodological	  approach	  and	  overall	  research	  process	  
I chose a (mainly) qualitative research approach for this thesis, in line with the research 
questions and the employed conceptual approaches. In terms of epistemology, this study can be 
positioned in the realistic paradigm as it was understood by March and Furlong (2002), which, 
to be brief, can be seen as between the positivist and interpretist positions. In line with the 
central claim of openness in all respects of a qualitative research process (Flick et al. 2008, pp. 
22ff; Meier Kruker and Rauh 2005, p. 14) I applied an iterative research design (Flick 2007, 
pp. 122ff). The whole research process was circular, in the sense that the literature review, data 
collection, data analysis and publishing results were conducted alternately. I also kept the 
research setting flexible, in the sense that the definition of the case studies – and thus the focus 
of the research – were defined on the basis of new information acquired and analysed during 
the research process. The research questions were also slightly refined, and an extra one was 
formulated during the process.  
While the livelihoods perspective was chosen in the beginning, the other conceptual 
approaches were selected after first analysis of the data. In this rather new research field, it 
helped to use an inductive procedure so that I could be open to the empirical findings during 
the data’s generation and their first analysis. The overall research approach was qualitative. 
However, the methodical approaches for data generation and analysis differed slightly 
depending on the research question; hence, also the degree of interpretist vs. positivist position 
varied (see also Section 3.4). The fourth research question was tackled through a detailed 
chronological compilation of my own data and data from an extensive literature review. 
Comparing primary data with subsequent publications allowed me to reconstruct practices of 
data reproduction and their consequences.  
1.3.3	   Field	  visits,	  stages	  of	  field	  research	  and	  resulting	  publications	  
The empirical research process involved various trips to Tanzania, and can be divided into 
three different stages in terms of content. 
I conducted five field visits to Tanzania between 2009 and 2013. They resulted in a total of 23 
weeks of field work (see Figure 4). An initial explorative field visit served mainly to collect 
first information, including some unpublished reports about the land deal situation in Tanzania, 
and to start establishing contacts, both within and outside the NCCR North-South network. 
More extensive field visits, dedicated to the three main stages of field research, were conducted 
during 2010 and 2011. Lastly, in early 2013, I travelled to Tanzania to present my research at a 
NCCR North-South workshop, and took the opportunity to conduct a few final interviews with 
key informants and to share my preliminary findings with the Tanzania Investment Centre. 
 
Figure	  4:	  Field	  visits	  with	  stages	  of	  field	  research	  and	  administrative	  tasks 
* Jul	  /	  Aug	  2010	  (9	  weeks) Jan	  /	  Feb	  2011	  (6) Apr	  /	  May	  2011	  (5) **
Stage	  I Stage	  II Stage	  III Admin.	  tasks
Explorative	  field	  visit Presentation	  of	  findings *	  Oct	  2009	  (2	  weeks)	  /	  **	  Feb	  2013	  (1	  week)
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I spent a great deal of time on administrative issues, including repeated registration as a 
research associate at the SUA, obtaining a temporary Tanzanian residence permit, and getting 
research clearances for different districts, along with recommendation letters for specific 
villages. 
I did my empirical research in three main stages (see Table 2). 
Stage I – National setting and land deal situation: I initially pursued two broad aims. I sought 
to gain a deeper understanding of the legal procedures and relevant institutional actors during 
land acquisitions by foreign investors. Parallel to that, I aimed to gain an overview of the 
number and types of foreign land deals in Tanzania and the accompanying debates so that I 
might choose the case studies. The second task proved to be time-consuming, as only limited 
information was available and it was often of poor quality (see Section 3.1). The gap in reliable 
data that I discovered led to the formulation of a fourth research question, the publication of a 
working paper (Locher and Sulle 2013) and thence to Research Paper IV. 
Stage II – Case studies: During the second and main stage of field research, I visited the two 
case study areas three times (case study A) or twice (case study B), respectively. My research 
assistants (see Section 3.4.4) and I focused on the first three research questions. The data of 
this research resulted in the publication of Papers I-III. 
Stage III – Insights in attitudes of district officials in additional districts: Realising that 
officials (and politicians) play an important role in the land deal processes, I became interested 
in their varying practices, particularly the underlying attitudes towards land deals. This specific 
sub-question of the first main research question was investigated in six districts as well as the 
case study districts. I could only incorporate the results in this PhD thesis to a limited extent. 
However, the insights I gained helped me to sharpen my understanding of the district officials’ 
influence on the decision-making process, and were taken up in Research Papers I and II. 
Table	  2:	  Stages	  of	  field	  research:	  aims	  and	  outputs	  
Stage	  of	  field	  research	   Aim	  /	  addressed	  research	  question	   Research	  paper	  
Stage	  I	  	  
National	  setting	  and	  land	  deal	  
situation	  
• Overview	  on	  land	  deal	  situation	  in	  Tanzania	  
• Selection	  of	  case	  studies	  
• Research	  question	  4	  
• Understanding	  legal	  and	  institutional	  setting	  
(contribution	  to	  research	  question	  1)	  
IV	  
(in	  addition:	  
Locher	  and	  Sulle	  
2013)	  
Stage	  II	  
Case	  studies	  in	  Kilolo	  and	  
Pangani	  districts	  
• Research	  question	  1	  
• Research	  question	  2	  
• Research	  question	  3	  
I,	  II,	  III	  
Stage	  III	  
Insights	  into	  attitudes	  of	  officials	  
in	  additional	  six	  districts	  
• Contribution	  to	  research	  question	  1	   Contribution	  to	  
I,	  II,	  III	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2	   Conceptual	  approaches	  and	  perspectives	  
2.1	   Personal	  perspective	  and	  assumptions	  
In this PhD research I tried to approach the field without having any major theoretical 
frameworks in mind in order to be open to different findings and to base my analysis largely on 
empirical data. Although I have some sympathy for criticism of capitalism, I did not want to 
conduct my research based on Marxist approaches and related assumptions (as outlined in 
section 1.1.3). Of course, I am aware that – like all humans and hence all researchers – I am 
not free of certain assumptions about my research topic. I was (and to a more limited extent I 
still am) convinced that land deals could and can bring both negative and positive effects and 
that they might produce winners and losers among the rural population too. I started from the 
point of view that local people in a given area might not necessarily disapprove of investors, 
and that a smaller or larger group of local inhabitants might welcome them. In other words, I 
thought that the overall picture in this critical debate was not black or white, but varied 
depending on the context and perspective and merited careful scrutiny. However, my focus 
was always on rural people, assuming that they are those most affected by land deals; I was 
generally convinced that inhabitants of a certain region should have priority when there are 
decisions to be made about developments in their area.  
My position has influenced my choice of conceptual approach. I employed a selection of 
approaches in a rather eclectic way. By combining the strengths of the different approaches, I 
gave consideration to the various aspects of the research topic. The critical livelihoods 
perspective provides an actor-oriented position and sharpened my perception of local 
perspectives. The property concept and the legal pluralism perspective helped me to grasp land 
tenure and how it is embedded in social organisation. The theory of access and the bargaining 
power model were useful for understanding processes and power relations that are relevant for 
access to, and appropriation of, land. The conceptual approaches, the way they are interlinked 
or can be related to each other and their relevance in this study are described in more detail in 
the following sections. The use of the different approaches for the different research questions 
is displayed in Table 1. 
2.2	   Critical	  livelihoods	  perspective	  
"The appeal is simple: look at the real world, and try and understand things from local 
perspectives." (Scoones 2009, p. 172) 
 
As an overall approach to this study, I adopted a critical livelihoods perspective (Geiser et al. 
2011; Scoones 2009). Livelihoods approaches – also labelled sustainable livelihood 
approaches – were stimulated by Conway and Chambers two decades ago (Chambers and 
Conway 1992, in De Haan and Zoomers 2005, p. 27) and have been developed by different 
authors since. Carney provides a common definition of livelihoods (Carney et al. 1998, p. 2, in 
De Haan 2012, p. 347) as follows: “A livelihood system comprises the capabilities, assets 
(including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living”.  
Livelihood approaches take an actor-oriented position – an emic perspective – and highlight 
the active role of poor people instead of seeing them as passive victims. They focus on the 
micro level, mainly on households and individuals (De Haan and Zoomers 2005, p. 28). 
Livelihood approaches can be seen as a reaction to the structural perspectives that prevailed 
until the 1980s, including dependencia, neo-Marxism and modernisation theories. Their appeal 
– “look at the real world, and try and understand things from local perspectives” (Scoones 
2009, p. 172) – has called for acknowledging diversity in complex livelihood strategies. It has 
thus challenged single-sector approaches to multifaceted rural development problems. The 
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introduction of the British Department for International Development’s (DfID) Sustainable 
Livelihoods Framework (SLF) as an analytical tool for research and practice resulted in the 
approach being widely adopted (see De Haan 2012; Geiser et al. 2011). Designed to contribute 
to problem mitigation, the SLF puts the emphasis on poor people's assets (often called 
‘capitals’) and how development interventions could improve these assets. 
Livelihood studies were strongly criticised for ignoring structures, politics and power (De 
Haan and Zoomers 2005; Geiser et al. 2011; Scoones 2009). Although most livelihood 
frameworks contain information about ‘transforming structures and processes’ or ‘policies, 
institutions and processes’, and some studies have indeed included them in their analysis and 
discussion, the critics state that these contributions have been marginal. Most studies tend to 
focus on poor people's assets without analysing how institutions negotiate access to assets 
(Shahbaz et al. 2010). This tendency is termed the "pentagon trap" by a group of NCCR North-
South researchers who gained considerable experience in working with the DfID-inspired 
livelihoods approach (Geiser et al. 2011). Combined with the SLF's "normative trap" of 
focusing on people's own views of wellbeing and the causes of poverty, researchers might run 
the risk of neglecting wider issues of power (Geiser et al. 2011). Thus the major challenges to 
the livelihoods approach are seen as the importance of power in questions of access (De Haan 
and Zoomers 2005, pp. 27f) and in „the need to inject a more thorough-going political analysis 
into the centre of livelihoods perspectives“ (Scoones 2009, p. 171). De Haan (2012), however, 
argues that, more recently, livelihood research has managed to integrate the analysis of power 
relations in a meaningful way, by combining the livelihoods perspective with other approaches 
that conceptualise power relations, for example by using the environmental entitlements 
approach (Leach et al. 1999; see also De Haan 2012, p. 349) or the notion of political arena 
(De Haan and Kamanzi 2011; Olivier de Sardan 2005; see also De Haan 2012, pp. 350f). 
This PhD study adopted the actor-oriented viewpoint that highlights the active role of poor 
people. By focusing on the views, experiences and daily practices of poor people, I aimed to 
bring in the perspective of those most affected by land deals. As recommended by Geiser et al. 
(2011) and De Haan (2012), I complemented the livelihoods perspective by employing other 
conceptual approaches in order to analyse power issues. Specific approaches were applied to 
tackle questions of access to land and related institutions, as well as (negotiation) power of 
different stakeholders. In an attempt not to impose artificial, pre-defined categories on complex 
realities (Scoones 2009, p. 172), the approaches were chosen based on insights that I gained 
during the research process. 
In applying a critical livelihoods perspective to a study on the global land rush, I also address 
Scoones’ concern (2009, p. 181f) that this perspective has failed to engage with global 
processes and their influence on local livelihoods, such as economic globalisation and 
questions about agrarian change. The livelihoods perspective was relevant for all research 
questions focusing on the case studies (research questions 1-3) and for the related publications 
(Research Papers I to III), but most importantly for Paper I, which highlights local people’s 
views on the land deals and investment projects I examine (research question 3). 
2.3	   Analytical	  concept	  of	  property	  and	  legal	  pluralism	  perspective	  
Access to livelihood assets such as land is negotiated through institutions, understood in 
North’s (1990, p. 3) sense as “rules of the game in a society”, including norms, rules and 
regulations that structure everyday life. Property is a central institution regarding land. In order 
to capture property and land tenure conceptually, I used an analytical framework on property 
and the legal pluralism perspective. They were particularly helpful for the analyses in Papers II 
and III with a focus on (complex) land rights and related conflicts during the land deal 
processes. 
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F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann and Wiber describe property not as a specific right or 
relation, such as private or collective ownership, but as a broad concept that "concerns the 
ways in which the relations between society's members with respect to valuables are given 
form and significance" (Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006, p. 14). The authors define three major 
elements in relation to property, namely: (a) the social unit that can hold rights and obligations; 
(b) the (constructed) property objects; and (c) the different sets of rights and obligations with 
respect to such objects. 
Rights can be broadly grouped into two categories, namely use rights (the rights to access and 
use or exploit economically a resource) and control rights (the rights to manage a resource, to 
exclude others from using it, or to alienate it to others through sale, rental or gift) (Benda-
Beckmann et al. 2006; Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001, p. 11). In many societies, land 
‘ownership’ bundles a set of rights into one social unit, i.e. a landowner or a group of 
landowners hold several control rights and usually also use rights over a given land slot. Thus 
property rights are better understood as bundles of rights (or “web of interests”, see Meinzen-
Dick and Mwangi 2009). Rights may also be delegated. A landowner for example can assign 
user rights to a tenant, who might in turn pass (part of) them on to a sharecropper (Benda-
Beckmann et al. 2006, pp. 15, 20).  
In order to get a better analytical grasp of property regimes, it is helpful to distinguish four 
"layers of social organization" (ibid., pp. 15f) in which property is expressed: 
• Layer (1):  Cultural ideals and ideologies (e.g. neo-liberal concepts of private property,  
 socialist concepts of common property); 
• Layer (2):  Legal regulations; concrete rules, usually based on cultural ideals and  
 ideologies (e.g. state law or customary law); 
• Layer (3):  Social relationships (e.g. between landowner and tenant); 
• Layer (4):  Social practices or daily interactions (e.g. cropping, fencing or inheriting  
 land). 
Since property systems evolve over time, the layers of such a legal order are not always fully 
coherent. The four layers are mutually interdependent and can influence each other. For 
example, social practices may reflect and reproduce ideologies regarding property, or they may 
negotiate social relationships and eventually transform related laws. It is important to notice 
that social relationships are often multifunctional and reflect local power relations shaped by 
kinship, economic situation, political dependencies or other influential aspects. Consequently, 
property is always seen as embedded in a specific social and political context, encompassing a 
variety of different arrangements at different levels (Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006, pp. 14-23). 
In any social context, different legal regimes may coexist at the same time, each of them based 
on legislations such as statutory law, customary law or religious law, supported by their 
respective sets of cultural values, and determining property relationships and practices. These 
systems may coexist peacefully or in open conflict, and may influence each other. For 
example, customary law can adapt partly to statutory law, or statutory law can take up 
elements of religious law. Such coexistence and interaction of legal systems is referred to as 
legal pluralism (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001, p. 11). 
In the context of legal pluralism, people may refer to a repertoire of property ideologies and 
legal regulations to justify and support their claims (ibid.). However, “[i]t is not sufficient to 
assert claims to the resource; unless claims are accepted by a larger collectivity than the 
claimants they are not considered legitimate. (…) Rights are only as strong as the institutions 
or collectivity that stands behind them“ (ibid.). The faith of claims also depends upon the 
extent to which they are congruent with the dominant legal order. If claims do not meet the 
standards of the leading paradigm or property-related ideology, they will hardly be successful 
(Griffiths 2011, p. 175). Griffiths (ibid.) states that “…with the rise of the nation-state, a 
particular paradigm of law became predominant, one in which state law acquired jurisdiction 
and took precedence over other forms of ordering within a territorially, bounded, geographic 
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space”. This legal order, called positivist or legal centralist paradigm, is predominant in 
Western culture.  
The legal pluralism perspective was useful in the analysis of the Tanzanian land law and its 
implementation in a context where customary legal orders prevail, i.e. the perspective was 
employed to address a part of research question 1, namely its focus on institutions that shape 
land deal processes (see Research Papers II and III). The legal centralist paradigm –
predominant in Western countries, where many investors come from – would not be in line 
with the livelihoods approach with its focus on local views. Accordingly, in this study, state 
law is not necessarily seen as the (only) legitimate one.  
2.4	   Theory	  of	  access	  
As demonstrated above, property rights do not simply derive from law, but are embedded in a 
social context and should be understood “as negotiated outcomes" (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 
2001, p. 10). In order to gain a better grasp of the issue of power in this broader context, I 
employed the theory of access and its related framework by Ribot and Peluso (2003). It 
illustrates that a focus on property alone would be too narrow when analysing access to natural 
resources. 
Ribot and Peluso (2003) theorise access to resources, or more precisely how people gain, 
maintain and control access to certain resources, or are excluded from it. Access is defined as 
"the ability to benefit from things" (ibid, p. 153) – drawing upon the definition of property as 
“the right to benefit from things” (ibid.). Access is about all possible means by which people 
benefit from resources (ibid, p. 156). Property rights are just one of these means. Ability, in 
Ribot and Peluso’s definition of access is akin to power (ibid, p. 155). The authors define 
power as the capacity of actors to affect others, and as emergent from people. With the access 
theory, “[b]y focusing on ability, rather than rights as in property theory, this formulation 
brings attention to a wider range of social relationships that can constrain or enable people to 
benefit from resources without focusing on property relations alone” (ibid, p. 154, emphasis in 
original). Thus access analysis can also help one to understand situations where people benefit 
from resources without having rights – based on whatever legal order – to them.17 
Access is constituted by bundles of powers that people or organisations hold or can draw upon. 
The power strands – also known as ‘access mechanisms’ – are means, processes and relations 
that affect people’s ability to gain, maintain and control access. The power strands presented 
by Ribot and Peluso (2003, pp. 161–172) vary broadly and include among others access 
sanctioned by legal frames, i.e. property regulations (‘rights-based access’), access to finances 
and equipment that allow for example the extraction of benefits from land (‘access to capital’), 
the ability to shape discourses that influence entire frameworks of access (‘access to 
knowledge’), and ‘social identity’ such as gender or ethnicity, which affects the distribution of 
benefits. The different power strands often intertwine. 
Ribot and Peluso's framework is a helpful guide for empirically grounded analysis of power 
issues related to access to land. The bundles of powers can be adapted to specific situations 
(see also Smalley and Corbera 2012, Fairbairn 2012). This was done in this study in order to 
show how particular strands of powers were influential when the investors gained access to 
land, i.e. the framework was used to tackle power relations and exclusion in the decision-
making process (see research question 1, Research Paper I). 
                                                      
17	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  are	  also	  situations	  where	  people	  have	  rights	  to	  a	  resource,	  but	  cannot	  access	  it,	  i.e.	  
they	  cannot	  benefit	  from	  it	  due	  to	  certain	  limitations	  (e.g.	  access	  to	  labour)	  (Ribot	  and	  Peluso	  2003,	  p.	  160).	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2.5	   A	  bargaining	  power	  model	  
While the access theory provides a good overview on all sorts of possible means by which 
people gain access to natural resources, it remains rather unspecific about how to analyse the 
significance of power strands such as e.g. ‘access to capital’ and ‘access to labour 
opportunities’ (Ribot and Peluso 2003, pp. 165-167) in concrete situations. For my analysis of 
negotiations of the land deals (i.e. for part of research question 1), I thus used elements of the 
bargaining power model developed by Yan and Gray (1994). The model integrates findings 
from bargaining theory (Bacharach and Lawler 1984, in Yan and Gray 1994, p. 1481) and 
resource dependence theory (J. Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, in Yan and Gray 1994, p. 1481). I 
applied the model to look at the relative bargaining power of parties in business relationships. 
While it was developed to analyse international joint ventures, which is technically speaking 
not the case in the investment projects I analysed in Tanzania, I argue it may nonetheless be 
applied to the case studies in this research. Since the forestry investments require long-term 
collaboration, or at least acceptance between forestry companies and local people, there exists 
a similar situation to the one described by the authors.  
The model distinguishes between two types of bargaining power elements. First, context-based 
elements refer to the stakes of involved bargainers and their alternatives to the deal; a stake is 
the extent of a bargainer's of dependence on the planned joint project and its outcomes. The 
higher a partner’s stake, the weaker his or her bargaining power. On the other hand, the more 
alternatives available to bargainers, the smaller is their dependence on the other partner and the 
higher their bargaining power (Bacharach and Lawler 1984, in Yan and Gray 1994, p. 1481). 
Second, resource-based components are resources and capabilities committed by the parties to 
the cooperative relationship such as for example land, money or labour. Bargainers committing 
crucial resources that are difficult for the other party to replace have great power in the 
negotiations, as they can use them as leverage (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, in Yan and Gray 
1994, p. 1481). 
While I found the access theory helpful for unravelling the powers that shape the land deal 
decisions in the case studies, the bargaining model was useful for analysing actual bargaining 
situations, such as compensation negotiations between the investors and the local population. 
Thus the combination of the bargaining model and the access theory allowed me to analyse the 
broad picture of power relations in the land deal processes, as presented in Research Paper I. 
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3	   Methodology	  
3.1	   Literature	  review:	  fast-­‐accruing	  empirical	  evidence	  
In 2009, at the start of this research project, very little information was available on the global 
land rush. The existing literature was to a large extent provided by non-scientific authors and 
organisations (for the quality of available data see Research Paper IV). I derived my first 
insights on Tanzania mainly from a report by an international policy research organisation 
(Sulle and Nelson 2009). However, it focused on biofuel projects, which attracted most interest 
in that time. The limited information meant that I had to spend considerable time on gaining an 
idea of the land deal situation in Tanzania and beyond, and identifying potential case studies 
(stage I of field research, see Section 1.3.3). 
Whereas the scarce information led to some additional work – yet also opportunities in terms 
of research gaps – at the beginning, the situation changed completely during the following 
years. The rapid rise in large-scale land acquisitions led to a ‘gold-rush-like’ phenomenon – 
termed “hype” by Kaag and Zoomers (2014) – in academia, independent research 
organisations and other NGOs. The topic gained a great deal of media attention; newsletters 
were created and several conferences were held specifically on this issue18. Further, there were 
different attempts to gain and present a global overview of the deals, first in reports compiled 
on the basis of media coverage (e.g. Friies and Reenberg 2010; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 
2009), later in more sophisticated, newly established databases (GRAIN 2012; Land Matrix 
2015). A flood of scientific contributions, including several special issues in notable journals, 
has come since 2011 and has not abated to date. 
According to this PhD study’s circular research design, reading relevant literature was a 
constant task. However, coping with the “literature rush” (Oya 2013a) and the fast-accruing 
(scientific) knowledge was a major challenge during the second half of the research project. 
For the sake of finalizing this study, the coverage of related literature had to be limited and 
review stopped early 2014, with some exceptions. 
3.2	   Selection	  of	  case	  studies	  
Research about land deals has so far shed light on projects that have primarily had negative 
impacts on local livelihoods. This may also have been the consequence of a bias in the 
selection of case studies, as cases resulting in conflicts have arguably attracted more public 
attention through media and NGO reports, and were therefore more visible to researchers as 
well. Assuming that more favourable examples of land investments also exist (Cotula et al. 
2008, p. 26 for lack of research on promising business models for biofuels), I have deliberately 
chosen a country and an investment sector that I presumed would show more positive 
outcomes for the local population. Unlike other target countries of land investments, Tanzania 
supposedly has abundant land and a progressive land law in terms of respecting local land 
                                                      
18	  Conferences	  on	  the	  phenomenon	  included	  the	  following:	  NVAS	  International	  Conference	  ‘Africa	  for	  Sale’	  
(organised	  by	  the	  Netherlands	  African	  Studies	  Association,	  in	  Groningen,	  the	  Netherlands,	  in	  2010);	  the	  Land	  Deal	  
Politics	  Initiative	  Conferences	  I	  (at	  University	  of	  Sussex,	  Brighton,	  UK,	  in	  2011)	  and	  II	  (at	  Cornell	  University,	  New	  
York,	  US,	  in	  2012);	  International	  Workshop	  on	  Large-­‐scale	  Land	  Acquisitions	  (at	  GIGA,	  Hamburg,	  Germany,	  2012);	  
Land	  Rush	  or	  Development	  by	  Investment?	  The	  ‘Land	  Grab’	  Debate	  in	  Africa	  (organised	  by	  the	  Swiss	  Society	  for	  
African	  Studies,	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Berne,	  Switzerland,	  in	  2013);	  and	  the	  Conference	  on	  Agricultural	  Investment,	  
Gender	  and	  Land	  in	  Africa	  (organised	  by	  the	  Future	  Agricultures	  Consortium	  in	  Cape	  Town,	  South	  Africa,	  in	  2014).	  
In	  addition,	  there	  were	  specific	  panels	  at	  several	  major	  conferences,	  such	  as	  ECAS	  2013	  (5th	  European	  Conference	  
on	  African	  Studies)	  at	  ISCTE,	  Lisbon,	  Portugal,	  and	  at	  the	  Annual	  World	  Bank	  Conferences	  on	  Land	  and	  Poverty	  in	  
Washington	  D.C.,	  US.	  
  
30 
rights (see Section 4.1.1). As I highlighted in Section 1.1.7, it can be assumed that forestry 
plantations might have more favourable outcomes for local people than investments in other 
sectors. 
The choice of case studies for this research can be described as a “critical case sampling” 
(Patton 1990, pp. 174–176) if considering the land laws of host countries and the investors’ 
intended relationship with the local population as key dimensions in determining the effects of 
land deals. Critical case sampling allows one to draw conclusions on other cases based on 
logical generalisations, in the sense of “if it happens there, it will happen anywhere” (ibid., p. 
174); for this study this is taken to mean that if outcomes are negative even under these 
comparatively conducive conditions, they are most probably similar or worse in cases with less 
favourable conditions. 
I expected a comparison of two case studies in Tanzania to lead to a broader understanding of 
the issues that influence the process of land transfer and its potential implications. I based my 
selection of case studies on several criteria. To address the main research questions I intended 
to identify investment projects whose land acquisition processes were still ongoing or only 
recently completed. Both the projects I chose meet this requirement. The two projects differ in 
terms of the type of land acquired (individual vs. communal land holding) and the kind of 
compensation offered (in cash vs. in kind). Furthermore, as they are located in different 
districts and regions, several authorities were involved in the land transfer process, which is 
relevant when one considers the important role district officials and politicians play in the 
whole process. The selected sites have different characteristics in terms of natural resources 
and climatic conditions, the local availability of (arable) land, and their populations. See 
Section 5 for a detailed portrait of the case studies.	  
3.3	   Data	  generation	  and	  access	  to	  the	  field	  
3.3.1	   Data	  generation	  through	  qualitative	  methods	  
A combination of qualitative methods was used to tackle the different research questions (Flick 
2004; see Table 1). For a detailed compilation of the generated empirical data and additional 
sources I used in this study see Box 1. 
Expert	  interviews	  
I conducted expert interviews with representatives of national government, civil society 
organisations and academia in research stage I, and with regional and district government 
officials in research stages II and III. They form an important part of the empirical data in this 
thesis. Expert interviews are frequently used in social research, but they are not often reflected 
methodologically (Meuser and Nagel 2009). 
In this study, experts are defined on the basis of Meuser and Nagel (2009, p. 470) as persons 
who bear in some ways responsibility for certain societal issues (often as professionals) and 
who have – based on that responsibility – access to specific knowledge about those issues19. 
Bogner and Menz (2002, pp. 36–39, 43–45) differentiate between three types of expert 
interviews, focusing on different types of expertise. I used: 
- Explorative expert interviews at the beginning of research stages I and II in order to gain 
first insights into the land deal situation in Tanzania and the case studies. In this context, I 
mainly focused on the experts’ process knowledge [in German: Prozesswissen]. Process 
knowledge is defined as practical know-how gained in daily routine work and knowledge 
about events and constellations in the own working context; 
                                                      
19	  For	  an	  in-­‐depth	  discussion	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  experts	  see	  Bogner	  and	  Menz	  (2002,	  pp.	  39-­‐47).	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- Systematising expert interviews [systematisierende Experteninterviews] in research stage I, 
when one of the guiding questions was: ‘how are land deals (supposed to be) processed?’ 
Systematising interviews aim to generate a comparable set of data to gain a systematic 
overview of a certain question. For my research, I focused on both the experts’ process 
knowledge (i.e. knowhow about actual land deal practices) and their technical knowledge 
[technisches Wissen]. The latter is defined as specialised know-how that one can learn, for 
example, during one’s vocational training or studies (i.e. in this context knowledge of the 
Tanzanian legal framework for land deals); 
- Theory-generating expert interviews [theoriegenerierende Experteninterviews], though 
only to a limited extent. This interview type focuses on the interpretative knowledge 
[Deutungswissen], i.e. it tries to reconstruct the experts’ implicit maxims and subjective 
guidelines for actions and decisions in their professional field. I applied this type of 
interview in research stage III, when I set out to understand the district officials’ subjective 
perspectives and thus the underlying motivations in their roles as intermediaries of the land 
deals. However, for this purpose, repeated interviews with the same person proved more 
fruitful, but they were not generally possible in the districts beyond the case study sites due 
to time constraints. 
I used a more structured or a looser interview guide, depending on the type of expert interview. 
The guides were tailored to each interviewed person and according to my growing knowledge. 
The expert interviews were always conducted in English; all interviewed individuals turned out 
to have excellent English language skills. 
 
Semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  different	  groups	  of	  people	  
In-depth semi-structured interviews (Newing 2011, pp. 101-104; Willis 2006, pp. 144-146) 
focusing on the research questions 1-3 were conducted with local people from different 
economic backgrounds, gender and age, ranging from individuals who were heavily involved 
Box	  1:	  Empirical	  data	  and	  other	  sources	  of	  information	  	  
Research	  stage	  I:	  National	  setting	  and	  land	  deal	  situation	  	  
(research	  question	  4,	  contribution	  to	  research	  question	  1,	  selection	  of	  case	  studies)	  
• 18	  expert	  interviews	  with	  national	  government	  officials	  
• 17	  expert	  interviews	  with	  representatives	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations,	  academia	  and	  
others	  
• Legal	  documents	  
• Published	  and	  unpublished	  reports,	  investors’	  webpages	   	  
Research	  stage	  II:	  Case	  studies	  in	  Kilolo	  and	  Pangani	  districts	  	  
(research	  questions	  1-­‐3,	  background	  to	  case	  studies)	   	  
• Investors’	  webpages	  
• 10	  interviews	  with	  representatives	  of	  investors	  
• 17	  expert	  interviews	  with	  regional	  and	  district	  government	  officials	  
• 25	  interviews	  with	  key	  persons	  at	  village	  level	  
• 33	  interviews	  with	  people	  of	  affected	  villages	  
• 100	  interviews	  with	  people	  of	  affected	  villages,	  conducted	  by	  field	  assistants	  
• 11	  group	  discussions,	  including	  2	  participatory	  mapping	  sessions	  
1	  site	  visit	  to	  former	  landholding	  with	  burial	  places	  
Research	  stage	  III:	  Insights	  into	  attitudes	  of	  officials	  in	  additional	  six	  districts	  	  
(contribution	  to	  research	  question	  1)	  
• 11	  expert	  interviews	  with	  district	  and	  regional	  officials	  of	  six	  districts	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in the land deal to people who were not directly affected. Key informants such as 
representatives of local government, elders, and teachers were interviewed regarding the 
research questions, but also in more explorative interviews that aimed to give me an overview 
of the case study area and the characteristics of its population. Interviews were based on a 
semi-structured interview guide that allowed for flexible formulation and sequencing of the 
questions, and permitted additional questions that came up during the interview. The 
interviews lasted around one hour in average, and were directly translated by the research 
assistant from the local language into English and vice versa. The interviews were usually 
conducted in front of or inside the respondent’s house, sometimes with a single person, but 
often in the presence of family members, who also took part in the interview.  
When I visited a village for the first time, I had to approach the village chairperson and/or the 
Village Executive Officer (VEO, an employed secretary to the Village Council) and inform 
them about the research endeavour. In Case Study A, where individual land holdings had been 
transferred to the investor, the village chairpersons were asked whether they could provide a 
list of people who had handed over land to the investor. In most cases there was a list in the 
minutes of a Village Assembly meeting. In one of the villages I examined, I visited and 
interviewed the full sample of directly affected people. In other villages, I had to make a 
selection. Besides these directly affected individuals, I approached additional villagers for 
interviews. For those, and for the interviewees in Case Study B, where the land that had been 
transferred was village reserve land, I applied a purposeful sampling strategy with focus on 
maximum variation (Patton 1990, pp. 169, 172), making sure to include respondents of both 
sexes, with different economic situations and different ethnic origins. Sometimes I also applied 
the snowball system (Patton 1990, p. 176) to find additional respondents. 
Approaching labourers of the forestry companies proved to be more challenging. In some 
areas, the workplace of the labourers is remote and they work for long hours six days a week. 
In Case Study A, many recruited labourers could not go home every day. They stayed on a 
campsite near their workplace and were brought back to their villages once a month by a 
company truck. The campsite, part of the company’s fenced area, was not accessible to me. In 
other cases, where labourers could reach their home on a daily basis, interviewing them 
entailed visiting them at their homes late in the evening, when time was limited and the 
labourers were tired, or on Sundays, when they generally preferred to be spending time with 
their families or in their fields. Thus the data on labour conditions from the perspective of the 
local population are based on limited interviews with labourers, and with some former 
labourers who had stopped working for the forestry companies. 
Several meetings were also held with the plantation operations manager and company field 
staff in Case Study B, while in Case Study A contact with the company was limited to a few 
initial meetings before they later turned me down (see below). 
Group	  discussions	  
In total I conducted eleven group discussions (Flick 2007; Newing 2011, pp. 104–106) at both 
case study sites. In four cases, the groups formed more or less spontaneously when I had 
actually intended to interview one of the village leaders. Seven group meetings of six to ten 
participants each were held at my own initiative. They included two mapping sessions (see 
below). I felt that women would feel more comfortable among themselves, and so the 
discussions were in some cases conducted in separate women’s and men’s groups. The 
participants were invited on the basis of criteria that allowed for a broad mix of people who 
were affected to different degrees by the land deals and came from varying socio-economic 
background. The meetings were held in village offices. VEOs or village chairpersons helped 
organise them, but they were asked to leave the room during the discussions. The involvement 
of local leaders might have caused a bias in the selection of participants. However, we usually 
found a mixture of opinions among the group members. 
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The detailed procedure can be seen as a combination of group interviews and group 
discussions, with more structured parts, and other parts where the participants were encouraged 
to speak more freely (Boddy 2005; for group interviews see also Flick 2007, p. 249f). My field 
assistants (see Section 3.3.4) were well instructed about the procedure beforehand, and the 
questions I had prepared for discussion were gone through together with them. After I had 
opened the meeting with an introduction, it was mainly the field assistants who moderated the 
discussions. The meetings were all held in Swahili and taped, and they were in general not 
directly translated into English so as not to disturb the flow of the discussion. My command of 
Swahili was good enough to allow me to get the gist of the debates. In certain cases, I asked for 
a quick translation so that I could pose further questions, if I thought it necessary.  
The group discussions focused on the people’s views and opinions of the land deals, the 
investors, the national, district and the local governments’ role. Hence, they mainly produced 
data regarding the third research question, but also touched on issues relating to the other 
research questions. The discussions also focused on local people’s livelihoods and aspirations, 
providing me with information about local living conditions in the case study sites. 
Participatory	  mapping	  	  
I asked to conduct a participatory mapping session (Chambers 1994; Beazley and Ennew 2006, 
p. 194) in each of two neighbouring villages with contested land rights (see Research Paper II). 
The village leaders were instructed to invite particularly elder participants rooted in the region, 
as the existing land tenure systems had historical roots. The participants drew their areas on 
large sheets of paper and discussed and explained various issues to me (see Figure 5). These 
meetings proved to be extremely helpful for understanding the area’s complex land tenure 
situation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure	  5:	  Outputs	  of	  participatory	  mapping,	  in	  Kilolo	  District	  in	  January	  2011;	  photos	  by	  M.	  Locher.	  
Participatory	  observation	  and	  site	  visit	  
While staying in the case study sites, I was able to observe local living conditions and social 
interactions to a certain extent; this gave me a better understanding of the social context. 
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During my interviews with local respondents, the conditions of people’s housing and clothes 
helped me to make a broad judgement of their economic situation. I planned to attend village 
meetings regarding the land deals, but unfortunately no such meetings were held during my 
field stay. In Case Study B, a field assistant had the chance to observe a Village Council 
meeting and a Village Assembly meeting20, when district officials and representatives of the 
investor came to the village. The notes of her observations provided interesting data. In Case 
Study A, an older man agreed to show me the plot of land that his family had lost to the 
company. This land included the graves of his ancestors, which the company had partially 
planted with seedlings (see Figure 6). The visit and the related informal talks gave me a 
number of insights. 
 
 
Figure	  6:	  Gravesite	  surrounded	  by	  tree	  seedlings	  planted	  by	  the	  investor	  in	  Kilolo	  District;	  photo	  by	  M.	  
Locher	  (2011).	  
3.3.2	   Accessing	  interview	  partners	  
The way in which I established contacts for interviews with experts and key persons was very 
important. The interviews generally proved far more fruitful when they were arranged through 
personal contacts than when I initiated them through bureaucratic procedures such as research 
permits. My membership of the NCCR North-South network was particularly helpful in this 
regard in two ways. First, I learned a lot about research practices and cultural differences from 
the experiences of other ‘Northern’ researchers in Tanzania, but also from supportive 
exchanges with Tanzanian colleagues. Second, the NCCR North-South network and additional 
contacts with researchers from outside the network helped me gain access to interview partners 
for the expert interviews. 
                                                      
20	  For	  a	  description	  of	  the	  Village	  Council	  and	  the	  Village	  Assembly,	  see	  Section	  4.1.1.	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The network was also relevant for making contact with the investors. Establishing contact was 
relatively smooth for Case Study B, where one member of the board of the company was a 
personal friend of one of my academic contacts. Hence, several information-rich meetings 
were held with the plantation operations manager and company field staff. In contrast, in Case 
Study A, where I had no personal connections, the contact to the company was limited to two 
formal meetings at the regional office in Iringa. Thereafter, the company’s headquarters in 
South Africa refused any further contact21. 
With every interview I conducted, I increased my network and gained further contacts. 
Naturally, it wasn’t always possible to get a personal reference for a new interview partner. I 
gained a standard reference letter from SUA that allowed me to approach regional and district 
officials for the regions I had selected for my field research. Repeated visits improved the 
quality of the interviews, as they built trust. 
3.3.3	   Researcher	  positionality	  
When conducting qualitative (in-depth) interviews, and particularly when the research topic is 
sensitive, the researcher’s positionality is crucial. The success of field research depends to a 
great extent upon the role the researcher is assumed to be playing (Flick 2007; Müller-Böker 
1999). One important issue is establishing a certain level of trust. In that regard, it was helpful 
for the interviews in the villages and also with (English speaking) officials that I had gained a 
basic command of Swahili language and of Tanzanian ways of communication. Furthermore, 
with the exception of a few expert interviews and the group discussions, none of the interviews 
were taped. When interviewing villagers, I did not want to risk intimidating them with 
technical equipment and by adding an obstacle to trust. In expert interviews with government 
officials, I gained the impression that they would rather share their information and opinions 
on this politically sensitive topic if I did not tape our conversation. 
Positionality	  in	  expert	  interviews	  
Due to the politically sensitive topic, I had to find ways to approach government officials in 
order to gain their acceptance and commitment to conduct a fruitful interview. I used to frame 
my research interest in a neutral way, stressing the aspiration to look at both (potentially) 
positive and negative consequences of land deals. I also applied various techniques to position 
myself vis-à-vis the interview partners, depending on their formal position and personality. I 
usually did this spontaneously during the interviews, but also considered it in terms of Bogner 
and Menz’ typology of interaction between experts and interviewers. The following four types 
of interaction proved useful (Bogner and Menz 2002, pp. 50-63): 
- The interviewer can act as a co-expert or as an expert of a similar field: when he or she is 
considered by the interviewee to be either an expert in the same area of expertise or an 
expert with different, but equivalent expertise. Such an interview is dialogue-oriented and 
can be seen as a symmetrical exchange of knowledge among ‘equals’. Being a PhD student 
I usually gained respected as an academic and was increasingly treated as an expert, the 
more explicit knowledge I had acquired from other interviews and was able to share. 
- When the interviewee perceives the interviewer as little knowledgeable, as a lay person, but 
with a great interest in the interviewee’s subject, this establishes an asymmetric situation, in 
                                                      
21	  Having	  read	  my	  PhD	  proposal,	  which	  quoted	  some	  very	  critical	  voices	  on	  the	  global	  land	  rush,	  the	  company’s	  
managing	  staff	  obviously	  did	  not	  trust	  me	  to	  collaborate	  with	  them	  and/or	  produce	  the	  results	  they	  wished.	  
Unfortunately,	  I	  had	  visited	  the	  company’s	  nursery	  before	  getting	  official	  go-­‐ahead	  from	  headquarters,	  with	  the	  
friendly	  permission	  of	  the	  local	  manager.	  Though	  not	  my	  intention,	  this	  was	  interpreted	  as	  trespassing	  on	  the	  
company’s	  territory.	  My	  assertion	  that	  as	  a	  researcher	  I	  intended	  to	  assess	  different	  perspectives	  on	  the	  land	  deal	  
was	  apparently	  not	  a	  persuasive	  answer	  to	  their	  central	  question	  –	  analogously	  formulated	  in	  the	  meeting	  –	  
whether	  I	  was	  ‘on	  their	  side	  or	  not’.	  I	  kept	  company	  staff	  informed	  about	  my	  fieldwork,	  but	  could	  not	  convince	  
them	  to	  meet	  again.	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which the interviewee mainly shares and the interviewer receives information. The 
interviewer can ask very open, almost naïve questions that often provoke an urge in the 
interviewee to develop the subject and explain at length. I occasionally used this type of 
interaction with people from other backgrounds such as lawyers and business people, and 
with people who seemed to like to ‘preach’. Acting as a layperson sometimes seemed to 
help inspire confidence in the interviewee. 
- When the interviewer and interviewee share common values and experiences (e.g. if they 
are members of the same political party), the interviewer can be seen as an accomplice. This 
interview form is characterised by trust and the sharing of confidential information, and the 
interview style is informal. I did not experience this constellation to any real extent, but I 
sometimes felt I was in this kind of interview when talking to representatives of civil 
society organisations campaigning for local people’s land rights. They seemed to ascribe to 
me motives similar to theirs. 
These types of interaction are not neatly separable and were often combined during one 
interview. 
Positionality	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  interviewees	  in	  the	  case	  study	  areas	  
After some first scepticism or shyness, the interviewees I approached in the villages often 
seemed flattered that a researcher from Switzerland was interested in their everyday lives and 
their experiences with the companies. However, it was necessary to ensure that interviewees 
understood that though from Europe, I was not part of the European investment companies. 
The association with the Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) proved very helpful in this 
regard. SUA was well known to most of the villagers and highly respected, and my links to it 
gave the research a more ‘local touch’. Some respondents wanted to know what benefits they 
would get out of this research. It was important to explain transparently that this PhD study 
would usually not give them any practical benefits. However, in some cases I was able to 
provide some knowledge about their legal rights or share recent information I had received 
from the district land officers. This was greatly appreciated. Also, repeated visits to the same 
interviewees were very valuable for building confidence and receiving more in-depth 
information.  
3.3.4	   Working	  with	  research	  assistants	  	  
I worked with four research assistants. They not only translated for me, but also facilitated 
access to interview partners and accompanied me when I approached the local authorities to 
gain permission for my research. They supported the research by explaining cultural 
differences in communication and interaction, which helped me to behave in a locally 
acceptable manner. 
In one case study area, I got to know a local inhabitant who had worked for a European 
researcher before. He offered me his services. He stemmed from a middle-class family with a 
respected father and had done research in the whole area before, so he was very helpful in 
arranging contacts and building trust with interviewees. During the exploratory phase and in 
the other case study area, I worked with three young scholars. 
Two of my research assistants conducted a number of interviews after I had left the area. 
Having worked with me for a while, they were familiar with the research questions and my 
way of working. I had gained the impression that some of the people were intimidated in the 
presence of a foreign researcher and guessed that they would open up more when the interview 
was conducted by a Tanzanian researcher on his or her own. 
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3.4	   Processing	  and	  analysis	  of	  data	  
The empirical data consist of around 230 qualitative interviews in total, and 11 group 
discussions, including two mapping sessions with their drawing products (see Box 1 in Section 
3.3.1). 
Some expert interviews and all group discussions were recorded and then transcribed. Not all 
the other interviews were recorded; instead notes were taken during the interviews. These 
notes were usually typed up and added to the same evening to avoid missing out any important 
information. When I conducted interviews jointly with field assistants, they were usually asked 
to crosscheck and – if necessary – add to the typed notes. The records of the group discussions 
were directly translated and transcribed in English, by or together with the field assistant who 
had facilitated the group discussion. 
I used several techniques of qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2010) to analyse the data. 
The process and immediate outcomes of land acquisitions were analysed by first structuring 
the data regarding their content in a rather deductive procedure and browsing through the 
plentiful data in search of specific information. In a second step, the relevant aspects were 
either summarised or compiled chronologically in a table. This procedure was helpful when 
trying to retrace the negotiation process for compensation in a specific village, for example. 
The analysis was sometimes of a purely descriptive character, when the statements regarding a 
certain issue were broadly consensual. However, it sometimes also proved to be more 
complicated, when the answers of the interviewees varied considerably. By bringing together 
the different statements, and trying to weigh the plausibility of different answers and interpret 
discrepancies, I attempted to reconstruct the issue under analysis from different angles. In such 
cases, I strove to gain more data from different groups of people on the same issue so as to get 
a clearer, or at least a broader, picture (Denzin 1970).  
Data regarding the more interpretative research question related to local people’s perceptions 
were analysed using the open coding techniques proposed in the Grounded Theory (Corbin 
and Strauss 2008, pp. 61–74), similar to Mayring’s technique of building categories based on 
the data material. This inductive procedure allowed for an open approach to the data and more 
in-depth analysis. For example, local people’s expectations vis-à-vis investors were developed 
in this way by analysing related statements in the context of the decision-making process or 
interviewees’ comments regarding the investors’ activities. 
For answering the fourth research question regarding research practices I complemented my 
own data with data of my co-author and with a highly detailed literature review on the 
situation in Tanzania (see annotated bibliography with 61 entries in Locher and Sulle 2013). 
By compiling information related to land deals in chronological order of publication date or 
indicated fieldwork period, my co-author and I were able to establish whether specific pieces 
of information were based on primary data generated by the authors of a given report, or 
whether they were derived from secondary data. Thus, we could trace and analyse the practices 
of data representation and reproduction. 
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4	   Land	  laws	  and	  land	  deals	  in	  Tanzania	  
 
Tanzania can be considered a typical target country in the recent land rush. With large areas of 
seemingly unused arable land according to government statements (Askew et al. 2013, p. 120; 
TIC n.d., pp. 9, 21, 28) and a recent World Bank report (Deininger and Byerlee 2011, p. 89) 
and with favourable investment policies, it has attracted a number of foreign investment 
projects over the last decade. At the same time, media reports and research findings suggest 
growing competition for land and an increasing number of land conflicts (Abdallah et al. 2014, 
p. 36; Askew et al. 2013, p. 120; The Citizen 2013). Further, the country struggles with an 
unstable food security situation (Mann and Smaller 2010, p. 6; UNCTAD 2009, p. 159), 
stirring up the debate about the legitimacy of land deals and their potential effects on local 
people.  
In the following sections, I will briefly explain the legal and policy basis for transnational land 
deals and describe the overall land investment situation. 
4.1	   Land	  laws	  in	  Tanzania	  
4.1.1	   Land	  tenure	  regime	  and	  legislation	  
Tanzania’s land tenure regime is based on local laws, religious laws and the laws of the 
German and British colonialists (Shivji 1998, p. 2f; see also Isaksson and Sigte 2009). The 
process of 'villagization' (village formation, called operation vijiji) brought major changes to 
the land tenure regime as part of the ujamaa strategy implemented by President Nyerere’s 
socialist government in the late 1960s and the 1970s22. Villagization’s resettlements – often 
implemented with considerable force – of about two-thirds of the rural Tanzanian population 
and its encouragement of communal farming based on collective land holding resulted in major 
but poorly planned land reform and confusion over land tenure (Shivji 1998, p. 12; Abdallah et 
al. 2014, p. 43). Following an economic crisis and to some extent due to pressure from donors, 
Tanzania abandoned the villagization strategy in the mid 1980s, and went through 
liberalisation processes. Land increasingly became a marketable good; land rights were 
transferred among citizens, and the number of land conflicts increased. The conflicts were also 
partly the result of the tenure insecurity created by villagization, particularly in numerous cases 
where people decided to move back to their original homelands. Overall, the land tenure 
regime in Tanzania is considered to be quite complex (Abdallah et al. 2014, p. 37; Daley 
2005a, 2005b; Knight 2010, pp. 153–155; Odgaard 2006; Ojalammi 2006). 
In response to changing land tenure practices and conflicts, the government introduced a new 
land law in 1999, which came into force in 2001. It consists mainly of the Land Act (URT 
1999a) and the Village Land Act (URT 1999b), supplemented by Regulations (e.g. Village 
Land Regulations, URT 2001). The law enshrines all land as public land (URT 1999a, s. 4(a); 
URT 1999b, s. 3(b))23. The land is vested in the President, who holds the final decision-making 
rights on behalf of the whole nation. Citizens cannot hold radical titles, i.e. ownership of land, 
                                                      
22	  Ujamaa	  is	  Swahili	  for	  ‘familyhood’	  or	  ‘community’.	  The	  main	  purposes	  of	  the	  villagization	  programme	  were	  the	  
delivery	  of	  education,	  health	  and	  water	  services,	  the	  introduction	  of	  more	  productive	  modern	  agriculture,	  and	  the	  
encouragement	  of	  socialist	  forms	  of	  cooperation	  (Scott	  1998,	  p.	  230).	  In	  Scott’s	  words	  (ibid.,	  p.	  231):	  “For	  Nyerere,	  
village	  living,	  development	  services,	  communal	  agriculture,	  and	  mechanisation	  were	  a	  single	  indissoluble	  
package”.	  
23	  Radical	  title	  in	  all	  land	  has	  been	  vested	  in	  the	  state	  since	  German	  colonial	  times	  (Shivji	  1998,	  p.	  2;	  Stein	  and	  
Askew	  2009,	  p.	  2).	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but they can own rights over land, i.e. rights to occupy and use it (Alden Wily 2003, p. 19). 
Such rights to occupy may be bought or sold, and inherited.24  
All land in Tanzania is divided into three classes with differing jurisdiction. ‘General Land’ is 
administered by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (in short, hereafter, 
Ministry of Lands) and comprises urban areas and land that has been allocated by the central 
government under entitlements. ‘Reserved Land’ refers to several specific types and uses of 
land, such as forests, national parks or highways, and is governed by the relevant Ministry 
(Alden Wily 2003; URT 1999a, s. 6). 
‘Village Land’ includes the areas of the approximately 12,000 villages – roughly two-thirds of 
Tanzanian land – and is administered by the respective Village Council. The Village Council is 
the elected local level government of 15-25 members, accountable to the Village Assembly, 
which consists of all residents above 18 years (Alden Wily 2003, pp. 4-6). The Village Council 
manages the land on the basis of customary law, provided this does not violate the main 
provisions of the statutory law, such as the rights of women, children or the disabled (URT 
1999b, s. 3)25. Customary law is defined as "law which has hitherto been applicable in that 
village" (URT 1999b, s. 20(4)(a)). Customary rights can be registered through a Certificate of 
Customary Right of Occupancy (URT 1999b, s. 29). However, customary rights also explicitly 
include unregistered rights, and have the same legal status as land titles to ‘General Land’. 
Village Land can be further sub-divided into three categories (URT 1999b, s. 12(1)), i.e. 
‘communal village land’, used for public purposes such as schools or public markets; 
‘individual land’, occupied or used by an individual, family or group of persons; and ‘spare 
land’ for future communal or individual use. The latter is sometimes referred to as village 
reserve land. Each village is supposed to develop its own Village Land Use Plan (URT 2007). 
A village land use plan shall include an analysis of the current use of the land and the future 
community needs (URT 2007, s.27(1)). The preparation of a village land use plan is a lengthy 
participatory process supported by government officials. In August 2010, only around 10% of 
all Tanzanian villages had such a plan (interview with official of the National Land Use 
Planning Commission in 2010; Abdallah et al. 2014, p. 42). Since around 2007, a village land 
use plan is reportedly required before land can be transferred to an investor26. 
Tanzanian legislation can be termed an "institutionalised hybrid" (Benda-Beckmann et al. 
2006, p. 19; see also Knight 2010, pp. x, 217), combining coexisting customary laws and state 
law. It has decentralised responsibilities for land management in rural areas to the lowest 
government level (Cotula and Mathieu 2008, p. 23). However, observers see the land acts as 
being controversial (Palmer 1999). Shivji (in Palmer 1999, p. 4) and Sundet (2005, p. 13f) 
criticise the fact that the national government retains too much power over village land. 
Vermeulen and Cotula (2010, p. 909) and Alden Wily27 (2011) on the other hand see the land 
                                                      
24	  I	  therefore	  refer	  to	  ‘landholders’	  instead	  of	  'landowners'	  in	  my	  thesis.	  According	  to	  the	  recent	  Land	  Use	  Planning	  
Act	  (URT	  2007,	  s.	  2),	  landholder	  means	  “a	  holder	  of	  a	  right	  of	  occupancy	  or	  customary	  right	  issued	  or	  recognized	  
under	  any	  law	  relating	  to	  the	  acquisition	  of	  land	  rights	  in	  Tanzania	  under	  the	  Land	  Act,	  and	  the	  Village	  Land	  Act”.	  
25	  This	  provision	  means	  that,	  for	  example,	  a	  customary	  land	  law	  that	  foresees	  no	  landholding	  for	  women,	  as	  in	  
many	  Tanzanian	  communities,	  is	  not	  fully	  respected	  and	  protected	  by	  the	  state	  law.	  In	  that	  sense,	  the	  protection	  
of	  customary	  land	  rights	  is	  limited.	  For	  insights	  into	  the	  introduction	  of	  women’s	  land	  rights	  in	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  
land	  laws	  see	  McAuslan	  (2010).	  
26	  The	  requirement	  of	  a	  village	  land	  use	  plan	  for	  land	  transfers	  is	  not	  spelled	  out	  in	  law,	  but	  reportedly	  in	  a	  
Presidential	  Order	  from	  2007	  (Isaksson	  and	  Sigte	  2009,	  p.	  31).	  Several	  national	  and	  district	  officials	  I	  interviewed	  
referred	  to	  this	  requirement,	  but	  –	  like	  Isaksson	  and	  Sigte	  –	  I	  was	  not	  able	  to	  get	  hold	  of	  the	  Presidential	  Order.	  
The	  ‘Guidelines	  for	  Sustainable	  Liquid	  Biofuels	  Development	  in	  Tanzania’	  published	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Energy	  and	  
Minerals	  in	  2010	  state	  that	  land	  deals	  for	  biofuel	  investments	  require	  village	  land	  use	  plans,	  but	  these	  guidelines	  
cannot	  be	  considered	  as	  legally	  binding	  and	  do	  not	  effect	  land	  investments	  for	  other	  purposes.	  	  
27	  Liz	  Alden	  Wily	  was	  a	  consultant	  for	  the	  UK	  Department	  for	  International	  Development	  (DFID)	  and	  the	  Tanzanian	  
Ministry	  of	  Lands	  during	  the	  process	  of	  drafting	  the	  land	  acts	  (Palmer	  1999,	  p.	  2;	  Sundet	  2005,	  p.	  2).	  It	  is	  debatable	  
whether	  this	  former	  professional	  position	  diminishes	  her	  capacity	  for	  (self-­‐)criticism	  or	  improves	  her	  discernment	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acts in a more positive light, particularly in comparison with laws of other African countries. 
Alden Wily, who analysed the laws of more than twenty African countries, considers the legal 
situation “indisputably most advanced in Tanzania” (2011, p. 747) in terms of assigning the 
representation and protection of customary land rights to democratic and legally acknowledged 
community-based governments28. German et al. (2013, p. 11) too emphasise Tanzania’s 
progressive laws compared to the situation in Ghana, Mozambique and Zambia, where 
legislation places more power in the hands of local chiefs than in the people they represent. 
The implementation of the new laws is a slow process, hampered by a lack of funding, 
corruption and a constantly changing legal framework due to a variety of amendments and 
detailed regulations since the laws came into force (e.g. URT 2001, 2004; Abdallah et al. 2014, 
p. 43f; Askew et al. 2013, p. 136; Pedersen 2010, 2012, p. 277). Yet it seems that enhanced 
education and the efforts of civil society organisations are slowly improving recognition of 
customary rights (Askew et al. 2013, p. 137). 
4.1.2	   Legal	  regulations	  regarding	  land	  transfer	  to	  a	  foreign	  investor	  
Non-Tanzanian citizens can only obtain land (in the form of rights of occupancy) for 
investment purposes (URT 1999a, s. 19(2)). Foreign investors, who are interested in land in 
rural areas, have in principle three options29 (Abdallah et al. 2014, p. 40). They may receive 
derivative rights from the land bank of the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), which is still 
very limited to date (see next section); they can purchase or sublease land from other holders 
of granted rights of occupancy; and, finally, investors might receive titles of rights of 
occupancy from the Ministry of Lands. For that to happen, suitable plots of ‘Village Land’ 
need to be transferred to the category of ‘General Land’, following a complex procedure that is 
outlined below30. Rights of occupancy and derivative rights can be granted for a maximum of 
99 years (URT 1999a, s. 32(1)). 
A common way for investors to find appropriate land in rural areas – this also applied to the 
two case studies – is as follows (see also Abdallah et al. 2014, p. 42). Advised by the TIC, 
investors approach district or regional government officials or politicians in order to identify 
areas with potentially suitable land. Together, they visit respective villages and inform the 
Village Councils (VC) and Village Assemblies (VA) about their plans. If the VA in general 
agrees with the project, a complex de iure process of land transfer starts, entailing the 
                                                                                                                                                             
in	  interpreting	  and	  comparing	  the	  laws,	  given	  the	  considerable	  insights	  she	  gained	  and	  her	  vast	  experience	  in	  
several	  African	  countries.	  
28	  The	  controversy	  is	  related	  to	  the	  complexity	  and	  some	  inherent	  contradictions	  in	  the	  law,	  which	  leave	  room	  for	  
different	  interpretations	  (Sundet	  2005,	  p.	  2).	  An	  important	  ambiguity	  is	  the	  definition	  of	  general	  land,	  which	  is	  not	  
consistent	  in	  the	  two	  land	  acts	  and	  affects	  the	  definition	  of	  village	  land.	  In	  the	  Village	  Land	  Act,	  general	  land	  is	  
described	  as	  “all	  public	  land	  which	  is	  not	  reserved	  land	  or	  village	  land”	  (URT	  1999b,	  s.	  2);	  whereas	  the	  definition	  in	  
the	  Land	  Act	  features	  the	  same	  definition,	  but	  with	  the	  addition	  “…and	  includes	  unoccupied	  or	  unused	  village	  
land”	  (URT	  1999a,	  s.	  2).	  This	  weakens	  the	  Village	  Councils’	  authority	  in	  administering	  land	  deemed	  “excess”	  village	  
land	  (Sundet	  2005,	  p.	  14).	  Another	  point	  of	  strong	  criticism	  is	  the	  President’s	  radical	  title	  in	  the	  nation’s	  land,	  
which	  again	  questions	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Village	  Councils	  as	  managers	  of	  village	  land	  (e.g.	  Shivji	  in	  Palmer	  1999,	  p.	  
4).	  However,	  Alden	  Wily	  seems	  unconcerned	  about	  the	  President’s	  radical	  title	  and	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  more	  
important	  “where	  control	  over	  land	  tenure	  matters	  is	  actually	  vested”,	  namely	  in	  the	  Village	  Council	  (Palmer	  1999,	  
p.	  4).	  
29	  A	  foreign	  investor	  cannot	  acquire	  customary	  rights	  of	  occupancy,	  as	  these	  rights	  are	  only	  provided	  to	  citizens	  
(URT	  1999b,	  s.	  22(1)).	  
30	  A	  fourth,	  but	  so	  far	  not	  commonly	  practised,	  option	  for	  land	  access	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  Tanzania’s	  Land	  
(Amendment)	  Act	  2004.	  It	  allows	  the	  establishment	  of	  joint	  ventures	  between	  foreign	  investors	  and	  citizens,	  
where	  local	  groups	  retain	  land	  rights,	  while	  the	  investor	  can	  obtain	  an	  “interest	  in	  land”	  from	  citizens	  (URT	  2004,	  s.	  
3,	  referring	  to	  URT	  1999a,	  	  s.19(2);	  see	  also	  Vermeulen	  and	  Cotula	  2010,	  p.	  907,	  Footnote	  5	  and	  	  ‘land	  for	  equity’	  
model	  in	  Section	  7.4).	  For	  more	  details	  on	  how	  foreign	  investors	  can	  acquire	  land,	  see	  Isaksson	  and	  Sigte	  (2009),	  
Sulle	  and	  Nelson	  (2009),	  LEAT	  (2011)	  and	  Makwarimba	  and	  Ngowi	  (2012).	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following steps, among others (URT 1999b, s. 4). The district land officers demarcate the 
respective land plots. Thereafter, the Ministry of Lands gazettes a notice and sends it to the 
respective VC. The VC must inform all villagers that might be affected by the loss of their 
customary land rights through such a land transfer. The affected people can make 
representations to the VC or to district land officials, who shall take these into account in their 
further decision-making. Based on recommendations from the VC, the VA can either approve 
or reject the land transfer, and its decision is submitted to the district and further to the 
President31. During the VA meeting, a district land officer32 and the investor are supposed to be 
present and answer questions. Thereafter, the payment of compensation has to be agreed 
between the investor33 and the affected villagers (in case of individual land) or the VC (in case 
of communal or spare land). Based on a detailed survey of the land, a compensation scheme 
must be prepared and approved by the central government. Finally, the transfer of the land 
becomes effective through another government notice. Thereupon, the investor is supposed to 
pay compensation to the land right holders within six months. Compensation has to be paid for 
the value of the land itself34 and for ‘unexhausted improvements’, namely constructions or 
crops or trees on the land. Additional compensation may include resettlement fees, transport 
and disturbance allowances. The valuation should be based on current market value and be 
prepared by a qualified valuer (URT 2001, s. 8-25). 
The Tanzanian regulations are remarkable in two respects. “[T]he requirement that project 
proposals be discussed in front of the entire village assembly […] makes Tanzania’s legislation 
far more progressive in ensuring downward accountability to affected persons than that of 
other countries” (German et al. 2013, p. 11). Thus Tanzania’s laws are considered “arguably 
among the most progressive legislation in Africa regarding community consent to land 
transfer” (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010, p. 909). Further, only in Tanzania “the ‘type, amount, 
method, and timing of the payment’ and ‘full and fair compensation’ are required by law.” 
(German et al. 2013, p. 11). 
However, again, the interpretation and implementation of these legal requirements is 
questionable (e.g. Massay 2015). Abdallah et al. (2014, p. 44) highlight the lack of clarity 
about the legal setting: “Our visits to state agencies and district and village authorities have 
given the impression that no one has a full overview of the laws and regulations and how land 
is being allocated.” They further observed that state officials at various levels ignore laws and 
regulations (Abdallah et al. 2014, p. 51). Vermeulen and Cotula (2010, p. 909) examined the 
procedures regarding community consent to the land transfers and concluded that they are only 
                                                      
31	  In	  fact,	  according	  to	  the	  law	  (URT	  1999b,	  s.	  4(6)),	  in	  the	  case	  of	  areas	  over	  250	  hectares,	  the	  Village	  Assembly	  
can	  only	  provide	  a	  recommendation,	  while	  the	  decision	  lies	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  President.	  It	  is	  not	  even	  clear	  for	  
areas	  below	  250	  hectares	  whether	  the	  President	  can	  alienate	  land	  against	  a	  Village	  Assembly’s	  will.	  The	  Village	  
Land	  Act	  (URT	  1999b,	  s.	  4(1	  and	  2))	  states	  that	  the	  President	  can	  transfer	  village	  land	  to	  general	  land	  or	  reserved	  
land	  for	  ‘public	  interest’,	  whereas	  public	  interest	  includes	  ‘investments	  of	  national	  interest’,	  which	  are	  not	  further	  
described	  in	  the	  law.	  However,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  foreign	  investment	  in	  agricultural	  land,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  President	  
does	  not	  in	  practice	  usually	  transfer	  land	  against	  a	  Village	  Assembly’s	  recommendation;	  at	  least	  I	  have	  no	  
knowledge	  of	  any	  such	  case	  (see	  also	  German	  et	  al.	  2013,	  p.	  7;	  Isaksson	  and	  Sigte	  2009,	  p.	  25).	  Yet	  there	  is	  
evidence	  of	  the	  government	  alienating	  the	  customary	  land	  rights	  of	  pastoralists	  through	  other	  (policy)	  means	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	  protected	  areas	  and	  hunting	  tourism	  (see	  the	  recent	  case	  of	  the	  Loliondo	  Game	  
Controlled	  Area,	  Nelson	  2013;	  Smith	  2014;	  TNRF	  2011).	  	  
32	  In	  the	  law,	  it	  says	  „The	  Commissioner	  or	  an	  authorized	  officer…“	  (URT	  1999b,	  s.	  4(7)).	  The	  Commissioner	  for	  
Lands	  is	  a	  government	  official	  appointed	  by	  the	  President,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Land	  Act	  1999	  (URT	  1999a,	  s.	  
9(1)),	  and	  responsible	  to	  the	  Minister	  for	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  Land	  Act	  (URT	  1999a,	  s.	  10(1)).	  In	  practice,	  
authorized	  district	  land	  officers	  usually	  represent	  the	  Commissioner	  in	  their	  district.	  
33	  According	  to	  the	  law	  (URT	  1999b,	  s.	  4(8)),	  agreement	  has	  to	  be	  reached	  with	  the	  Commissioner	  for	  Lands.	  
However,	  in	  practice,	  compensation	  is	  directly	  negotiated	  and	  paid	  by	  the	  investor.	  Direct	  payment	  by	  the	  investor	  
is	  supported	  by	  the	  law	  (URT	  1999b,	  s.	  4(11)).	  
34	  This	  is	  contrary	  to	  Vermeulen	  and	  Cotula	  (2010,	  p.	  911)	  who	  wrote	  that	  Tanzanian	  legislation	  would	  only	  foresee	  
compensation	  for	  loss	  of	  improvements,	  not	  for	  land.	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implemented to a limited extent. My own research results in this regard partly coincide with 
these findings, as displayed in more detail in Articles I and II and in Section 7.2. 
4.2	   Investment	  in	  agricultural	  land	  in	  Tanzania	  
4.2.1	   Agrarian	  development	  and	  investment	  policies	  
Over the last decade, the Tanzanian government has shifted its focus regarding agrarian 
development from smallholder farming to large-scale farming (Abdallah et al. 2013, p. 51). 
Tanzania’s ‘Kilimo Kwanza’ initiative (Kiswahili for ‘Agriculture First’) is a modernisation 
strategy launched in 2009 that seeks to transform and strengthen the Tanzanian agricultural 
sector by stimulating public and private investment with different incentives and improved 
infrastructure (Abdallah et al. 2013, p. 39; Polack et al. 2013, p. 23). The related Southern 
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) is additionally seeking to “foster 
inclusive, commercially successful agribusinesses that will benefit the region’s small-scale 
farmers” through a public-private partnership approach (SAGCOT 2014; German et al. 2013, 
p. 8). The SAGCOT is criticised for promoting large-scale commercialisation and neglecting to 
strengthen smallholders (Sulle and Hall 2013). 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the government started to introduce an institutional and legal 
framework for attracting foreign investment (Abdallah et al. 2013, p. 51; Vermeulen and 
Cotula 2010, p. 910). With the Tanzania Investment Act of 1997, it established the Tanzania 
Investment Centre (TIC). The objectives of this “one stop facilitation center for all investors” 
(TIC n.d., p. 79) are to “co-ordinate, encourage, promote and facilitate investment in Tanzania“ 
(URT 1997, s. 5). In recent years, the government has actively invited foreign investors to 
come to Tanzania (interview with TIC officials in 2010 and 2011; Al Shaibany 2014). The TIC 
is mandated to establish a ‘land bank’ in order to ease land access for investors. But so far, 
very little land, mainly from abandoned former state farms, has been allocated to this database. 
The process to include ‘idle’ village land in the land bank seems to be stagnating due to slow 
administrative procedures, potential conflicts and a lack of funds for compensating villages 
(interview with TIC official in 2011; Abdallah et al. 2013, pp. 39f, 42; Massay 2015, p. 388).  
The wave of foreign land deals, particularly for agrofuels, has provoked critical debate in the 
Tanzanian media and in academia and civil society organisations (e.g. Bengesi et al. 2009; 
Gordon-Maclean et al. 2009; Kamanga 2008; Mande 2009; Mngazija 2009; Mwamila et al. 
2009; Ng’wanakilala 2010; The Citizen 2013). At the end of 2010, the government published 
new biofuel regulations, which set a ceiling of 20,000 hectares for agrofuel investments, and 
limited the duration of land tenure for biofuel projects to 25 years, with an initial conditional 
period of five years for the investor “to demonstrate investment seriousness” (URT 2010, s. 
20). 
4.2.2	   Recent	  foreign	  large-­‐scale	  land	  deals	  in	  Tanzania	  
The evidence for foreign (and domestic) land deals in Tanzania is limited for several reasons 
(Hanlon 2011, p. 16; Locher and Sulle 2013). One explanation is “that procedures for foreign 
investors to access land for investment have become ad hoc and that Tanzanian institutions do 
not have a full overview of what is going on in the sector” (Abdallah et al. 2014, p. 51). The 
following observations can nonetheless be made. 
There has been a steep increase in the number of companies intending to invest in agriculture 
in the last decade, as registered by the TIC (see Figure 7)35. Of these registered companies, 
according to Abdallah et al. (2014, p. 46), some have already acquired land, while others are 
                                                      
35	  The	  two	  setbacks	  in	  the	  increase	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  political	  uncertainties	  during	  the	  change	  of	  president	  in	  
2005	  and	  by	  the	  global	  economic	  crisis	  in	  2008/2009	  (Abdallah	  et	  al.	  2014,	  p.	  46).	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still in the process of clarification. Many of the investments realised are located on former 
state-owned land (Abdallah et al. 2014, p. 53). 
 
Figure	  7:	  Number	  of	  companies	  investing	  in	  agriculture	  in	  Tanzania,	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  companies	  
as	  newly	  registered	  at	  the	  TIC,	  2001-­‐2012;	  Source:	  representation	  by	  Abdallah	  et	  al.	  (2014,	  p.	  45),	  
based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  TIC	  Research	  and	  Information	  Division,	  2013.	  
	  
The increase in the number of registered companies in the years 2005-08 can be mainly 
attributed to (planned) agrofuel projects (Abdallah et al. 2014, p. 46). However, there is a 
striking gap between planned and implemented agrofuel deals (Hultman et al. 2012; Locher 
and Sulle 2013, p. 36). According to Abdallah et al. (2014, p. 45f), 32 projects, mainly by 
European investors, requested a total of around one million hectares of land, nine of them 
acquired land and only six went operational. Of those, three went bankrupt, and the others 
changed to food production. The reasons given are the global financial crisis, the disappointing 
economic performance of the most common agrofuel crop, jatropha, poor management and 
political uncertainties about the long-announced new biofuel regulation (Hultman et al. 2012; 
Nelson et al. 2012).  
The increase in registrations for agricultural land deals at the TIC in most recent years is 
attributed to food investments (mainly rice and sugar cane plantations) related to the Kilimo 
Kwanza strategy (Abdallah et al. 2014, p. 46). However, little is known about these projects. 
Land investments also take place in the forestry sector. Though there are not many forestry 
companies, their plantations cover comparatively large areas (Locher and Sulle 2013; TIC n.d., 
pp. 32f). However, one of the established projects was cancelled in 2012 (see Section 5.2); 
other projects for expansion were withdrawn, indicating a potential slow-down in new forestry 
investments in Tanzania. 
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crisis. The increase in 2011 and 2012 is connected to food-related investments 
under Kilimo Kwanza. The TIC statistics include all investments with a Cer-
tificate of Incentive. Some of these have acq ired land, while others have 
initiated the process of identifying land for investment.
Empirical evidence Diligent Ltd: The Dutch company Diligent Ltd operated a 
unique out-grower system with more than 100,000 farmers and was expanding 
rapidly towards central and west Tanzania when the liquidation of the company 
occurred in 012. The CEO claimed lack of funds for the company’s activities 
as the main reason. The company had not acquired any land; smallholders in 
the area already grew jatropha trees as hedges in some villages as far back as 
the 1960s. Diligent Ltd began to buy the seeds from already existing plants. 
Som  women we interviewed complained about low payments. They were 
themselves peeling the fruits to be able to sell the seeds to the company. The 
seeds were collected in the villages by a middleman, a villager, who delivered 
the seeds to the factory and brought payment back to the village. Whether 
the right amount was paid to the individual village producer was difficult for 
Diligent to control. The high number of farmers required for the production 
made contract procedures complicated and costly. We consider this investment 
to have less risk of negative socio-economic and environmental impacts, since 
it was based on villagers’ existing jatropha hedges. The attitude and ambition 
of the CEO were similar to those of NGOs. 
The company had built a small factory in Arusha using technical equipment 
2.1 The number of new companies investing in agriculture, registered by the TIC 
annually, 2001–12 (source: TIC research and information division, 2013)
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5	   The	  case	  studies:	  sites	  and	  investment	  projects	  
 
The two case studies were selected based on their characteristics and criteria as described in 
Section 3.2. Their location is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure	  8:	  Map	  of	  Tanzania	  showing	  the	  case	  study	  areas;	  Source:	  own	  representation,	  design	  by	  	  
M.	  Steinmann;	  Legend:	  A:	  Case	  study	  on	  the	  New	  Forests	  Company	  (NFC)	  in	  Kilolo	  District,	  	  
B:	  Case	  study	  on	  the	  Tanga	  Forests	  Ltd	  (TF)	  in	  Pangani	  District. 
5.1	   Case	  study	  A:	  The	  New	  Forests	  Company	  in	  Kilolo	  District	  
Kilolo is a hilly district in Iringa region, located in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania. It has 
favourable conditions for the permanent cultivation of staple foods, vegetables and fruit. Many 
households plant timber as savings, particularly on their less fertile or steep plots of land. 
People also keep a few cattle in some areas. In search of income opportunities, some young 
men migrate temporarily to other regions in Tanzania to take up employment in forestry 
plantations. Most of the people in the area belong to the Wahehe and Wabena peoples and are 
Christians. Women were reported to be involved in village decision-making, though to a lesser 
extent than men. 
In 2006, a Member of Parliament from Kilolo District introduced the New Forests Company 
(NFC) to his district. UK-based NFC presents itself as a sustainable forestry business. Its 
plantations in Uganda, Mozambique and Tanzania plan to produce feed material for sawmills, 
board factories and pole treatment plants, as well as energy operations (NFC 2015a). Initially, 
the company also aimed to produce carbon credits in compliance with the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)36 under the Kyoto Protocol (NFC 2009), but carbon sequestration goals do 
not seem to be part of NFC’s focus anymore. However, the company has acquired Forest 
                                                      
36	  The	  CDM	  is	  a	  mechanism	  based	  on	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  that	  promotes	  sustainable	  development	  and	  emission	  
reductions.	  It	  certifies	  emission-­‐reduction	  projects	  in	  developing	  countries.	  The	  emission	  reduction	  credits	  earned	  
are	  saleable,	  and	  can	  be	  used	  by	  industrialised	  countries	  to	  meet	  a	  part	  of	  their	  emission	  reduction	  targets	  under	  
the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	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Stewardship Council (FSC)37 certificates for its Ugandan plantations and planned to have its 
Tanzanian plantation certified in 2014 (NFC 2014, p. 13), thus committing itself to respecting 
certain social and environmental standards. NFC emphasises that applying Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) is a worthwhile strategy to reduce its risk of losing the investment to a 
fire (NFC 2014, p. 6). This is particularly the case in the research area, where it is a common 
practice to ‘clean’ fields after harvest by burning crop residues, and fires regularly get out of 
control. NFC therefore depends on the collaboration and benevolence of the local community 
for the prevention and, if need be, fighting of fires. It states: “CSR makes financial sense by 
reducing security costs and mitigating future risks, as prevention is always cheaper than 
treatment“ (NFC 2015b). 
NFC representatives visited 12 villages in Kilolo District to promote their investment. In some 
villages the company's request for land was totally declined, with the argument of a lack of 
land. Other villages generally welcomed the investor. By early 2013, NFC had acquired 6,300 
hectares of land in seven villages and was still in the process of acquiring more, in an attempt 
to gain more connected pieces of land. The transferred land belonged mainly to individual 
households (with one exception, where village land had been transferred; see Research Paper 
II). Some of the land was permanently cultivated, and a small part was used for grazing cattle; 
other land was not in use, mainly due to its remoteness from the settlements. Landholders were 
compensated with cash. In addition, the investor promised to support the local communities in 
terms of infrastructure improvements, distribution of seedlings, and training in enhanced tree 
nursing practices. In 2009, the company established a tree nursery and its first plantations of 
pine and eucalyptus (see Figures 9 and 10). By early 2013, it had provided a maternity ward 
and funded the improvement of a school building (communication with the district land officer 
in 2013; LARRRI 2010). 
 
Figure	  9:	  Tree	  nursery	  in	  Kilolo	  District;	  photo	  by	  M.	  Locher	  (2011).	  
                                                      
37	  FSC	  is	  an	  international	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  organisation	  that	  promotes	  responsible	  forest	  management	  (FSC	  2015).	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Figure	  10:	  Plantation	  of	  pine	  tree	  seedlings	  in	  Kilolo	  District;	  photo	  by	  M.	  Locher	  (2010).	  
5.2	   Case	  study	  B:	  Tanga	  Forests	  Ltd	  in	  Pangani	  District	  
Pangani District is located on the northern part of the Tanzanian coast. The local people 
practise small-scale subsistence farming and some cash crop farming (sunflower, fruits). They 
also fish and keep some livestock. Large areas of land are covered with bush, and are partly 
used by pastoralists for grazing and by villagers for collecting firewood and grass that is used 
for weaving mats and other products. An old sisal plantation run by a Kenyan company38 
provides labour opportunities. The work is considered very tough and is mostly carried out by 
migrants from Kigoma region, who live in a separate colony provided by the company. The 
ethnic composition of the study area is broadly mixed; the predominant religion is Islam. With 
some exceptions, women seemed to be little involved in village decision-making. 
In 2006, Tanga Forests Ltd (TF) became active in Pangani. It is the subsidiary of the 
Norwegian company Green Resources SA (GRAS), which has been running large tree 
plantations in Iringa region since the 1990s. According to the company’s statement, a major 
part of GRAS plantations are FSC certified (GRAS 2015a, 2015b). GRAS produces and sells 
carbon credits on the voluntary market; they are certified against different standards (Voluntary 
Carbon Standard and The Climate Community & Biodiversity Alliance) including a CDM 
project (CCBA 2015; GRAS 2015b, 2015c; UNFCCC 2015). In 2005, GRAS established TF 
with the aim of expanding its plantations to Pangani and other districts in Tanga region. 
TF acquired an area of around 7,500 hectares in six villages in Pangani. With one exception, 
the land had been village reserve land covered with bushes and shrubs. TF did not pay any 
compensation in cash, but instead built various infrastructural buildings in each village, 
                                                      
38	  Amboni	  Plantations	  Ltd,	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  REA	  Vipingo	  Plantations	  Limited.	  REA	  Vipingo	  Group	  has	  its	  headquarters	  
in	  Nairobi	  (Rea	  Vipingo	  Group	  2014).	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according to their priorities. This compensation in kind included a dispensary, a village office, 
a water tank, and school rooms. The company established a nursery and three plantations of 
teak and eucalyptus (see Figures 11 and 12). 
In July 2012, GRAS closed down its subsidiary, TF. The reasons it gave were the weak 
performance of the planted seedlings due to unsuitable soil and changing weather conditions, 
but also conflicts over land issues (personal communication with former Plantation Operations 
Manager in 2013). 
 
Figure	  11:	  Teak	  plantation	  in	  Pangani	  District;	  photo	  by	  M.	  Locher	  (2011).	  
 
 
Figure	  12:	  New	  village	  office	  provided	  by	  the	  investor	  in	  Pangani	  District;	  photo	  by	  M.	  Locher	  (2011).	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6	  	   Synthesis	  of	  the	  research	  papers:	  aims	  and	  results	  
 
The four research papers in Part II constitute the core of this PhD thesis. Paper II has been 
submitted to the Journal of Eastern African Studies, where it is going through an anonymised 
review by at least two referees. The other three papers have already been published in double-
blind peer-reviewed journals. My contribution to the four papers is as follows: 
• Paper I is co-authored by Ulrike Müller-Böker. I contributed the initial ideas, empirical 
data, data analysis and a major part of the conceptual work. I drafted the first manuscript, 
based on discussions about the main arguments, concepts and conclusions with my co-
author. The article was then structured and written in collaboration with Ulrike Müller-
Böker. I finalised it based on the referees’ comments in consultation with her. 
• Paper II is single-authored. 
• Paper III is co-authored by Bernd Steimann and Bishnu Raj Upreti. Using the main idea 
by my co-authors and an initial draft by the second author, I elaborated the structure and 
arguments of the article. I contributed a third of the empirical material and reworked the 
discussion and conclusion in the manuscript. After receiving the referees’ comments, I 
completed the article based on consultation with my co-authors.  
• Paper IV is co-authored by Emmanuel Sulle. I provided the initial idea and the conceptual 
design for the article, conducted a major part of the review of compiled data from 
literature and contributed a smaller amount of empirical data. I wrote the manuscript in 
collaboration with my co-author. I established the conclusion in consultation with 
Emmanuel Sulle, and finalised the article after the revision. 
6.1	   Research	  Paper	  I	  
Locher M., Müller-Böker U. 2014: “Investors are good, if they follow the rules” – Power 
relations and local perceptions in the case of two European forestry companies in 
Tanzania. In: Geographica Helvetica, 69(4), 249-258. 
This article analyses two important aspects of the case studies in Tanzania in detail. First, it 
presents local people’s perceptions of the land deals, thereby answering research question 3. In 
doing so, it also briefly describes the land deals’ implications (research question 2). Second, 
the paper examines the power relations between local people and investors during the decision-
making and negotiation process, taking account of intra-community differences. Hence, it 
addresses research question 1. 
The analysis shows that most local inhabitants welcomed the investors, based on – at least 
partially justified – expectations of gaining employment and infrastructure or other benefits as 
compensation for their land. Both types of compensation – in cash for individual land (in Case 
Study A) and in kind for communal land (in Case Study B) – were appreciated in principle. 
Individuals who received cash used it for varying short-term and more sustainable purposes 
(i.e. for immediate consumption versus improved housing or school fees). Many people also 
welcomed the infrastructure on offer, namely a dispensary, a village office, a water tank and a 
school-building improvement, among others. Local inhabitants expressed their view that the 
Tanzanian state did not have enough funds to provide such facilities. Interviewees further 
emphasised that there were no, or not enough, employment opportunities in their region. They 
therefore considered private investments to be necessary for the development of their region. 
The paper stresses that there are three crucial conditions that determine the rather positive view 
of many local people. First, villagers strongly expect the investors to follow the proper 
procedure, respect local land rights and provide the agreed compensation in time. Second, local 
people expect to be able to continue their land-based livelihood strategies; thus, whenever 
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possible, they only provided land that was of no current use to them to the investors. Third, 
local people wish to have additional labour opportunities to diversify their livelihood 
strategies. However, the conditions of the offered labour opportunities were considered very 
hard in Case Study A, and the salary low and often paid late in Case Study B. Disappointment 
about the labour conditions on offer, as well as tensions and conflicts related to omitted land 
rights or delayed compensation payments (see also Article II) led to a more nuanced perception 
among affected people. Some even turned against the companies. 
Focusing on the first research question regarding land deal processes, the paper scrutinised the 
power relations between local inhabitants and investors. Using access theory and a bargaining 
model, the analysis revealed the following power strands that shape decision-making on land 
deals. 
• Tanzanian land law: It gives considerable decision-making power to the local population. 
• Access to government authorities: Civil servants and politicians are highly respected 
among villagers and thus have a considerable impact in two ways: they firstly influence 
the decision-making process when accompanying investors in the villages, and secondly 
the implementation of the transfer process, including the clarification of complex land 
tenure situations and compensation settlements. They fulfil their intermediary roles in a 
variety of ways, ranging from supporting the local population up to seeking personal 
benefits through formal collaboration with the investor and playing a double role vis-à-vis 
the villagers. 
• Legitimizing development discourses: The Tanzanian government’s discourse of rural 
development, reproduced by government authorities at all levels and employed by 
investors, provides legitimation for land deals. 
• Unequal access to knowledge about land rights: While investors have access to legal 
experts and can get support from the Tanzania Investment Centre in land rights issues, 
local communities have usually only very limited knowledge of land law. 
• Local communities' potential resistance: In conflictive cases, local people could 
potentially (threaten to) employ illegal actions such as destroying the plantations as a final 
resort. 
• Unequal resources and alternatives: the investors’ favourable resources, i.e. their 
financial assets, and unequal availability of alternatives to the deal play a crucial role in 
bargaining situations. As long as investors have relatively unrestricted access to land in 
many countries, the resources villagers contribute to deals – land and labour – are 
comparatively easy for investors to replace; and as long as rural people receive only 
limited support in terms of infrastructure and income opportunities from other sources, 
they have hardly any alternatives to the proposed deals. Hence, many of them see foreign 
investment projects as a unique chance to improve their livelihoods. 
These power strands lead to villagers having rather weak bargaining power vis-à-vis investors. 
Their power varies between groups within local communities. Some relevant factors are 
people’s economic situation, their education, access to knowledge, gender and livelihood 
strategy, and other aspects of social identity. For example in case study A, households in 
adverse economic conditions, be it due to a drought or for personal reasons, tended to accept 
the deal, even when the compensation on offer was low. In case study B, women and 
pastoralists participated less in Village Assemblies that decided on the land deal and the 
infrastructure being offered. Generally, comparatively privileged households or individuals 
have a lower risk of agreeing to a land deal under unfavourable conditions and consequently 
suffering from adverse consequences. On the other hand, poor members of communities seem 
to make use of new labour opportunities more often than wealthier people. 
Overall, unequal power relations during the land deal processes led to ambivalent outcomes 
and mixed local perceptions of the analysed land investments. This is despite the presumably 
more positive pre-conditions compared to other land deals – namely the relatively progressive 
land laws in Tanzania, and the assumption that forestry investors care more about good 
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relations with local people than investors from other sectors. The paper concludes that the 
global land rush in its current form provides severe risks for the livelihoods of rural 
populations.	  
6.2	   Research	  Paper	  II	  
Locher M. submitted: “How come others are selling our land?” – Customary land rights 
and the complex land acquisition process of a UK-based forestry company in Tanzania, 
submitted to: Journal of Eastern African Studies. 
Research Paper II provides in-depth findings related to research questions 1 and 2. It describes 
the decision-making and transfer procedure of a specific land deal in the context of a complex 
land tenure situation, and the related immediate implications including violations of land 
rights. It analyses flaws in the law and particularly in its implementation and reveals how 
unequal social relations lead to unequal recognition of customary and statutory land laws and 
rights. Employing the property concept and the legal pluralism perspective, the article 
elaborates the long and complicate process when the village Kidabaga transferred an area 
called Witamasiva – remote village spare land with no clear boundaries – to the New Forests 
Company (NFC). When NFC started to plant, it turned out that people from neighbouring 
village Kiwalamo had been using part of the plot, based on longstanding local agreements. 
After around two years, their claims were finally approved. However, the land had already 
been transferred, so they were not given back their land as they had requested, but were 
compensated for it. 
In the area around Witamasiva, customary and statutory laws seem to have coexisted since the 
1970s, without creating major tensions. However, their discrepancy became obvious with the 
investor's request to acquire that land. On the one hand, affected former landholders from 
Kiwalamo feel that it is their land that was sold by others. They refer to customary law and 
long-standing customary rights over that land, claiming that land tenure is regulated by 
agreements among local inhabitants, with village boundaries having no particular effect on the 
matter. On the other hand, part of the villagers and village representatives in Kidabaga feel that 
they rightfully decided to transfer Witamasiva – and accidentally also some area around it – 
and claim that it was their village’s land. They refer to statutory law, which foresees the 
Village Assembly as the institution responsible for taking decisions regarding land within 
village boundaries. It is clear that the decision for land transfer was not made according to the 
customary law of Kiwalamo villagers, but rather according to statutory law. According to 
Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan (2001, p. 11), it can be concluded that the legitimising institution 
behind the statutory law was stronger than the collectivity behind the customary law. The 
analysis of the institutions and social relations reveals that statutory law enjoys broad 
recognition from all groups of stakeholders. It is embodied by district officials, who are highly 
respected by local people (as also highlighted in Research Paper I). Thus statutory law has 
stronger backing than customary law, which is only fully recognised and maintained by groups 
of villagers. The village government has a challenging double role, representing both statutory 
and customary laws. Village Council members may not always be capable of fully backing 
customary rights, as it can be very difficult to know about and identify all local arrangements. 
The land deal process implemented as per statutory law featured at least six flaws at local and 
district level. The flaws included representatives of the village not showing the respective area 
to the district officers properly and not informing potentially affected villagers from the 
neighbouring village, and district officials not taking hints about affected landholders seriously 
and pressuring affected stakeholders to agree on compensation when the problems were 
recognised instead of starting the whole process from the beginning again. The flaws are 
related to (i) the difficulty of identifying local land orders in complex land tenure regimes, (ii) 
unequal social relations between government authorities, members of the Village Council, 
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other villagers and non-village members and (iii) unequal knowledge about statutory law of 
local people compared to representatives of the district and the investor (see also Research 
Paper I). 
The paper illustrates that when flaws happen in the land transfer process, be they at local or 
district level, it is hard for affected local people to defend their rights. This resulted in adverse 
implications such as loss of land against own will, major delays in compensation payments, 
and a resulting decrease in food security for some households. It further led to insecurity 
among the villagers in Kiwalamo, as the deal cancelled part of their long-standing customary 
land arrangements, which in turn questioned other parts of their arrangements. In the worst 
cases, ‘indirectly compulsory resettlements’ were feared, i.e. although no housing was 
affected, some villagers indicated that they did not have enough arable land anymore to sustain 
their livelihoods, and as there was no reserve land left in their village, they felt compelled to 
move elsewhere. One of the weaknesses of the Tanzanian law is that it does not foresee such 
situations, so the affected people were not compensated for resettlement, as is the case when 
housing is directly affected by land deals. 
The paper concludes that there is no guarantee that local land rights can be fully protected in 
the global land rush. The analysis showed that relying on legal procedure and on elected 
village representatives does not guarantee conflict-free land transactions. This is because of 
flaws in the law, but also, and more importantly, because several errors can occur during their 
implementation at different levels. Some of the weaknesses in implementation are related to 
unequal social relations between actors backing different laws. Thus, the claim that 
transnational land deals can be disciplined by improved regulations is questionable (see also 
Research Paper III). The findings of this paper support calls for alternative pathways of 
agrarian development that do not affect people’s land rights. 
6.3	   Research	  Paper	  III	  
Locher M., Steimann, B., Bishnu, R. U. 2012: Land grabbing, investment principles and 
plural legal orders of land use. In: Journal of Legal Pluralism, 65, 31-63. 
Research Paper III builds on the findings regarding research question 1 as displayed in 
Research Papers I and II. The article focuses on two international proposals that came up in the 
broader context of growing concerns about potential negative impacts of the global land rush. 
These are: 
• the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries 
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, endorsed by the Committee on 
Food Security (CFS) to protect people's rights (FAO 2012; in short FAO guidelines); and 
• the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods 
and Resources, developed by experts from the FAO, the World Bank Group, the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), to make such investments more 
responsible (FAO et al. 2010; in short RAI principles)39. 
One of the proposals’ central tenets is that investors and host governments respect local 
people’s existing property rights over land by formalising them in a transparent and 
participatory manner. The article challenges the two proposals from a legal pluralism 
                                                      
39	  The	  RAI	  principles	  have	  been	  strongly	  criticised	  for	  having	  been	  created	  by	  experts	  from	  international	  
organisations	  instead	  of	  by	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  stakeholders.	  The	  document	  has	  since	  been	  further	  developed	  in	  a	  
participatory	  process	  to	  the	  ‘Principles	  for	  Responsible	  Investment	  in	  Agriculture	  and	  Food	  Systems’,	  which	  were	  
endorsed	  by	  the	  Committee	  on	  Food	  Security	  (CFS)	  in	  October	  2014.	  However,	  Article	  III,	  written	  in	  2011	  and	  
published	  in	  2012,	  focuses	  on	  the	  2010	  version	  of	  the	  RAI	  principles.	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perspective. Referring to empirical evidence from Tanzania, Nepal and Kyrgyzstan, it raises 
three fundamental concerns about the formalisation of property rights.  
First, the paper demonstrates that the recognition of customary rights is a very complex and 
delicate endeavour. Local claims may overlap and compete with each other. Further, local 
elites, including elected representatives in Tanzania, might not be aware of all the flexible 
tenure arrangements in their constituency. One example concerns the case where people lost 
land to an investor against their will. This happened, among other reasons, because the village 
chairman, who was responsible for instructing government officials about a particular plot of 
land, was not fully familiar with the specific area and its local tenure arrangements (see 
Research Paper II). Further, individual property boundaries are often not visibly marked, but 
are conveyed verbally by referring to natural landmarks and reproduced through regular use 
such as planting crops. However, some land is not used intensively and there are also fallow 
periods. This makes it particularly difficult for outsiders to physically detect customary 
property rights during short visits. As a result, external interventions may fail to sufficiently 
account for existing property claims and rights, even when they have tried to do so in a 
participatory manner. Neither of the two international proposals addresses this in a fully 
satisfactory manner.  
Second, the paper argues that formalisation through state intervention is sometimes necessary, 
but the centralist approach of formalising property rights, as proposed in the RAI principles, 
cannot be recommended in such circumstances. In many contexts, as illustrated in examples 
from Nepal and Kyrgyzstan, this approach has resulted in adverse effects for local 
communities due to the expansion of power of the central state administration rather than by 
strengthening local communities’ rights. 
Third, a more rights-based vision of a property regime that respects local land rights as 
proposed by the FAO guidelines still runs the risk of reinforcing unequal local power 
structures. For example in Tanzania, customary land rights can be formalised at local level. Yet 
this requires registration at village and district level and includes certain costs for landholders. 
Thus formalisation might be less accessible for poor people than for better-off villagers, and 
easier for members of the village government who have more regular contacts with district 
officials and often better knowledge on land laws than others. Yet, a rights-based approach to 
property rights leaves it to local communities to decide whether or not their land should 
become a marketable good to outsiders. The example of Tanzania’s Village Land Act of 2001 
with its decentralised land management, which gives full legal status to customary rights, is an 
attempt in that direction. Yet implementation brings its own challenges. 
In many countries, the full realisation of a rights-based property regime would require new 
regulations, land reforms and fundamental changes in governance. Hence, from an analytical 
perspective, a moratorium on large-scale land deals would be the most appropriate step in 
order to implement such longer-term strategies to protect customary rights. From a more 
pragmatic perspective, though, the research paper acknowledges the FAO guidelines and – to a 
far lesser extent – the RAI principles as initial, more immediate efforts to reduce the negative 
effects of the land rush. 
Conceptually, this article concludes that employing a legal pluralism perspective is very 
helpful for gaining a holistic understanding of land tenure systems. This is crucial for the 
analysis of potential effects and proposed measures in the context of the global land rush.	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6.4	   Research	  Paper	  IV	  
Locher M., Sulle E. 2014: Challenges and methodological flaws in reporting the global 
land rush: observations from Tanzania. In: Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(4), 569-592. 
This paper provides answers to research question 4. It contributes to the evolving debate on 
appropriate research methodologies for studying the global land rush. The paper shows that 
flawed methods of citing and using data allow the dissemination of inaccurate information. 
This complicates the task of providing an overview of the situation of land deals, which is 
already challenging enough owing to the dynamic and non-transparent nature of the 
investments. 
The paper first illustrates the challenges facing researchers in accessing relevant information in 
Tanzania. These are linked to the lack of a central government database and to the complexity 
of the land deal process. The analysis then presents the following methodological issues. 
Sources in several publications on land deals are given in aggregate, incomplete and inaccurate 
ways. As a consequence, readers are unable to trace the original sources of information. This 
results in neglected quality checks, “recycling of facts long after their sell-by date” (Scoones et 
al. 2013, p. 475) leading to the reporting of ceased or never realised land deals, and double 
reporting of deals under different names. Another major problem is related to the strong 
reliance on media sources in research on the global land rush. In addition to the identified 
selection biases in media reports summarised elsewhere, it is assumed that journalists focus on 
investments that provide exciting headlines, such as land deals that result in conflicts and 
protests. This bias, which could be called ‘bias towards land deals with spectacular outcomes’, 
might lead to the under-reporting of deals that draw less public attention, namely deals that 
create fewer conflicts or perhaps even positive outcomes for local people. The paper further 
illustrates that in Tanzania’s case, over-reporting also happens when media articles present 
investment projects as active, though they are merely announced plans that might never be 
implemented. In addition, it was found that announcements made by investment companies, 
though often considered ‘reliable sources’, are similarly unreliable. Not only do some investors 
seek to conceal information on land deals from the public, but companies also announce land 
investment projects as operational (possibly in an attempt to attract investors) when these 
projects have in fact either already ceased or the land deals have not yet started. The 
consequences of the flawed practices we present are an unnecessarily blurred picture of the 
land deal situation, producing an inadequate basis for relevant political decisions or social 
actions and a misleading starting point for new research projects.  
The paper proposes a more specific, precise and rigorous way of collecting, presenting and 
reproducing data, which allows for the tracking of the primary sources of all the detailed 
information given in compilations of land deals. Though laborious and less user-friendly, this 
is the only way that compilations can serve as appropriate databases to support further research 
and political and social responses. 
The paper refers to the data compilation and analysis for Tanzania published in Locher and 
Sulle (2013), which is mainly based on primary sources, and distinguishes between announced, 
ongoing, concluded and discontinued land deal processes. These figures are lower than 
contemporaneous figures in similar databases. The observations show, among other things, that 
there is a significant difference between the land deal projects that have been announced and 
implemented, that the boom in biofuel projects has subsided, and that the relevance of 
domestic land investments is largely unknown. 
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7	   Final	  reflections,	  conclusion	  and	  recommendations	  
7.1	   Reflections	  on	  the	  conceptual	  and	  methodological	  approaches	  	  
This research provides empirical findings for a debate that is often determined by theoretical 
perspectives and assumptions. My choice of the conceptual approaches was not based on an 
overall theoretical perspective. Yet it was coherent in the sense that the approaches – namely 
the critical livelihoods perspective, the property concept and legal pluralism perspective, 
access theory and the bargaining power model – complement each other, thereby furthering our 
understanding of land-related issues. The unique combination of approaches enabled me to (i) 
focus on local inhabitants’ agency and on differentiation among them; (ii) comprehend 
property and access to land in its full complexity; and (iii) analyse power relations from 
different angles. The case studies are located in Tanzania, but the research approach can be 
applied to other contexts. 
While the critical livelihoods perspective was applied from the beginning, the other conceptual 
approaches were chosen after a first analysis of the data. In what is a relatively new research 
field, this inductive procedure allowed me to be open to the empirical findings during the 
generation and first analysis of the data – in line with the overall qualitative research approach 
and the livelihood perspective’s claim to start from the ‘reality on the ground’. However, this 
procedure does present the disadvantage of offering only a limited theory-led focus during first 
data generation. For example, the concept of brokerage (Bierschenk et al. 2002), though only 
applicable to a limited extent, could be used in further studies. If employed at an early stage of 
the study, and with some adaptations, it could be useful during field research when one is 
examining specific aspects of the role government authorities play as intermediaries between 
investors and local populations. Yet, if not applied from the beginning, one might lack some 
specific data when conducting data analysis later on. 
Based on the existing information in 2009, broad, empirical research questions, such as the 
ones treated in this PhD thesis, were adequate overall. With a growing body of evidence about 
the global land rush, more specific – and partly also more theoretical – research questions 
would be suitable for further research. The focus in this study was on the more immediate 
effects of land deals on local livelihoods. Further research will be needed to determine the 
long-term outcomes. 
Lastly, I would like to add four minor observations regarding data generation. First, for expert 
interviews, my approach of being well prepared yet flexible in terms of my positioning vis-à-
vis the interview partner proved fruitful, as did my spontaneous adjustments during the 
interview. Second, I found repeated interviews effective for generating data in villages, as it 
allowed me to gain people’s trust and have better access to their personal perspectives. Third, 
direct access to labourers can turn out to be a particular challenge, depending on the local 
setting and the relation with the company. Labourers’ time constraints and access problems in 
remote areas can hamper data generation and need to be taken into account when planning 
future research on this issue. Finally, it would have been useful to conduct more participatory 
observation in the villages; this would have given me a more profound understanding of local 
social structures including intra-household gender relations, and I could have participated in 
village meetings. However, I believe that I covered most of the relevant issues by triangulating 
methods and considering the literature. 
7.2	   Summary	  of	  the	  findings	  regarding	  the	  research	  questions	  
The overarching aim of this thesis was to contribute to a differentiated analysis of the recent 
land rush in rural areas in the Global South. This was done through a detailed analysis of the 
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land deal processes, the immediate outcomes and local people’s perceptions in two selected 
case studies, and by assessing reports and data compilations on the land deal situation in 
Tanzania.  
Considering the lack of empirical evidence on more positive experiences, I deliberately chose 
an investment sector that I presumed would lead to more positive outcomes for the local 
population and a country with comparatively favourable land laws and good potential 
availability of land. The existing research on transnational land deals focused primarily on 
investments for food and fuel, and overlooked the significant role played by the forestry sector. 
I therefore added to a more complete picture of the global land rush by focusing on the forestry 
sector and by analysing cases with potentially positive outcomes. The choice of cases with 
favourable pre-conditions (critical case sampling) also allowed me to draw assumptions about 
land deals under less favourable conditions. Further, my critical analysis of research 
methodologies and existing data, as well as proposed guidelines for responsible land 
governance and investment, also contributed to a differentiated view of the phenomenon and 
its outcomes. In the following section, I shall highlight my main findings, along with the 
overall research questions presented in Section 1.2. 
1.	  How	  do	  land	  acquisition	  processes	  take	  place?	  
At the outset of this thesis, there was hardly any scientific knowledge about the processes of 
how land deals materialise. Focusing on power relations, land rights and differentiation among 
local people, this research highlights how numerous factors interact in this process. Some 
important findings were: 
• Contrary to reports in most literature on the global land rush, local people in Tanzania 
generally do have a say. This is illustrated in the case of several villages where the Village 
Assemblies declined to provide land to the investors due to limited land reserves. They 
could take these decisions based on Tanzanian land law, and were backed up by district 
land officers. Thus local people’s agency must not be underestimated, though this agency 
is subject to power relations; 
• My analysis of power relations between investors and local inhabitants reveals a 
combination of relevant factors that influence land deal processes. The relevant power 
strands include land law, unequal knowledge about land rights, (access to) influential 
government authorities, legitimizing development discourses, local communities' potential 
resistance through (the threat of) destructive actions, and unequal resources and 
alternatives to the deal. The financial resources mobilised by the investors play a pivotal 
role in bargaining situations, and so does local people’s lack of alternative livelihood 
options. I argue that the power strands and factors of bargaining power I identified play – 
with differing weights – an important role in land deals everywhere; 
• Local, district and regional government officials and politicians play an important 
intermediary role in the villagers’ decision-making and the process of land acquisition in 
terms of identifying and recognising local land rights and the settlement of compensation. 
The way government authorities fulfil their roles – whether they support the local 
population or whether they pursue national visions for agrarian development and their 
own personal benefit by working informally or formally for the investor – can 
substantially influence the outcomes of the deals; 
• One needs to differentiate between social groups to analyse power positions and the 
related outcomes of the land deals. Some influential factors are the economic status of the 
household, which provides more or less room for manoeuvre, and people’s level of formal 
education, which determines how well they grasp the land deal processes and their own 
rights. Gender and livelihood strategy (i.e. farming and pastoralism) are also factors in 
some contexts, as they influence the level of participation in village decision-making and 
information sharing. Another important issue in Tanzania is the villagization policy in the 
mid-1970s. The resettlements at that time and related local arrangements among affected 
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landholders contribute considerably to the complexity of land tenure within and across 
village borders, increasing the risk of land rights being neglected. Overall, many villagers 
made their decisions from a weak position, and some were even passed over in the 
decision-making process; 
• The complexity of recognizing local land tenure must not be underestimated. Even when 
companies do try to follow the formal regulations, it is a complicated endeavour and one 
prone to errors. Thus it is hardly possible to guarantee full protection of existing land 
rights. 
2.	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  land	  deals	  and	  related	  investments	  for	  local	  livelihoods?	  
My findings focused on the immediate outcomes rather than the long-term ones and 
complement the existing literature in the following ways: 
• There are plots of land that are unused or only extensively used and that local landholders 
agree to hand over to investors without losing their (immediate) livelihood assets. Thus 
dispossession and ‘surplus populations’ are not always the (direct) result of land deals. 
However, land availability varies at local level and may differ from village to village. 
Plots that are willingly handed over are fragmented and often not convenient or sufficient 
for the investors’ plans; 
• Land investments can have positive implications. Unlike in other case studies carried out 
elsewhere, there was compensation in the form of public infrastructure and cash. Local 
people generally appreciated this. The compensation was particularly welcome in cases 
where people provided land that was of no direct use to them. The investors also offered 
labour options, as largely desired by local people. Yet in many people’s views, the 
conditions were disappointing; 
• At both case study sites, unequal power relations during the negotiations and a lack of 
attention to complex land tenure situations led to cases where land rights were violated, 
inadequate compensation provided and, in the worst cases, food security actually 
decreased; 
• A nuanced analysis shows that poor households with limited access to land are not only 
those with the least bargaining power, but also those who suffer most when they lose land 
under adverse conditions and are left without a basis for their livelihoods. On the other 
hand, some villagers from poor households also benefit from the land investments, at least 
to a limited extent, when they are able to take up labour opportunities that are sometimes 
rejected by members of better-off households. Although the labour conditions are 
arguably insufficient to raise people out of poverty, the new income opportunities do seem 
to make a positive difference to their livelihoods. However, most of the new jobs are not 
permanent positions, and far from all people who lost land were able to take up labour 
opportunities; 
• In general, when discussing new labour opportunities as outcomes of land deals, it is of 
great relevance whether these jobs are a replacement or supplement to existing livelihood 
strategies; in both case study areas, a majority of households were able to continue their 
land-based livelihood strategies. However, this was mostly not the case in conflictive 
situations where people lost land against their will, and when poor households gave away 
their land in times of hardship.  
• Taking a more long-term view, it is important to notice that the villages involved give up 
part of their reserve land for future generations when they agree to transfer unused land to 
an investor. They hand over permanent control of this land to the national government and 
the investors. This is not only the case in Tanzania, but also in other African countries 
with similar legal frameworks. It is to be expected that the descendants of families with 
limited access to land will be the first to suffer from future shortages of land. 
Overall, I have shown that land investments by forestry companies have both positive and 
negative implications for local people and their livelihoods. It would be questionable to weigh 
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up the different implications, as they do not necessarily affect the same people. Moreover, 
drastic individual experiences such as losing land against one’s will are unlikely to be made up 
for by the work opportunities on offer and new infrastructure in the region.  Poorer households, 
who lose land under adverse conditions, and future generations of households with limited 
land, are likely to suffer most in terms of their land-based livelihood strategies. This points to a 
risk of widening social differentiation among rural communities. 
3.	  How	  do	  local	  people	  perceive	  foreign	  land	  investments?	  
My study brings in local stakeholders’ perspectives that are often neglected in other research. 
• Many villagers deliberately agreed to the land deals and the accompanying investments 
due to their expectations regarding infrastructure and labour opportunities. At an initial 
stage of the land deals, at least, they saw the investment projects as a unique chance to 
improve their livelihood situation, and emphasised the limited alternatives that existed. 
• Positive perceptions and related decisions are bound to certain conditions. These 
conditions are (i) a fair land deal process, (ii) (what local people perceived to be) a 
sufficient availability of land that would allow them to keep their own land and land-based 
livelihood strategies, and (iii) opportunities to earn some additional income in the form of 
decent labour opportunities. The last two points are related to the people’s preferred 
livelihood strategies, which they indicated were independent farming (though under more 
supportive conditions) and some occasional additional income from working as labourers.  
• When these three conditions were not met, people’s opinions became more critical or 
negative. After experiencing disappointing labour conditions or conflicts related to 
neglected land rights and delayed compensation payments, some villagers regretted their 
decision and argued that they had not had enough information to fully consider the 
consequences. Other villagers continued to see mainly the investment projects’ positive 
effects.  
• People did not indicate many preferences other than the three aforementioned conditions 
for having a positive attitude towards investors. Some interviewees would have preferred 
a more labour intensive crop (such as sugarcane); others appreciated forestry plantations 
as being ‘good for the environment’. Interestingly, the origin of a company did not 
generally play a significant role in local inhabitants’ perception of investors. If so, the 
preferences of either foreign or Tanzanian origin were related to assumptions that one or 
the other would be more inclined to follow the proper procedure and respect local people 
and their rights. 
4.	  How	  are	  data	  regarding	  the	  global	  land	  rush	  (re)produced	  and	  reported?	  	  
I met many data collection challenges in my initial research into contemporary land deals in 
Tanzania; these were related to the complexity of land deal processes and the limited overview 
of land deals among the central government, but also to flawed methods of presenting and 
reproducing such data. In various publications, sources of data are given in aggregate or 
incomplete ways, making it difficult or impossible to track the primary sources of the given 
information. Other problems are related to the use of media sources and announcements on 
investors’ websites. Both sources are frequently unreliable and lead to both over- and 
underreporting of land deals. The flaws resulted in the dissemination of inaccurate information, 
such as the reporting of land deals that have never materialised. Academics and policymakers 
must realise that knowledge about the land deal situation in Tanzania, and arguably in many 
parts of the world, is still less clear than certain databases and data compilations suggest – 
though the situation has improved in recent times.  
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7.3	   Conclusion	  
As I have outlined, the effects of the analysed land deals vary significantly according to the 
context and to people’s bargaining power, but they are rather ambiguous. It can be assumed 
that land deals under less favourable conditions – for example, in countries with less 
progressive land laws, or with investors who care less about maintaining good relations with 
local people – have worse consequences for local communities. 
Significant and predominantly positive outcomes for local people are only to be expected when 
a bundle of conditions are met:  
• First, land acquisitions would need to be restricted to areas with ample land 
availability, so that they would not necessarily interfere (to any great extent) with 
existing land-based livelihood strategies. It is, however, rare to encounter abundant 
land in large or connected plots that is suitable for investment; 
• Second, it is essential that any land rights, including individual and common 
customary rights, be acknowledged by the national government; 
• Third, decisions regarding land deals should be taken locally. This also requires 
functioning local governments that are accountable to their constituencies; 
• Fourth, it is crucial that there is a political will and a commitment by government 
officials at all levels to implement the provisions of the law and to support the local 
population in their negotiations with investors. Further, the existence of strong civil 
society organisations that keep an eye on the government and step in in favour of local 
populations if necessary is vital; 
• Fifth, all social group of the local population need to be well-informed about their land 
rights and about the potential risks of a land deal; and 
• Sixth, host governments need to maintain a transparent and critical discourse about 
land deals. 
In practice, this bundle of conditions is rarely met in the targeted countries. Hence, even 
though there might be some positive effects associated to a few particular land deals, the global 
land rush, in its present form, is highly questionable and poses a severe danger to the 
livelihoods of rural people. 
7.4	   Recommendations	  for	  policy	  and	  further	  research	  
The dynamic and non-transparent nature of the global land rush calls for continuous 
investigation. In doing this, the use of precise and rigorous methods of collecting, presenting 
and reproducing data is crucial. This may be laborious and time-consuming, but it allows 
important quality checks and follow-ups (Research Paper IV). Generous knowledge-sharing 
among researchers, with representatives of governments and civil society organisations and 
with the interested public is also desirable in order to provide a basis for related political 
decisions, social actions and upcoming research projects. 
In view of the findings regarding land deals’ conflict-ridden processes and ambivalent 
outcomes even in comparatively positive cases (Research Papers I and II), I agree with critical 
scholars and civil society organisations that are campaigning for alternative rural development 
pathways in the Global South or for a moratorium on large-scale land acquisitions (some 
examples are De Schutter 2011; German et al. 2013, p. 15; IPC 2011; see also Seufert 2013, p. 
185 and Research Paper III). At the same time – in the absence of any possibility of halting the 
global land rush for the foreseeable future – there is a need for strict regulations for ongoing 
and forthcoming land deals in order to encourage more socially acceptable processes 
and positive implications for rural people. 
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My detailed analysis of the power strands and bargaining positions during land deal processes 
(Research Paper I) provides indications for potential measures in that regard. I recommend that 
more in-depth case studies be undertaken in order to gain a better understanding of my 
demonstrations, and also perhaps of additional power strands in other contexts.  
In the following sections I outline policy recommendations (based on the aforementioned 
conditions and beyond) and highlight specific further research needs along with them. 
Favourable	  land	  laws	  and	  local	  governance	  
This research has pointed out that favourable national land laws represent a necessary – though 
not sufficient – basis for fairer land deals. The following points are crucial: 
(i) Full recognition of all customary land rights, namely those of individuals and of 
communities, and both registered and unregistered ones, by the national legislation. 
(ii) Establishment of decision-making regarding land deals at local levels in a way that 
gives a voice to all affected holders of land rights.  
The land laws of many countries, often whole legal regimes, would need to be adapted 
accordingly40. Further, meaningful and socially acceptable decision-making at local level also 
requires: 
(iii) Functioning local governments that are accountable to their constituencies. 
In many countries, the realisation of these demands would require fundamental changes in 
governance, which takes political will and a lot of time. The 'Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National 
Food Security' (FAO 2012)41 provide a valuable basis in this regard. Their adaptation and 
national implementation needs to be encouraged (see also Seufert 2013; Sulle and Hall 2014). 
Participatory	  land	  use	  planning	  	  
As highlighted in Research Paper III, detailed land tenure analysis and planning should be 
considered as a mandatory precondition for any land deals. This process should first include a 
careful analysis of local land uses and rights, including those of pastoralists, women and other 
potentially vulnerable groups (see also the recommendations in the Voluntary Guidelines, 
Section 7.3 in FAO 2012). Second, it should establish whether or not there are land reserves 
that can be provided to investors without compromising the local land needs of the present and 
future generations.  
Participatory land use planning at village level, as foreseen by Tanzania’s legal regulations, 
could serve as a something of a model. However, in Tanzania,  ‘…the resulting plans often 
relied on 10-year projections of anticipated use to determine future land needs, in stark contrast 
to the 99-year renewable land leases being negotiated by prospective investors’ (German et al. 
2013, p. 10). The procedures need improving in this regard. More research is recommended on 
the ongoing village land use planning in Tanzania and how this, where implemented, may 
influence land deal decisions. Anecdotal evidence I collected during my research points to 
interesting findings in this regard. 
                                                      
40	  For	  example,	  only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  African	  countries	  feature	  remarkable	  laws	  regarding	  the	  recognition	  of	  
common	  property	  rights,	  yet,	  ‘in	  no	  case	  in	  a	  foolproof	  manner’	  (Alden	  Wily	  2011,	  p.	  745).	  
41	  The	  Voluntary	  Guidelines	  are	  confirmed	  by	  the	  recently	  endorsed	  ‘Principles	  for	  Responsible	  Investment	  in	  
Agriculture	  and	  Food	  Systems’	  (CFS	  2014)	  which	  refer	  to	  them	  regarding	  tenure	  issues	  (Section	  25	  in	  CFS	  2014).	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Sensitisation	  of	  government	  officers	  and	  other	  intermediaries	  
It is not only the legal framework that influences how land deals are implemented, but 
government (land) officers’ knowledge, values and convictions too. Land investment projects 
are shaped by the officers’ ideas about agrarian development, their acknowledgment of 
customary land rights and the understanding of their own roles for example. In some countries, 
the recognition of plural legal orders of land needs to be strengthened to reduce dismissive 
attitudes towards local customs and land rights, for example by adapting training courses for 
government officials42. Further, national development discourses need to be broadened to 
allow for the expression of critical views of the often-dominant neoliberal development model 
(see below). 
Generally, there needs to be greater recognition of the pivotal role of intermediaries – such as 
national, regional and local politicians and officials, as well as civil society organisations and 
businessmen – in the realisation of land deals. These intermediaries might have differing 
characteristics and relevance, depending on the legal setting and the overall context in a given 
country. With a few exceptions (Sud 2014 on India; and to a certain extent Evers et al. 2013b; 
Fairbairn 2013 on Mozambique; Schoneveld 2013), this issue has not been taken up 
satisfactorily, and more research is necessary to understand the role of these ‘missing 
middlemen’43. My data on government officials’ role in Tanzania, though limited, suggest a 
certain tension between politicians who want to enforce land deals and government officials, 
often in subordinate positions, who are responsible for making sure that legal procedures are 
followed – a hypothesis that could be examined in further studies. 
Empowerment	  of	  local	  people	  before	  and	  during	  land	  deal	  processes	  
Overall, power relations during land deal processes must be better balanced in favour of local 
people. This might be pursued by providing the affected villagers with detailed knowledge 
about their land rights and the potential risks of the land deals, which would enable them to 
take informed decisions. In the current situation in Tanzania and elsewhere, where government 
officials are not necessarily neutral supporters of villagers (e.g. as land deals are promoted by 
the national government), external backing would be helpful, e.g. from civil society 
organisations that conduct preparatory training sessions beforehand, or by lawyers that assist 
the villagers during the process. 
There is a need for further research into the power positions of different groups of local people 
vis-à-vis investors during the land deal processes in different contexts. In Tanzania, it is 
recommended to focus in particular on the position of women and their limited participation in 
decision-making, and on pastoralists and internal migrants, who might not (yet) be registered 
in a village and are thus legally excluded from the decision-making process. 
Critical	  views	  of	  large-­‐scale	  land	  deals	  and	  promotion	  of	  other	  investment	  models	  
The sometimes inconsiderate and unconditional legitimation of land deals by host governments 
based on (agrarian) development discourses – supported by international organisations such as 
the World Bank – must give way to more critical perceptions of large-scale land investments. 
Public discourses must also shed light on the land deals’ multiple risks. Further, governments 
                                                      
42	  An	  innovative	  approach	  followed	  by	  the	  Tanzanian	  NGO	  Haki	  Ardhi	  addresses	  civil	  servants	  and	  politicians	  alike.	  
In	  joint	  workshops	  for	  these	  stakeholders	  at	  district	  and	  ward	  level	  and	  at	  village	  level,	  Haki	  Ardhi	  provides	  
information	  about	  politicians’	  and	  officials’	  duties	  and	  responsibilities,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  limits	  of	  their	  roles,	  in	  an	  
attempt	  to	  ensure	  that	  land	  laws	  are	  implemented	  better	  and	  that	  less	  interference	  among	  different	  actors	  takes	  
place.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  challenging	  enterprise,	  as	  it	  is	  far	  from	  easy	  to	  get	  different	  stakeholders	  to	  commit	  to	  
working	  together	  on	  such	  a	  delicate	  issue.	  Analysing	  the	  response	  and	  the	  potential	  effects	  of	  this	  approach	  would	  
make	  an	  interesting	  and	  potentially	  rewarding	  research	  project.	  
43	  This	  expression	  refers	  to	  the	  catchy	  title	  of	  Sud’s	  recent	  article:	  ‘The	  men	  in	  the	  middle:	  a	  missing	  dimension	  in	  
global	  land	  deals’	  (Sud	  2014).	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should promote a range of different investment models, as recommended in the Voluntary 
Guidelines (FAO 2012, Section 12.6).  
In Tanzania, it seems that the government is currently developing a more nuanced picture of 
land deals based on its recent experiences with a large number of foreign investors. The plans 
it has announced to limit the land size of individual deals and to encourage out-grower models 
instead of large-scale plantations point in this direction, as well as the ‘land for equity’ model it 
has been promoting of late. In the latter, the land remains in the control of the original 
landholders and is allocated to investors for a certain period in return for a share of the 
company’s profits.44 However, the processes and outcomes of such investment arrangements 
still depend on many other power strands as demonstrated in Research Paper I. Whether these 
models will contribute to comprehensive rural development – as for example envisaged in 
Tanzania’s agrarian development policy – or whether they lead to rural proletarianisation as 
feared by R. Hall (2011b, p. 206) in the case of outgrower models will need to be scrutinised. 
Awareness-­‐raising	  among	  investors	  
My limited data about the role of local and regional managers working for investment 
companies suggest that they have considerable influence on land deal processes and outcomes. 
It makes a difference whether or not they know the cultural context, history and land rights 
regime, and recognise domestic regulations and bureaucratic systems. To my knowledge, the 
executive officers or country managers are often from foreign countries and are usually 
professionals with a business-related or a technical background – for example, forest engineers 
in the case of timber companies. They are not necessarily trained in or sensitive to social 
issues, intercultural differences and historical processes. Hence, they might not understand the 
complexity of land-property relations in African countries and other regions of the Global 
South and might not fully comprehend the local social and economic effects of their own 
interventions. Therefore I recommend that investors need to be made aware of the social 
context they are operating in and of the major and sometimes unintended consequences that 
their interventions can have. Those with a rather centralistic view of legal land systems need to 
learn about the existence and relevance of customary land rights and plural legal orders. A 
potentially promising way of addressing such issues is to speak the language of business to 
them, highlighting the potential economic loss to investors if they do not consider certain 
issues. This has been attempted by means of a publication commissioned by the Rights and 
Resources Initiative, which explains the financial risks of ignoring tenure issues to potential 
investors (The Munden Project 2012). Another example is an FAO study (Liu 2014), which 
emphasises that land acquisitions are not necessarily the best business models for investors, 
from an economic point of view, due to the high risks of conflicts and negative reputation. 
There appears to be little detailed knowledge of investors’ perspectives and their actual 
practices during land deals. It could be helpful to have further research into the characteristics, 
motivations and roles of the investors’ implementers on the ground. However, my experience 
of one of the companies refusing to participate in my research shows that a lack of 
transparency on the part of investors might complicate such endeavours. 
Consumers’	  scope	  of	  action	  
Finally, one should not overlook the role of consumers. Consumers can considerably influence 
the global land rush in two ways. First, they can put pressure on companies to assume their 
corporate social responsibilities, either by supporting of civil society campaigns or through 
                                                      
44	  Information	  about	  the	  ‘land	  for	  equity’	  model	  has	  been	  provided	  by	  a	  TIC	  official	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  Locher	  in	  
2013;	  see	  also	  Kiishweko	  (2012)	  and	  footnote	  30	  in	  Section	  4.1.2	  for	  legal	  provision	  to	  this	  model.	  However,	  in	  
light	  of	  the	  Tanzania’s	  investor-­‐friendly	  position	  in	  its	  overall	  agrarian	  development	  policy	  (Kilimo	  Kwanza)	  and	  the	  
related	  Southern	  Agricultural	  Growth	  Corridor	  of	  Tanzania	  (SAGCOT),	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  the	  government	  
will	  really	  implement	  the	  announced	  measures	  regarding	  land	  deals.	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political action in the investors’ home countries. This is already having some effects in the 
textile sector and should be expanded to business sectors involving land deals (Zoomers and 
Kaag 2014, p. 215). In Switzerland for example, an association of more than 50 civil society 
organisations is currently launching the ‘Popular Initiative for Responsible Business’. If this is 
adopted by voters, due diligence regarding human rights and the environment will become 
mandatory for Swiss companies investing abroad (Recht ohne Grenzen 2015).45 Second and 
lastly, consumers purchase ‘land-consuming’ products: palm oil and meat, (agro)fuel for 
mobility, pensions and other funds with high profits and little respect for social and ecological 
standards, among others. Questioning and changing these consumption patterns can make a 
real contribution to a fairer and more sustainable use of land. 
  
                                                      
45	  Another	  example	  from	  Switzerland	  is	  a	  law	  that	  grants	  tax	  exemptions	  to	  environmentally	  friendly	  fuel	  from	  
renewable	  sources	  on	  the	  proviso	  that	  the	  fuel	  production	  complies	  not	  only	  with	  ecological,	  but	  also	  with	  specific	  
social	  standards,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  food	  security.	  This	  has	  apparently	  led	  to	  a	  situation	  whereby	  no	  
agrofuels	  have	  yet	  been	  sold	  on	  the	  Swiss	  market,	  but	  only	  biofuels	  from	  biomass	  such	  as	  vegetable	  waste	  oil	  or	  
wood	  waste	  (Curia	  Vista	  der	  Bundesversammlung	  2011;	  EZV	  2008).	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Abstract. The rapidly increasing interest of foreign investors in land in the global South, also termed land
grabbing, has been widely discussed as potentially supportive, but often rather harmful for local populations.
Combining a critical livelihoods perspective with access theory and a bargaining model, this study scrutinizes
local people’s perceptions of the land investments, power relations during land negotiations and intra-community
differences. By analysing two European forestry companies in Tanzania, we have chosen a sector and a country
with presumably more positive outcomes for local populations. The deals resulted in not only labour opportu-
nities and infrastructural improvements, which are mainly perceived as positive, but also cases of violated land
rights, inadequate compensation and decreased food security. Hence, even under favourable preconditions, the
consequences for local people are ambivalent. With this study, we contribute to a differentiated analysis of the
contested role of large-scale land deals in contemporary rural development.
1 Introduction
The rapidly increasing interest of foreign investors in land
in the global South is a prominent phenomenon of new rural
dynamics, often termed global land rush or land grabbing.
Large-scale land acquisitions, mostly in the form of long-
term leases of land, aim mainly at food and biofuels produc-
tion for export as well as at speculation. They are related to
drivers such as the financial and food markets and climate
policies (Peters, 2013). Transnational land acquisitions have
been widely discussed as potentially supportive, but often
rather harmful for local populations, particularly smallhold-
ers. Concerns include violated land rights and lack of access
to land-based natural resources for local people, resulting in
decreased food security and ultimately the replacement of
smallholders by badly paid labourers and unemployed land-
less poor (Cotula et al., 2009; de Schutter, 2011; Li, 2011).
Yet, land deals should be portrayed neither as simply “pro-
viding much-needed capital and technology for third world
agricultural production, food security and employment” nor
as “neo-colonial scrambles for land and resources conducted
by predatory investors at the expense of marginal popula-
tions abroad” (Wolford et al., 2013:191–192). Instead, more
in-depth case studies are needed that provide a nuanced anal-
ysis of the interaction of the involved stakeholders and bring
in local views (Smalley and Corbera, 2012; Edelman et al.,
2013).
This article aims to contribute to this debate with insights
from two case studies of forestry projects in Tanzania. We
argue that it is particularly crucial to look at how land deals
are negotiated. Power relations between investors and local
people are usually unbalanced in favour of investors (Bor-
ras Jr. and Franco, 2012:54). However, there are also cases
where local people have considerably influenced investment
projects (Smalley and Corbera, 2012). By employing ac-
cess theory and a bargaining perspective, we contribute to a
more specific understanding of the balance of powers in the
negotiation process. Further, we present the local people’s
views, and consider their heterogeneity in the power analysis.
Hence, we address the observation of Evers et al. (2013:4)
that “. . . the sentiments of the ‘local population’ are hardly
homogeneous and often absent from the debates”.
We have chosen the case studies deliberately with the aim
of analysing large-scale land acquisitions with potentially
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positive consequences. By looking at these cases we add to a
more complete picture of the global land rush. While much
of the literature on the land rush examined land deals related
to food or biofuels production, less attention has been paid to
forestry plantations. This is despite the fact that large-scale
forestry plantations make up a substantial share of the global
land rush and predictions that the demand for land for in-
dustrial forestry is likely to increase considerably in the next
two decades (Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011; Kröger, 2012).
Forestry plantations are not only profitable due to their wood
products but also as providers of carbon sequestration cer-
tificates that can be sold on the global market of greenhouse
gas emission reductions. They are long-term, highly vulner-
able investments, prone to fires and illegal harvesting. There-
fore, we argue that forestry companies depend to a greater
extent on the acceptance of the local population than other
companies. Representatives of the examined companies em-
phasized that applying corporate social responsibility is a
worthwhile strategy. This might be even more relevant for
investors, such as the ones examined, who want to engage in
the trade of emission certificates and need to observe inter-
national social and environmental standards.
Tanzania was chosen as case study country owing to its
relatively abundant land availability (Deininger, 2011) and its
laws recognising customary land rights (Alden Wily, 2012).
While both analysed cases focus on forestry plantations in
Tanzania, they differ in terms of local land availability, type
of acquired land (individual or communal land holding) and
offered compensation (in cash or in kind).
In the following, we first give a brief clarification of the
conceptual and empirical approaches used in the study. Af-
ter explaining the political and legal context of transnational
land deals in Tanzania, we present the analysis of our case
studies. The article closes with a discussion of the find-
ings and concluding remarks regarding the land rush phe-
nomenon.
2 Conceptual and empirical approaches
As an overall approach, we engage with a critical livelihoods
perspective (Scoones, 2009; Geiser et al., 2011; de Haan,
2012), focusing on daily practices and experiences of poor
people. With this, we bring in the perspective of those most
affected by land deals. To unravel the powers that shape the
land deal decisions, we combine access theory with a classi-
cal bargaining power perspective. The access theory of Ribot
and Peluso (2003) helps one to understand how people gain,
maintain and control access to certain natural resources. Ac-
cess, “the ability to benefit from things” (Ribot and Peluso,
2003:153), is constituted by a bundle of strands of powers,
also termed access mechanisms, that people or organizations
hold or can draw upon. The presented power strands refer to
both rights based and other structural and relational means
of access, such as social identity (gender, ethnicity, etc.; see
ibid., 170–171), and are often intertwined. The access theory
helps us to analyse a broad range of factors that shape ac-
cess and to understand why certain people are not included
in decision-making. For the analysis of concrete negotiations
of the land deals, we use elements of the bargaining power
model developed by Yan and Grey (1994) based on classical
bargaining and resource dependence perspectives (see also
Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). The model looks at the rela-
tive bargaining power of parties in relationships formed on
a voluntary basis. While it was developed to analyse inter-
national joint ventures (which is technically speaking not the
case here), we argue it can nonetheless be applied in our case
studies based on the long-term collaboration or at least ac-
ceptance that is needed between forestry companies and lo-
cal people. The model distinguishes context-based elements
of bargaining power such as the involved bargainers’ alterna-
tives to the deal, and resource-based components, e.g. land,
money or labour, committed by the parties to the cooperative
relationship. Bargainers committing crucial resources that
are difficult for the other party to replace have high power
in the negotiations, as they can use them as leverage. Thus,
the bargaining perspective is useful in understanding the rel-
evance of different elements of power in concrete bargaining
situations.
The analysis is based on more than 150 qualitative inter-
views, mainly with local people from different backgrounds,
and with key persons and state officials from the local, dis-
trict, regional and national level. Group discussions were
conducted with groups of men and women in three villages
in each case study site. Several meetings were also held with
staff of the company in case study B, while in case study A
the contact to the company was limited to a few initial meet-
ings and later refused. Fieldwork took place during 2010,
2011 and 2013.
3 Transnational land deals in Tanzania: political and
legal context
Like many other developing countries in recent years, Tanza-
nia has attracted a number of foreign investors interested in
land. Tanzania has reportedly leased out an area of around
200 000 to 1 000 000 hectares. While numerous investors
headed for biofuel projects, many of these projects have
been abandoned, mainly due to financial constraints. The fo-
cus of the more recent investment endeavours lies rather on
food production. Further, there are few forestry projects of
transnational companies, of which two have been chosen for
this study (Sulle and Nelson, 2009; Locher and Sulle, 2013;
Land Matrix, 2014).
The Tanzanian government has followed a policy of at-
tracting foreign investors as part of its strategy for economic
growth for around three decades and established the Tanza-
nia Investment Centre (TIC) to encourage and facilitate for-
eign investments. National government officials (interviewed
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by Locher, 2010, 2011) argued that the rural areas in Tanza-
nia could benefit from such investments in terms of labour
opportunities, improved agricultural technologies and infras-
tructure. However, due to numerous land disputes, public
pressure and deflating experiences with failing projects, in
2010 the government published guidelines which regulate
and limit biofuel projects, and reportedly is in the process
of establishing ceilings which would limit the size of future
land deals for any agricultural purpose (Hultman et al., 2012;
Kiishweko, 2012).
Tanzanian land law, regulated mainly by the Land Act
and the Village Land Act of 1999, is relatively progressive
in terms of respecting customary land rights (Alden Wily,
2012). Land in rural areas usually falls in the category of
village land and is administered by the village council, on
behalf of the village assembly, applying existing customary
law. This is recognized by the state whether it is in written
form or not. Village land may include land plots, which are
given to individuals or households for permanent use and
may also be inherited or sold (de facto ownership1) as well
as common land to which all villagers have access to (e.g.
forests), and barren land, which is considered as land reserve
for future generations (URT, 1999a, b). Though the land acts
have been enacted in 2001, they are still not enforced and
practised everywhere (Pedersen, 2010) and the procedures
regarding land deals are implemented only partially (Ver-
meulen and Cotula, 2010).
The current procedure for land acquisition is lengthy and
onerous. Foreign investors cannot lease village land directly.
Land deals are only possible if the land is transferred to
the category general land, which is under the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Develop-
ment (in short: Ministry of Lands). This process requires the
village assembly’s agreement2, documented by meeting min-
utes. Further, the involved parties have to agree on the com-
pensation. Compensation should be based on market value,
estimated by a government expert, and should be paid for
land and unexhausted improvements, such as crops or trees.
Finally, after several steps, the Ministry of Lands on behalf
of the President enacts the land transfer.
1Despite the villagers’ possibility to have de facto ownership of
land, in the following, we use the term landholders, to accommo-
date the fact that legally, all land in Tanzania is public land vested
in the president, who owns it on behalf of the whole nation (URT,
1999a).
2To be precise, for the transfer of areas larger than 250 hectares,
the village assembly only gives a recommendation to the president,
who makes the final decision; however, in the cases known to us this
recommendation was never ignored in a way that an area larger than
that agreed on by the village assembly would have been transferred.
In some cases the opposite happened: the District Land Allocation
Committee decreased the area to be transferred because it felt that
otherwise the villagers would not have enough land left for their
own (future) use.
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Figure 1. Map of Tanzania displaying the case study areas. A: New
Forests Company (NFC) in Kilolo district, B: Tanga Forests Ltd
(TF) in Pangani district.
4 Findings from the two case studies in Tanzania
4.1 The two investors and their forestry projects
4.1.1 Case study A: the project of the New Forests
Company in Kilolo district
Kilolo is a hilly district in the Iringa region, in the South-
ern Highlands of Tanzania (cf. Fig. 1). It has favourable con-
ditions for the permanent cultivation of several food crops.
Many households also plant timber as savings, particularly
on their less fertile or steep plots of land.
In 2006, a Member of Parliament from Kilolo introduced
the New Forests Company (NFC) to his district. The UK-
based NFC presents itself as a sustainable forestry enter-
prise, with plantations producing wooden feed materials in
Uganda, Mozambique and Tanzania, and aiming to produce
carbon certificates (NFC, 2014). Representatives of the NFC
visited 12 villages to promote their investment. In some vil-
lages the company’s request for land was declined because of
a lack of land. Other villages welcomed the investor. By early
2013, the NFC had acquired 6300 hectares of land in seven
villages (Table 1). The transferred land had mainly belonged
to individual households. Some of the land had been per-
manently cultivated; other land lay fallow, mainly due to its
remoteness. Landholders were compensated with cash. Fur-
ther, the investor promised to support the local communities
with infrastructure improvements, distribution of seedlings,
and nursing training. In 2009, the company established a
tree nursery and its first plantations of pine and eucalyptus
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Table 1. Share of village land provided to the investor in the Kilolo district (case study A) (based on figures obtained from the Kilolo district
land officer in 2013).
Village Total area of the Area provided to NFC (ha) Share of village area
village (ha) provided to NFC
Magome 18 636 (one plot covering areas 2295 together 4.1 %
Kidabaga 35 007 of all three villages)
Idete 1873
Isele 8272 (one plot covering areas 3852 together 22.5 %
Kising’a 8885 of both villages)
Ukwega 8212 122 1.5 %
Ipalamwa 4275 63 1.5 %
Total 85 160 6332 7.4 %
(personal communication by Locher with district land officer
in 2013; Locher, 2011).
4.1.2 Case study B: the project of Tanga Forests in
Pangani district
Pangani district is located on the northern coast of Tanzania
(cf. Fig. 1). The local people practise small-scale subsistence
farming, fishing and livestock keeping. Large areas are cov-
ered by bush land, partly used by pastoralists for grazing and
by villagers for collecting firewood and grass that is used for
weaving mats and other products.
The Norwegian company, Green Resources SA (GRAS)
has been running large tree plantations in Iringa region since
the 1990s. It produces and sells carbon certificates on the vol-
untary market (GRAS, 2013). In 2005, it established Tanga
Forest Ltd (TF) as a subsidiary with the aim of expanding its
plantations to Pangani and other districts in Tanga region. In
2006, TF started acquiring an area of around 7500 hectares
in six villages in Pangani, mainly village reserve bush land.
TF did not pay any compensation in cash, but constructed
different infrastructural buildings in each village. It estab-
lished a nursery and teak and eucalyptus plantations. In July
2012, GRAS closed down its subsidiary TF. The reasons
given were the weak performance of the planted seedlings
due to unsuitable soil and changing weather conditions as
well as conflicts around land issues (personal communica-
tion by Locher with former Plantation Operations Manager
in 2013).
4.2 Local people’s perceptions of the land deals and their
consequences
The case studies show that local people did not consider for-
eign investors as intruders and new colonists (as might be
expected; see for example Via Campesina, 2012), but wel-
comed them, based on – at least partly justified – expecta-
tions of getting employment and highly needed infrastruc-
ture or other benefits as compensation for their land. In prin-
ciple, both types of compensation – in cash for individual
land (in Kilolo) and in kind for communal land (in Pangani)
– were appreciated. Individuals who received cash used it
for varying short-term to more sustainable purposes based
on their different livelihood assets and strategies. Many vil-
lagers were planning to use the money for their children’s
school fees. Others bought new land or invested in improved
housing. Some households spent the money on consumption
or health-related needs. Many people welcomed the compen-
sation in terms of new infrastructure, particularly in Pangani
(dispensary, village office, water tank, etc.) but also to a lim-
ited extent in Kilolo (maternity ward and school building im-
provement). They highlighted that the Tanzanian state did not
have enough funds for providing such facilities. Interviewees
further emphasized that there were no or not enough employ-
ment opportunities in their region and that “We have young
people, they need to get a job”. They therefore considered
private investments necessary.
There are three crucial preconditions that determine the
rather positive view of many local people. First, villagers
strongly expect the investors to follow the proper procedure,
to respect local land rights and provide the agreed compen-
sation in time. Asked whether they would prefer foreign or
domestic investors, interviewed villagers usually answered
that this did not matter: “Important is that the company does
the right thing, not the origin”. This reflects the local people’s
strong dependence on the enforcement of the land law during
the negotiations (discussed below).
Second, local people expect to continue their land based
livelihood strategies. Thus, whenever possible, they only pro-
vided land to the investors that was of no current and di-
rect use to them. Indeed, many people did not feel any di-
rect change to their land-based livelihoods. One interviewee
stated: “I cannot see anything bad. The land was not being
used”. However, there were cases in which villagers lost land
against their will or were forced to sell due to hardship situa-
tions, and some of them reported decreased food security as
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a consequence of their reduced or lost possibility to produce
food. A disappointed villager summarized these two crucial
issues as follows: “The investor would be no problem, if they
would follow the agreement. And if they would leave some
land for us.”
Third, local people wish to get additional labour opportu-
nities to diversify their livelihood strategies. Both companies
offered new income opportunities in the form of daily labour.
However, the work load and conditions were considered very
hard in case study A, and the salary low and often paid with
delay in case study B. Mainly members of the poorest house-
holds accepted these insecure labour options and perceived
them as a slight improvement for their livelihoods.
After having experienced tensions and conflicts related to
omitted land rights or delayed compensation payments (dis-
cussed below) or when being deflated by unfavourable labour
conditions, some affected people had a more nuanced percep-
tion or even turned against the companies, as the following
two statements illustrate: “They have taken my land. I don’t
want to have any relation with them.” “It is not a good deal,
because the investor gets more than the villagers.” However,
a considerable part of the population continued seeing at least
some benefits from the investments. Accordingly, many vil-
lagers were disappointed when TF closed down its activities.
4.3 Strands of power shaping the land deal processes
4.3.1 Tanzanian land law in the context of complex land
tenure situations
Tanzanian law concerning land transfer, giving considerable
decision power to the local population, has been followed in
most of the analysed cases. Depending on the situation, entire
villages and individuals participated in the decision-making
process. Some also took the decision not to give land. Hence,
in most of the cases the existent land rights were respected.
However, in some cases the local people have been ex-
cluded from the decision-making process. In other cases,
they have been involved, but under unfavourable conditions.
This happened particularly when complex land tenure situa-
tions prevailed. In Pangani, for example, one village had pro-
vided land to TF that belonged to two neighbouring villages.
The conflict was brought to the Ministry of Lands, whose
investigations confirmed the village boundaries, but only af-
ter the company had already established plantations on that
land. The affected two villages could not take any decision
in this regard, and had not received any compensation by
2012, when TF closed down. In another village in Kilolo,
where village reserve land was sold, it turned out that part
of the plot had been in use by people from the neighbouring
village, based on longstanding local agreements. When the
landholders realized that they had lost their land to the NFC,
they appealed to their local leaders to claim it back. After
around two years, the landholders were finally compensated,
but not given back their land (Locher, 2011). An affected in-
terviewee stated: “We don’t have enough freedom to use our
land rights”, thus referring to other power strands besides the
legal mechanism that shape the land deal processes.
4.3.2 Government authorities’ twofold influence in the
land deal process
Government authorities, be they politicians or civil servants,
often act as intermediaries between investors and local popu-
lations. They are generally highly respected among the vil-
lagers due to their educational level and expert positions
(cf. also Chachage and Baha, 2010). As Ribot and Peluso
(2003:169) state: “Expert status also carries authority that
may allow individuals to manipulate others’ beliefs or the
categories of resource access and use”. Hence, first, govern-
ment authorities play a key role in the decision-making for
the land deals. During the promotional tours in Kilolo, for ex-
ample, district leaders accompanied the company represen-
tatives. This entourage not only provided information about
the procedures for the land deals but also enhanced the ne-
gotiated project’s legitimacy and acceptance. A district land
officer summarized the way how they approached the village
assemblies as follows: “We told them: there is this company
that wants to acquire land and you people have to provide
your land”. In both case study areas, some politicians from
the local to the regional level played a double role. Investors
hired them as land deal promoters; this was not always trans-
parent to villagers. Being or having been well-known polit-
ical representatives, these consultants had considerable in-
fluence on the villagers’ decisions. A female interviewee in
Kilolo stated the following: “These investors always come
with district or regional leaders, they put pressure on us.”
Also in the above-presented case of conflicts around village
boundaries in Pangani, a local politician employed by the
company was involved.
Second, the influence of district officials and politicians is
also crucial in the implementation of the legal process, in-
cluding the clarification of complex land tenure situations
and the settlement of the compensation. In both case stud-
ies, the clarification of land rights was not sufficiently car-
ried out by the local leaders and district officials, leading
to the above-mentioned conflicts. For compensation payment
in Kilolo, the district valuer estimated the value of the land
to be an average price of TSh 100 000/acre in 2008 (around
EUR 135/hectare), which was paid during the first land trans-
fers. However, the NFC representatives went on further pro-
motional tours without district officers to request additional
land. With the help of their hired consultants, they convinced
a number of landowners to accept compensation clearly be-
low market value, namely TSh 25 000/acre. In Pangani, the
district officials made no estimation of the value of the land.
Hence, it remains open whether the negotiated compensation
was adequate or not.
In sum, by having highly respected politicians and some-
times also officers on their side, the investors benefit from
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their influence on local people’s decision-making and their
power to shape the implementation of the land deal process.
This illustrates that “Access to authority is an important junc-
ture in the web of powers” (Ribot and Peluso, 2003:170).
Investors often have better access to authorities than local
people, but access also differs among the local population.
4.3.3 Legitimizing discourses
The decision regarding land deals is influenced by the Tan-
zanian government’s policy of encouraging land-based in-
vestments as part of a rural development strategy. Ribot and
Peluso (2003:169) pointed out that “discourse and the abil-
ity to shape discursive terms deeply influence entire frame-
works of resource access”. By reproducing the national de-
velopment discourse, government authorities at all levels
provide legitimation for land deals. Investors draw upon
this discourse to support their corporate social responsibil-
ity rhetoric during the promotional tours. In order to con-
vince local people to provide land, both companies pro-
moted a long-term, development-oriented “partnership” be-
tween themselves and the local population. The minutes of
the general assemblies in several villages in Kilolo give some
hints about the message the participants must have taken
home from these promotional tours. They reveal a long list
with a number of “purposes” of the NFC, which solely con-
sist of benefits for the local people, such as general poverty
reduction, protection of environment, employment opportu-
nities and investments in infrastructure.
A counter discourse in this context, traceable in academic
debates, is the concern about sufficient remaining land for
future generations. However, only a few Tanzanian villagers
and land officers referred to this discourse in specific land-
scarce situations, but never as fundamental argument against
land deals.
4.3.4 Unequal access to knowledge about land rights
While investors have access to legal experts and can get sup-
port from the TIC in land rights issues, local communities
have usually only very limited knowledge about the land law.
It is the task of government officers to inform them about
the legal procedures and their rights, but it seems that they
did it to a varying and usually insufficient degree. Hence, in
both case studies part of the individuals and villages gave
away an important livelihood asset without being fully aware
about the consequences. In Pangani, most of the villagers, in-
cluding village leaders, were not aware that the land which
was transferred to the category general land – to be pro-
vided to TF – was not in their hands anymore, but under
the authority of the Ministry of Lands. They were convinced
that they could withdraw it from the investor whenever they
wanted. Another confusing matter was the unit of measure-
ment. While in the rural areas acre is the common unit, in-
vestors and district staff used hectare – a considerable dif-
ference of which not all villagers were aware. They also did
not know that land should be compensated based on market
values. In Kilolo, when problems arose in the case of village
land that belonged to neighbouring villagers, most local peo-
ple and their leaders did not have the necessary knowledge
on how to reclaim their rights in time. Otherwise, they would
probably not have lost the land against their will.
4.3.5 Unequal resources and alternatives
When it comes to negotiations between local landholders
and investors, the investors’ resource-based components of
bargaining power consist of the offered compensation and
labour opportunities, while the villagers’ mainly commit
their land and labour. Once land is transferred local people
have no legal means to withdraw it from the investor. Hence,
they can only contribute their labour to the proposed part-
nership, a resource that is easily replaceable, as shown in
Kilolo, where labourers moved in from other areas. Unequal
availability of alternatives to the deal further unbalance the
bargaining power of the involved stakeholders: investors, at
least in an initial stage, could go elsewhere to find suitable
land and labourers for their endeavour, whereas many local
people have restricted mobility and feel that the proposed in-
vestment is a unique opportunity to improve their livelihood
situation. Also regarding work conditions, the lack of alterna-
tives made labourers accept the conditions offered, as high-
lighted by an interviewee: “they [company’s managers] know
that even if they pay low salary you must work on their plan-
tation because that’s the only way you can get money”. The
companies thus profit from the local people’s comparatively
weak resource-based bargaining power and limited alterna-
tives to the proposed deal.
4.3.6 Local communities’ potential resistance through
threat of illegal actions
In the conflictive cases where people’s rights are contra-
vened, ultimate means of resistance remain for them, i.e. the
“weapons of the weak” (Scott, 1985, see also Wolford et al.,
2013:195): they could harm the company by destroying their
plantations. Although to our knowledge the villagers never
openly threatened to employ this means, the atmosphere was
very tense in the cases of denied land rights. It might have
been fear of arson, combined with other reasons, which ulti-
mately led the NFC to agree on an additional compensation
payment in a conflictive case. Similar motives might have
brought the TF to suspend their plantation activities in 2010
in one of the villages upon the demand of village leaders who
suspected some inconsistency in the land deal process.
4.3.7 Power differences within communities
Local communities cannot be seen as homogenous with re-
gard to their involvement in the decision-making process.
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They must be differentiated along different aspects of their
social identity and individuals’ assets such as education and
financial resources, as illustrated in the following three ex-
amples.
In Pangani, it must be assumed that not all social groups
had been represented equally in the village discussions and
decisions. In particular, women and pastoralists were re-
ported to participate less in village meetings, and could there-
fore not bring in their opinion. However, during interviews,
no complaints were mentioned in this regard. In the con-
flictive case in Kilolo, most of the landholders have lost
land against their will due to lack of awareness on how to
(re)claim their rights in time. However, a knowledgeable
businessman understood what was going on and managed
to stop the district officials from surveying his plot for the
land transfer (for details see Locher, 2011). Finally, house-
holds with a favourable combination of assets have had more
freedom of decision on whether to transfer their land and un-
der what conditions. In Kilolo, households in adverse eco-
nomic conditions, be it due to a drought or personal reasons,
rather accepted the deal, even when the compensation offered
was low. In Pangani it became clear that the poorer house-
holds among the population that depended on labour income
welcomed the investor on their village reserve land without
further questioning, while members of better-off households
rather raised issues such as the question of the quality of the
offered compensation.
5 Discussion and concluding remarks
5.1 Towards a better understanding of processes and
consequences
By analysing two forestry companies in Tanzania, we have
deliberately chosen an investment sector and also a country
with presumably more positive outcomes for local popula-
tions compared to land deals in other sectors and countries. It
became obvious that even under these preconditions, the con-
sequences for local people are ambivalent. Unequal power
relations during the negotiations led to cases of violated land
rights, inadequate compensation for the land and decreased
food security in the worst cases. Further, the Tanzanian vil-
lagers involved have given up part of their reserve land for
future generations, and have handed control of this land over
to the national government and the investors, whose future
actions are not fully predictable to them. The insights we
gained go beyond the case studies. The focus on power in
the negotiation process grasps power strands that play – of
course with different weights – an important role in all land
deals. It can be assumed that land deals under less favourable
conditions lead to worse consequences for the local commu-
nities.
Besides this overall finding, our in-depth case studies have
further contributed to a more differentiated picture of the
global land rush in three aspects: first, in line with the liveli-
hoods perspective, we have shown that local people have
agency. Many deliberately decided for or against land deals.
Under certain circumstances, namely (perceived) sufficient
land availability and a fair land deal process, they welcome
foreign investors. However, many villagers take their deci-
sions in a weak position. Some were even passed over in the
decision-making process.
Second, it is crucial to understand the detailed power
strands at play and the different bargaining positions during
the decision-making and negotiation processes. Such an anal-
ysis provides us indications for potential measures to better
equilibrate the power positions. Our analysis revealed the fol-
lowing power strands: the land law as basis for rights-based
means of access, access to influential government authorities,
legitimizing discourses, varying knowledge on land rights
and local people’s potential resistance through illegal actions.
In bargaining situations, the investors’ favourable resources,
based on financial means, and unequal availability of alter-
natives to the deal play a crucial role: as long as investors
have rather unrestricted access to land in many countries, vil-
lagers’ offered resources to the deals are comparatively easily
replaceable for the investors. Moreover, as along as rural peo-
ple experience only limited support in terms of infrastructure
and income opportunities from elsewhere, they have hardly
any alternatives to the proposed deals, which they often see
as a chance to improve their livelihoods. These factors lead to
villagers having rather weak bargaining power vis-à-vis the
investors.
Third, the bargaining power vis-à-vis investors varies for
different groups within local communities. Relevant factors
are the economic situation, education, access to knowledge,
gender, livelihood strategy and other aspects of social iden-
tity. Comparatively privileged households or individuals have
a lower risk of agreeing to a land deal under unfavourable
conditions and consequently suffering from adverse conse-
quences. On the other hand, poor members of the communi-
ties might make use of new labour opportunities more often
than wealthier people. Yet, due to the poor working condi-
tions, we assume no substantial poverty reduction from these
opportunities (see also Li, 2011). Hence, while a broad and
in-depth impact analysis is still outstanding, our results indi-
cate a tendency towards a potential fragmented development
(see Rauch, this issue).
5.2 What reactions against negative consequences of
the global land rush?
In absence of the possibility to halt the global land rush, ef-
forts should first of all be made to channel land investments
to areas with comparatively ample land availability. In prac-
tice, this is very delicate, as the division between land un-
der use and unused land is not clear cut, and many (tem-
porary or common) uses are difficult to identify (Borras Jr.
and Franco, 2010). Further, areas with ample land and with
limited land often co-exist at small scale. More importantly,
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the availability of unused land is generally decreasing. Also
Africa, often considered as comparatively rich in unused
land, has changed from “a continent of land abundance in the
first half of the twentieth century to one of increasing land
scarcity at its end” (Berry, 2002:639). Hence, the question
of sufficient land for smallholders and future generations re-
mains a tenuous issue. Many observers advocate a complete
stop of large-scale land investments and increased support
of the rural population instead (e.g. de Schutter, 2011; Li,
2011).
Second, as long as land deals continue, an attempt to reach
more favourable outcomes requires a focus on the negoti-
ations. In this context, the important role of the host gov-
ernments must not be underestimated (Wolford et al., 2013;
Peters, 2013). The first requirement is the general recogni-
tion of any land rights, including customary rights, by the
national government (cf. Steimann and Geiser, 2012). When
it comes to land deals, the involvement of (local) landholders
as decision-makers is indispensable. This requires not only
respective land laws and financial means to implement them
but also political will and a respective attitude of government
officials on all levels (Knight, 2010), in short, good gover-
nance. Then, a careful and impartial analysis of local land
uses and rights, including those of pastoralists, women and
other potentially vulnerable groups, should be a precondi-
tion for any land investment. Participatory land use planning
at the village level, as foreseen in Tanzania, would be a po-
tentially helpful tool in this regard, if it were implemented
before any investors express their interest for the respective
area. Further, the power positions during the negotiations
must be better balanced in favour of the local populations,
by providing them in-depth knowledge on their land rights
and on potential risks of the land deals (e.g. through train-
ings conducted by NGOs beforehand or by lawyers that sup-
port the villagers during the process). Finally, the sometimes
inconsiderate legitimation of land deals by the government
based on development discourses needs to give way to a more
critical picture of land investments that also sheds light on
their multiple risks.
The following international initiatives address some of
the above-mentioned concerns: the Principles for Responsi-
ble Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods
and Resources (FAO et al., 2010; in short: RAI principles) by
the World Bank Group and three UN agencies address in-
vestors and host countries. The RAI principles are voluntary,
and the scope of their effects is questioned (Borras Jr. and
Franco, 2010; Locher et al., 2012). The Voluntary Guidelines
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (FAO,
2012) have been developed in a participatory process involv-
ing FAO member countries, international organizations, the
private sector and civil society. They address mainly potential
host states. The guidelines provide a valuable basis, but need
to be translated into concrete, effective instruments, adapted
to the diverse national settings. However, good governance –
the basis to implement any of these measures – remains an
issue in most of the targeted countries.
Also some host countries have become more active in
better regulating land deals. In Tanzania it seems that the
government is currently gaining a more nuanced picture on
land deals based on recent experiences with a large number
of foreign investors. Thus, the land deals might lose their
as of yet nearly unconditional legitimation by the govern-
ment. The announced plans to limit the land size of individ-
ual deals and encourage out-grower models instead of large-
scale plantations point in this direction. There are also hints
about a land for equity model to be encouraged in the future,
where local people would not transfer their land to the in-
vestors, but allocate it to them for a certain period and gain
shares of the companies’ profit (Kiishweko, 2012; interview
with TIC official by Locher, 2013). The possibility to with-
draw land from investors would considerably strengthen the
villagers’ resource-based bargaining power. However, out-
comes of such arrangements would still depend on many
other power strands and would need to be scrutinized once
implemented.
Finally, national policies of the investors’ countries of ori-
gin need to be strengthened. An example is provided from
Switzerland: a campaign of around 50 Swiss civil society or-
ganizations demands to make transnational land investments
of Switzerland-based companies adhere to Swiss regulations
(Recht ohne Grenzen, 2013).
5.3 Outlook
The global institutions influencing the global land rush – es-
pecially the financial market – are hardly comprehensible;
thus scenarios about the future effects of this phenomenon on
rural development in the global South remain partially spec-
ulative. There are hints about a slow down of foreign invest-
ments in some areas, e.g. in the biofuel sector of Tanzania
(Hultman et al., 2012). A tendency away from land deals to-
wards integration of smallholders in the global economy by
contract-farming arrangements – as seems to be the case in
Tanzania – is one scenario (Hall, 2011). However, the related
developments and effects on rural populations must be again
critically observed (see contribution by Franz in this issue).
As we have outlined, the effects of land deals differ consid-
erably depending on the context and people’s varying room
for manoeuvre. Considerable positive outcomes are only to
be expected under a bundle of conditions, which in practice
are rarely met. The growing awareness of the phenomenon
among academics and civil society organizations has led to
a public outcry, which might eventually have effects on in-
ternational and national policies and politics and companies’
scope of action, but may also fade away unheard. On any ac-
count, one point is clear: the challenges for rural poor to cope
with consequences of global actions at grassroots levels are
enormous. Thus, the global land rush, as it is occurring so far,
provides severe risks for the livelihoods of rural populations.
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‘How come others are selling our land?’ – Customary land rights and 
the complex process of land acquisition by a UK-based forestry 
company in Tanzania 
The recent increase in transnational acquisitions of agrarian land raises concerns 
about local people’s inadequate involvement in the decision-making process, and 
violations of their land rights. Tanzania’s statutory land laws are comparatively 
progressive in terms of recognising customary land rights. According to the 
legislation, transferring ‘Village Land’ to an investor depends on the villagers’ 
approval. It is therefore interesting to focus on the acknowledgement of 
customary land rights in land deals in Tanzania. This study analyses the land 
transfer process of a UK-based forestry company that has acquired land in 
different villages in the Kilolo district. In the case of the village presented here, 
the investor had followed the legal procedure regarding decision-making for the 
land deal in a formally correct way. Yet interviews with various stakeholders 
revealed flaws at local government level that have led to a conflictive situation, 
with numerous affected villagers having lost their land rights – and thus the basis 
for their livelihoods – against their will. Among those affected are several 
households from a neighbouring village, whose customary rights go back to the 
period before the resettlements during the 1970s (‘villagization’). Employing the 
concepts of property rights and legal pluralism1, this article analyses the decision-
making process that preceded this land transfer and illustrates how unequal social 
relations lead to unequal recognition of customary and statutory law. The study 
concludes that even under comparatively favourable conditions, there is no 
guarantee that local land rights are fully protected in the global land rush. 
Keywords: customary land rights, statutory law, global land rush, acquisition 
process, Tanzania 
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In recent years there has been rapid growth in the number of investors acquiring large 
shares of agrarian land in countries of the Global South for food, agrofuel or forestry 
plantations and many other purposes. The investors are agribusinesses, energy and 
forestry companies, among others, mostly from Western, Gulf and some Asian 
countries. 2  The strong increase in such investments has provoked numerous hopes and 
worries regarding their impacts in the host countries. Critics are concerned about 
violations of local land rights, decreased access to natural resources, and, ultimately, 
increased poverty and food insecurity in the respective areas.3 Supporters claim that the 
land investments entail new income options in terms of jobs or contract farming and 
improved technologies and infrastructure in rural areas. Yet also supporters recognise 
certain problems related to the land deals, but they hold that these can be minimized by 
improving the regulations on land deals, for example by implementing international 
guidelines.4 
Tanzania is considered a land-abundant country in the latest World Bank report5 
and is thus a typical target country for recent land deals. This article focuses on the case 
of a UK-based forestry. While there has been lively academic and public debate about 
agrofuel projects in Tanzania6, there is less awareness about land deals for other 
plantations such as food crops and trees, although many of the suspected implications 
may be similar. There are only a few large forestry companies in Tanzania, but their 
share of land acquisitions is considerable.7  
As in most African countries, customary land rights play a major role in rural 
areas in Tanzania. The recent statutory legislation is comparatively progressive in terms 
of respecting customary land rights and requiring local people’s approval to land deals. 
It is therefore interesting to focus on a Tanzanian case study in order to see whether a 
favourable legal setting can protect rural inhabitants from negative implications of 
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foreign land deals. This study argues that it is important not only to focus on the land 
acquisition process, but also to analyse it in the context of the local land tenure regime – 
an aspect which other studies have often neglected. This paper looks at the matter from 
the perspective of legal pluralism so as to give sufficient consideration to complex land 
tenure settings.  
The empirical work was mainly undertaken between August 2010 and May 
2011. At that time, the selected forestry company was at an advanced stage of acquiring 
land. The data are based on expert interviews with government officials at national, 
regional, district and village levels, and qualitative interviews with local inhabitants 
including key persons using semi-structured interview guidelines. In the two affected 
villages presented in this case study, group discussions and participatory mapping 
exercises were also conducted and copies of the minutes of village meetings were 
collected. Further information was obtained in 2013 from the district land officer by 
telephone and email. Apart from one preliminary meeting in August 2010, the investing 
company did not agree to contribute to this study. Therefore information about the 
company is mainly derived from the company’s website and from district officials and 
other sources. Relevant background information for this research was provided by a 
study conducted by Chambi Chachage and Bernard Baha of the Land Rights Research 
and Resources Institute (LARRRI/HAKIARDHI), a Tanzanian not-for-profit 
organisation, who visited the area in May 2010.8 
In the following section, I will introduce the concepts of property and legal 
pluralism. The second section provides an overview on the Tanzanian land regime and 
the legal regulations related to land transactions. It is followed by basic information 
about the investment project and a detailed description of the land deal procedure. The 
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fourth section presents an analysis of the transaction process. The article ends with a 
discussion and conclusion. 
1 Analytical framework for the analysis of property 
Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Melanie Wiber describe property not as a 
specific right or relation such as ownership, but as a broad concept, which ‘concerns the 
ways in which the relations between society’s members with respect to valuables are 
given form and significance’9. They define three major elements in relation to property:  
(a) the social unit that can hold rights and obligations (in this case individuals, the 
village, the Tanzanian government and the company); 
(b) the (constructed) property objects (e.g. a given plot of land); 
(c) the various sets of rights and obligations with respect to such objects. 
Property rights can be broadly divided into two categories, namely rights to use and 
exploit economically; and rights to regulate, allocate, represent in outside relations and 
make decisions – in short decision-making rights.10 In many societies, land ‘ownership’ 
bundles a set of rights together in one social unit, i.e. landowners hold several decision-
making rights and usually also use rights over a given plot of land. Rights might also be 
delegated. A landowner for example can assign use rights to a tenant, who in turn might 
pass (part of) them on to a sharecropper.11 
Benda-Beckmann et al.12 further distinguish four ‘layers of social organization’ 
in which property is expressed: 
• Layer (1): cultural ideals and ideologies (e.g. neo-liberalism or communism) 
• Layer (2): legal regulations (e.g. state law, customary law or religious law) 
• Layer (3): social relationships (e.g. between landowner and tenant) 
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• Layer (4): social practices or daily interactions (e.g. inheriting land or fencing) 
Since property regimes evolve over time, the four layers of such a property regime are 
not always fully coherent. Yet the layers are mutually interdependent and affect each 
other. In a specific social context, different legal regimes may coexist, each of them 
based on legislations such as statutory law or customary law, supported by respective 
sets of cultural values, and determining property relationships and practices. These 
regimes may coexist peacefully or be in open conflict, and may also influence each 
other. Such coexistence and interaction of legal regimes is referred to as legal 
pluralism.13  
In the context of legal pluralism, people may refer to different property 
ideologies and legal regulations to justify and support their claims.14 However, it is not 
enough to assert claims. The success of claims depends on the extent to which they are 
compatible with dominant legal order15; or, in Meinzen-Dick’s and Pradhan’s words: 
‘unless claims are accepted by a larger collectivity than the claimants they are not 
considered legitimate’16. The authors conclude: ‘Rights are only as strong as the 
institutions or collectivity that stands behind them’.17 In this study I used the presented 
concepts to analyse the local property regime and to reveal the social relations that are 
relevant for the recognition of customary and statutory land rights during the land 
transaction. 
2 Legal provisions for allocating Village Land to a foreign investor 
2.1 Tanzania’s land regime and land legislation 
Tanzania’s land regime is based on local laws, religious laws and German and British 
colonial laws. Further, during the 1970s, the resettlements under the process of 
‘villagization’ (operation vijiji, introduced by President Nyerere’s socialist government) 
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brought major changes to the land tenure situation.18 In the following decades, an 
informal land market developed and land conflicts increased. Expressed in terms of the 
four layers in the presented analytical framework, property ideologies and everyday 
practices had transformed and required a new statutory regulation (i.e. second layer). 
The new law, subdivided into the Land Act and the Village Land came into force in 
May 2001.19 
Based on former colonial law, the Land Acts retain all land as public land. Land 
is vested in the President, who holds the final decision-making rights on behalf of the 
whole nation. Citizens cannot own land, but they can own rights over the land, i.e. 
rights to occupy and use land.20 Such ‘rights to occupy’ may be bought or sold, and 
inherited. In this article it is therefore referred to ‘landholders’, not to ‘landowners’.21 
All land in Tanzania is divided into three classes with different jurisdictions. 
‘General Land’ is administered by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban 
Development (in short, hereafter, Ministry of Lands) and comprises urban areas and 
land that has been allocated by the central government under entitlements, e.g. to 
investors. Land rights granted under this category are named ‘granted rights of 
occupancy’ and can be hold for 33, 66 or 99 years. ‘Reserved Land’ refers to several 
specific types and uses of land such as forests, national parks or highways, and is 
governed by the relevant Ministry.22 
‘Village Land’ includes the areas of the approximately 12,000 villages, 
representing roughly two-thirds of Tanzanian land. Village Land is managed by the 
respective Village Council (VC), the elected local level government of 15-25 members. 
The VC is accountable to the Village Assembly (VA), which consists of all residents 
above 18 years. Village Land can be further sub-divided in three categories Communal 
village land is used for public purposes such as schools, markets or grazing areas. 
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Individual land is occupied or used by an individual, family or group of persons under 
customary law. The third category is spare land for future communal or individual 
use.23 
A main purpose of the Village Land Act is to protect villagers’ existing rights. 
Existing rights in rural areas are termed customary rights. The VC shall administer the 
land in accordance with customary law, provided this does not violate the main 
provisions of the statutory law, such as the rights of women, children or the disabled.24 
A customary right of occupancy (on Village Land) has the same legal status like land 
titles to ‘General Land’. Customary rights also explicitly include unregistered rights.25 
Tanzanian legislation can thus be termed an ‘institutionalised hybrid’,26 a combination 
of coexisting customary laws and state law. It is praised as a progressive land law 
compared to other African countries in terms of respecting customary land rights and 
entrusting land management responsibilities to village bodies.27 
2.2 Transfer of Village Land to a foreign investor 
Non-Tanzanian citizens cannot acquire customary rights of occupancy, as these rights 
are only provided to citizens. They can only obtain land for investment purposes.28 
There are different possibilities for doing so.29 The most common way is to identify 
suitable plots of ‘Village Land’, which are transferred to the category of ‘General 
Land’, whereupon the Ministry of Lands can provide rights of occupancy for investment 
purposes to the investor. In more detail, the usual procedure – which also applied to the 
presented case study – is as follows. Investors, sometimes advised by the Tanzania 
Investment Centre30, approach district or regional government authorities in order to 
identify areas with potentially suitable land. Together they visit the respective villages 
and inform the VC and VA about their plans. If the VA in general agrees with the 
project, the district land officers demarcate the respective land plot(s) and send the 
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relevant VA minutes to the Ministry of Lands. Thereafter, the following de iure process 
of land transfer starts.31 The Ministry of Lands gazettes a notice with information about 
the intended transfer and sends it to the respective VC. The notice has to provide a term 
of at least 90 days before the proposed transfer. The VC shall inform all people that 
might be affected by such a land transfer in terms of losing customary land rights. The 
affected people can make representations to the VC or district land officers32, who shall 
take these into account for their further decisions or recommendations. 
Based on recommendations from the VC, the VA can either approve or reject 
the land transfer in the case of areas below 250 hectares, and its decision is submitted to 
the President. In the case of areas above 250 hectares, the VA can only provide a 
recommendation, while the decision lies in the hands of the President. The President can 
order the compulsory acquisition of land, subject to the payment of compensation. 
However, it seems that in this context the President does not usually take a decision 
against the VA’s recommendation.33 During the VA meeting, a district land officer and 
the investor are supposed to be present and answer questions. Thereafter, the type, 
amount, method and timing of the payment of compensation have to be agreed between 
the government – in practice usually the investor – and the affected villagers (in case of 
individual land) or the VC (in case of communal or spare land). Based on a detailed 
survey of the land and an assessment by a qualified valuer, a compensation schedule 
must be prepared and approved by the central government. Finally, the transfer of the 
land is gazetted in a second notice and becomes effective within 30 days. Thereupon, 
within six months, either the government or the investor himself is supposed to pay 
compensation to the land right-holders. Compensation has to be paid for the value of the 
land itself and for ‘unexhausted improvements’, namely constructions, crops or trees on 
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the land. Additional compensation may include, among others, resettlement fees and 
transport allowances. The valuation shall be based on the current market value.34 
3 The land acquisition process of the UK-based forestry company in 
Kilolo District 
This section first provides a brief introduction to the investment project and the region 
where the company acquired land, before going on to describe the various stages of the 
land deal and its implications. 
3.1 The New Forests Company in Kilolo district 
Kilolo is a hilly district in Iringa region, located in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania. 
It has a humid climate with favourable conditions for the cultivation of food crops such 
as maize, beans, potatoes, vegetables and fruit. Many households also plant trees on 
some of their plots. High demand for timber in Tanzania and abroad has also attracted 
wealthy individuals from other Tanzanian regions who acquire land and grow pine, 
eucalyptus, cypress and other fast-growing trees. 
The UK-based New Forests Company (NFC) presents itself as a sustainable 
forestry business with the aim of producing feed material for sawmills, board factories 
and pole treatment plants, and running energy-forestry operations based on plantations 
in Uganda, Mozambique and Tanzania.35 The company expects ‘both attractive returns 
to investors and significant social and environmental benefits’.36 
In 2006, the district’s Member of Parliament introduced NFC to Kilolo District. 
By early 2013, NFC had acquired 6,300 hectares of land in seven villages and was still 
in the process of acquiring more land in those communities and in one further village in 
Kilolo District. In most cases the deal involves individual land holdings, but in the case 
presented here, some village spare land was also affected. In the following section, I 
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shall first show how government officials and the investor proceeded, drawing on 
statutory law, and how this led to conflicts. Subsequently, I shall present the relevant 
customary tenure regime in order to analyse in more detail the land deal process and its 
implications. 
3.2 Initial steps in the land acquisition process in Kidabaga 
In October 2006, representatives of the NFC and of Kilolo District visited several 
villages and presented the company’s plans to VC and VA meetings. According to the 
minutes, both of these meetings took place on 18 October 2006 in Kidabaga’s case.37 It 
is reported that even at that early stage the VC members generally agreed to welcome 
the investor and offered them part of their village land. The area – village spare land 
called Witamasiva38 – is located in a sub-village roughly 15 kilometres away from the 
main settlement of Kidabaga towards the neighbouring village Kiwalamo. Two parts of 
the area had been temporarily rented out to an individual and a farmers’ group 
respectively in order to get some revenue for the village. The information about the 
status of the remaining area differs depending on the source; it was unused or cultivated 
in parts by people from the neighbouring village Kiwalamo. However, the proposal to 
offer Witamasiva to the investor was presented to the VA. According to extracts from 
the minutes of the meeting, the aims of the NFC were presented as a long list of 
benefits, including ‘to give better tree seedlings to villagers’, ‘create 10,000 jobs’ and 
‘engage in the provision of education, health, water, etc.’ besides their core activities of 
planting trees and processing timber.39 Few concerns seem to have been raised during 
that meeting. However, it is reported that finally the VA agreed unanimously to provide 
this specific area to the NFC.40 
The VA had further decided that a committee of six representatives of the 
village would be responsible for showing Witamasiva to the district officials. The first 
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demarcation took place on 17 August 2007. A survey team from the district and NFC 
representatives went to the respective area, together with the village committee. 
According to numerous interview partners, including a member of the committee at the 
time, this committee under the late Village Chairman did not show the precise boundary 
of Witamasiva, but merely pointed at it from afar. Apparently, the committee leader did 
not originally come from that area and did not know it properly. Hence the land survey 
team demarcated a much larger area than the land called Witamasiva. Yet this only 
came to light later.  
On the basis of the generally positive signal from Kidabaga and other villages, 
the government gazetted a first notice on 6 February 2008. In this notice the President 
proposed the transfer of Village Land to General Land in 12 villages with a total area of 
14,704.7 hectares.41 The actual area of land that was supposed to be transferred in each 
village was not mentioned, nor was any information regarding the precise area, although 
this is legally required.42 Also, the VA minutes submitted to the Ministry of Lands 
beforehand do not state the detailed information, as the extent of Witamasiva was not 
known. 
On 11 April 2008 – thus within the given period of 90 days from the publication 
of the government notice – the district officials provided the information about the 
proposed transfer to the villagers of Kidabaga at a VC and VA meeting. Interestingly, 
according to Baha and Chachage, the minutes of both meetings featured a space where 
the size of the land should have been indicated, but it was left blank.43 This is 
remarkable, because on that date the district officials must at least have known the 
approximate size of the land, which they had demarcated nearly a year before.  
According to the minutes, several questions were raised. A VC member 
reportedly asked about compensation for properties on the land, and one member 
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specifically asked about compensation for people from the neighbouring village 
Kiwalamo who were using the land. This indicates that VC members already knew or at 
least suspected at the time that the land transfer would affect several people, and the 
district officials were made aware of this. Yet it is reported that the district officials 
continued confirming that the land to be transferred would only include spare land 
managed by the VC, and that property of individuals would be avoided as far as 
possible. If people should nonetheless be affected, they would be compensated.44 
According to the understanding of a villager I interviewed in his subsequent position as 
Village Chairman in 2010, it was agreed that a measurement would take place first and 
the compensation issue would be clarified before the village and the company entered 
into an agreement. In this vague situation, the (potentially) affected people were 
reportedly not informed by the VC.  
However, despite the lack of clarity about land size and potentially affected 
people, the minutes were obviously considered as the VA’s recommendation to approve 
the proposed land transfer. 
3.3 Survey and first agreement on compensation  
As mentioned above, Village Land cannot be transferred without a prior agreement 
about compensation. According to a district official, the village had consented to 
receive compensation in cash for the used part of the land only, specifically for the trees 
planted by the individual villager and the farmers’ group (‘unexhausted 
improvements’). For the remaining area of Witamasiva, the village reportedly did not 
ask for compensation in cash, arguing that the land was not used.45  
In July 2008, after the expiry of the 90-day period, the district officials 
conducted a survey and an evaluation exercise at the same time, thus laying the final 
steps for the land transfer. They placed beacons and filled in forms regarding 
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compensation, which were signed by the people who had planted trees and by the 
Village Chairman and the Village Executive Officer (VEO), an employed secretary to 
the VC, on behalf of the village. It was then, at the very latest, that at least the village 
representatives must have seen the exact boundary, as their signature is mandatory for 
setting up the beacons.46 The total area provided to NFC in Kidabaga amounted to 
around 1,572.8 hectares.47 However, local people seem to have been unaware of this 
figure. 
3.4 Transfer of land and arising confusion and conflicts 
At a VA meeting on 30 March 2009 the VC informed villagers of Kidabaga that their 
village had received 1.6 million Tanzanian Shillings in compensation. According to the 
minutes, a number of villagers were not satisfied with the amount nor, in particular, 
with the lack of clarity about the size of the land. They also complained that some land 
additional to the agreed area had been given to the investor for which no compensation 
had been paid. They asked the village government to follow up on this.48  
On 30 July 2009, thus four months later, the VEO of Kidabaga invited the 
respective people to meet in the contested area. He found the complaints justified; the 
area that had been surveyed one year earlier did indeed include land held by individuals 
outside the area known as Witamasiva. Thereafter, on 23 August 2009, some affected 
villagers from both Kidabaga and Kiwalamo wrote a formal letter to the VEO, stating 
that they did not agree to give any land besides Witamasiva, and that they did not want 
to receive any compensation for the individual land, but wanted their land back. The 
letter should have been forwarded to the district or some other relevant body, but it is 
not clear whether this happened.  
At roughly the same time, on 21 August 2009, the second government notice 
was published, announcing that the transfer of Village Land to General Land would be 
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effective within 30 days.49 In December 2009 NFC started to clear some land in 
Witamasiva and planted the first seedlings. The company used the land before having 
received the titles of rights of occupancy from the Ministry of Lands. This seems to be 
common procedure in Tanzania. NFC had apparently received the go-ahead from the 
district government. An interviewed officer argued that the company could start their 
plantation as soon as the local process was settled, the land surveyed and the 
compensation paid.  
It took several more complaints by local people before another VA meeting was 
held in January 2010; there, the villagers of Kidabaga confirmed their position and the 
VEO forwarded their complaints to the district. In February 2010 an affected villager 
from Kiwalamo reportedly sent a complaint letter to the Prime Minister and also 
managed to attract some media attention.50 Finally, the district recognised the claims of 
the affected people. However, the land had already been deemed General Land half a 
year before. District officials proposed that the affected villagers should be 
compensated. The former landholders announced their acceptance – albeit reluctantly in 
some cases – at a meeting on 24 March 2010. Some former landholders mentioned that 
they had been urged to sign the agreement with threats that they would otherwise 
receive nothing, while losing the land in any case. In August 2010 NFC recognised the 
villagers’ legitimate claims too and agreed to pay compensation to those who had been 
left out before. The company also consented to pay for the second survey that was 
required as a basis for the new compensation schedule. 
The September 2010 survey revealed that the demarcated area did not just cover 
Witamasiva but also included areas with land rights held by around 100 individuals. It 
was found that about half of these rights were held by people from the neighbouring 
village Kiwalamo.51 I shall briefly outline the history of Witamasiva in the following 
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section to give a better understanding of the reasons for this land property order around 
Witamasiva.  
3.5 Customary land tenure in the area acquired by the company  
The village of Kiwalamo was formed during the villagization programme in 1973. 
Before that, the people of the present-day village Kiwalamo had been living in 
dispersed settlements. Households also had their own burial places, with tombs usually 
marked with big trees. During the villagization process, people living around 
Witamasiva moved in different directions to form the villages Kidabaga and Kiwalamo. 
However, the border between the two new villages was drawn in such a way that all 
land around Witamasiva now belongs administratively to Kidabaga. 
When the people moved to the place called Kiwalamo to form a village, they 
were instructed by government officials to rearrange their land rights. The people who 
had been living in the area of the present core settlement of Kiwalamo before were 
instructed to share their land with newcomers so that the latter could establish a new 
household. As the available land was not enough for farming and other uses, the new 
arrivals continued to use the land around their former homes in addition to their newly 
allocated land. In turn, people who had originally lived in the area of the current village 
were given land use rights in part of the areas around Witamasiva that had been 
abandoned by the people moving to the new village. The effect of this rearrangement 
was that up to the present day most households in Kiwalamo have land rights both 
within and outside the village settlement area, whereas a major part of the area outside 
the settlement belongs to Kidabaga. To the minds of local people, this exchange of land 
rights was not carried out in the sense of an exchange of land holdings, but rather in the 
sense of a permanent or long-term exchange of land use rights. In other words: people 
who had been living in the area around Witamasiva still consider themselves to be 
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entitled to that land, but part of that land is regarded as tantamount to being ‘rented’ to 
those people in Kiwalamo who in turn 'rented' part of their land to people from 
Witamasiva. This ‘rent’ or exchange of land use rights involves no payment. If a 
newcomer to the village (for example teachers) wished to get land, he or she needed to 
buy it from the original settler on that land. 
From the perspective of elders in Kiwalamo, land tenure is regulated through 
mutual acceptance among villagers. In their view, villages are administrative 
institutions with no particular power over land property. Although they recognise that 
their land is located within the boundaries of Kidabaga, the villagers I interviewed still 
feel that it belongs to them. 
3.6 Revised land survey and compensation agreement 
In the second survey, in 2010, only a small part of around 2.8 hectares was considered 
Kidabaga’s spare land; this was the area that had already been compensated. The 
remaining area of around 1,570 hectares in Kidabaga, which had been provided free of 
charge, was categorised as land held by individuals, both from Kidabaga and Kiwalamo. 
District officials I interviewed claimed that it was only then that they had realised that 
Witamasiva was merely a small proportion of the total area. In the renewed 
compensation schedule based on that measurement, the customary land rights illustrated 
above were taken into account in the following way. Former landholders in the area, 
both from Kidabaga and Kiwalamo, were listed as being entitled to compensation for 
land plus unexhausted improvements (crops and trees), if there were any. They made up 
about half of the 100 or so right-holders. The people from Kiwalamo who had been 
‘renting’ the land were supposed to be compensated only for unexhausted 
improvements. Extra allowances were listed for graves. As there was no settlement on 
the transferred land, no related compensation had been foreseen. The total compensation 
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amounted to 687,645,900 Tanzanian Shillings (around USD 455,000 in 2010). There 
was some discussion between the village governments of Kidabaga and Kiwalamo 
regarding the land held by villagers of Kiwalamo. The government of Kidabaga was of 
the opinion that its VC, as the formal manager of land within village boundaries 
according to statutory law, was also entitled to compensation. Finally, it was agreed to 
pay compensation to the individual landholders after deducting 2% for Kidabaga. 
Although the new compensation schedule had been ready since November 2010, 
NFC only paid the compensation at the end of 2011. According to a district official, the 
company was hesitating about accepting the new measurements, arguing that it was not 
plausible that more than 100 people had been left out in the first survey, and that the 
total amount would be too high in the new compensation schedule. They also tried to 
bargain over the compensation for standing trees that belonged to former land users. 
Meanwhile, on the advice from the Regional Office, the district officials were holding 
back the title deeds of the rights of occupancy in order to put pressure on the investor to 
pay the compensation. 
3.7 Immediate consequences for local land rights and livelihoods in the 
villages Kidabaga and Kiwalamo 
Part of the area around Witamasiva, although not all by far, was used when NFC arrived 
in 2006. Cultivation was largely concentrated on the more fertile land closer to the 
rivers and included food crops and trees, while some of the drier hills were used for 
grazing cattle. 
A solution was found for the dispersed plots of grazing area that people lost; 
another neighbouring village gave part of its communal land as a common grazing area. 
The situation proved far more tense regarding land for cultivation. Since 2009 
representatives of the company and the local government had told the former land users 
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that it would be illegal for them to continue using the land, as it belonged to NFC. In 
some cases the company planted its seedlings among existing crops and allowed the 
small farmers to have a final harvest of the standing crop. While some affected 
households still had land to cultivate, others, mainly from Kiwalamo, complained about 
their loss of subsistence farmland, reduced food security and a lack of income to cover 
expenditure such as school fees. Some villagers from Kidabaga shifted their activities to 
new land, which they rented from other inhabitants. Given that they had not yet 
received the compensation by then, they argued that they were unable to buy land and 
lost a considerable amount of money paying the annual rent. 
In Kiwalamo, the agreement based on the second survey had other complex 
consequences. From a point of view of customary law, the people who had been living 
around Witamasiva earlier lost all of their landholdings for which they had decision-
making rights. The land within the settlement on which they have built their homes is 
regarded as having been ‘rented’ and is therefore less secure. The other people from 
Kiwalamo lost ‘only’ land use rights, albeit long-standing ones. They were therefore not 
compensated for loss of land, only for crops. There was no spare arable land in 
Kiwalamo under the management of the VC that could have been distributed among the 
affected villagers, and it seemed that there was also no substantial amount of individual 
land that might have been bought or rented from other villagers. Some of the people 
who were compensated for crops only (on ‘rented’ land) were said to be aiming to get 
back the part of their original land within the settlements that they had held before 
villagization. In this case, the other affected villagers who lost their original land 
holdings to NFC would be left without any land. They therefore argued that they would 
have to move away and try to find land for settlement and cultivation in another region. 
As they would probably be unable to find land for all the affected households in the 
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same place, they feared that they would be scattered around different villages, 
disrupting existing ties among relatives and neighbours. However, I was unable to 
explore this development any further within the time frame of this research. 
The graves had partly been left untended and were overgrown as a result. 
However, ancestral burial places play a vital role in cases of accidents, severe illnesses 
or fatalities. According to local beliefs, people will visit the burial places at times like 
these and clean the area around the graves in order to appease their ancestors. The 
investor had promised not to touch the burial places so that local people could still visit 
their ancestors’ tombs. When the company expanded its plantations, the local manager 
had asked the former landholders to show him the relevant sites so they might be 
protected. However, in their anger about the overdue compensation, some elders from 
Kiwalamo had refused to show the manager their burial places, arguing that they would 
do so only once they had received the compensation. The company subsequently 
continued its planting activities and partially covered some old burial sites. This caused 
great consternation among the affected people. 
5 Conceptual analysis: ‘How come others are selling our land?’ 
In the area around Witamasiva – which is located within the boundaries of Kidabaga, 
but partly used by villagers of Kiwalamo – customary and statutory land orders have 
coexisted since the 1970s without creating major tensions. However, their discrepancy 
became obvious when the investor sought to acquire the land. On the one hand, affected 
former landholders from Kiwalamo feel that it is their land, based on long-standing 
customary rights. This view is partly shared by their neighbours from Kidabaga. It is 
obvious that these land claims grounded in customary law were not protected. Thus an 
elder man from Kiwalamo asked:  
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How come others are selling our land? 
On the other hand, some of the inhabitants and village representatives in Kidabaga feel 
that they rightfully decided to transfer Witamasiva – and accidentally also some area 
around Witamasiva; they claim that it is their village’s land. One interviewee from 
Kidabaga said:  
Witamasiva was that time [when the VA decided to give it to the investor] used by 
people from Kiwalamo, with the permission of Kidabaga, but only temporarily. It 
was generally known that it belongs to Kidabaga, and that Kidabaga could take it 
back when needed. 
This view refers to the legislation as set in the statutory law, which views the VA as the 
legitimate institution for taking decisions about any land within village boundaries. 
The decision-making for the land transfer followed not the customary law cited 
by some villagers of Kiwalamo and Kidabaga, but statutory law – though not without 
considerable flaws, as will be discussed in further detail below. According to Meinzen-
Dick and Pradhan, it can be concluded that the legitimising institution behind the 
statutory law was stronger than the collectivity behind the customary law.52 In the 
following section, I will therefore look at the law-backing institutions and stakeholders, 
and their relations with each other. 
5.1 The recognition of statutory and customary law  
When foreign investors wish to acquire land in rural areas, they draw on statutory law – 
regulations that are in the public domain, and promoted and backed by the national 
government. The legitimising institution behind the statutory law is obviously the state. 
Not only the investor, but also the villagers and VC members I interviewed generally 
respected the Tanzanian state and never fundamentally questioned it in our interactions. 
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When it comes to land issues in Kidabaga and Kiwalamo, the state is usually 
represented by the district officials. District officials generally enjoy a high level of 
respect from local people, including VC members. They have the necessary knowledge 
about state law, which they have acquired through formal education, and the power to 
implement (or contribute to the implementation of) legal procedures by dint of their 
position. The villagers’ respect is also indicated in the minutes of the VC and VA, 
which refer respectfully to ‘experts’ from the district.53 In the presented case, the 
Member of Parliament for Kilolo and a former member of a Ministry, who accompanied 
the representatives of the district and NFC in some of their promotional meetings, have 
further strengthened the authority of the district officials. At one stage in the process the 
President even came into play – namely when he, as per legal requirement, finally 
effected the land transfer. Affected villagers from Kiwalamo and Kidabaga were 
informed accordingly that the decision was ‘signed by the President’, as interviewees 
often quoted officials. The reference to this figure of authority contributed to villagers’ 
feeling that they had no other option than to come to terms with the transfer. 
The villagers I interviewed not only respected the state, but the statutory land 
law too. Even people negatively affected by the land deal did not question the law as 
such. Though they did not know much about it in detail, they expected the law to be 
designed in a way that it would protect their rights, if implemented properly. In sum, 
statutory law and its backing institution – the state and its representatives – are 
recognised by all stakeholders involved. 
Customary law is sustained by villagers who have lived in the area for 
generations. They claim that numerous mutual and often long-standing agreements 
among individuals in a community constitute the land tenure order. Village boundaries 
have no particular effect in this matter. As I have outlined above, to some extent 
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statutory law recognises customary law as the main basis for land governance in 
villages. From the state’s point of view, the VC is responsible for the management of 
Village Land. But the elected VC has authority from a customary point of view too. 
Village councillors are usually respected and comparatively knowledgeable members of 
the village community; this is partly because they have more regular interactions with 
district officials and other external people. External stakeholders usually come to the 
VC to identify land in a given village. Yet, as I have shown, it can be very difficult for 
village representatives to know about and identify all local arrangements. Thus VC 
members may not always be fully able to back customary rights.54 
My analysis of the institutions and social relations reveals that statutory law – 
with its broad recognition among stakeholders, and notably respected authorities – has 
more powerful backing than customary law, which is only fully recognised and 
maintained by groups of villagers. The village government has a challenging double 
role in this regard, since it represents both statutory and customary laws. 
5.2 Flaws in the implementation of the land transfer process according to 
statutory law 
Statutory law was the basis for the land deal, but numerous errors hampered the 
implementation. They happened both at village and district levels. 
(a) The committee of village representatives approved by the VA in 2006 was 
responsible for showing the land to the district officials, but apparently it did not 
fulfil its task properly.  
(b) In the April 2008 meetings, when the VC and VA were officially informed 
about the intended land transfer based on the government notice, the district 
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officials reportedly did not inform them of the size of the area, even though the 
plot had already been demarcated for transfer. 
(c) After the April 2008 meetings, the VC of Kidabaga did not inform all affected 
villagers in Kidabaga and Kiwalamo about the proposed land transfer, even 
though village councillors must have known or at least suspected that holders of 
land rights were affected. Had the VC informed them at the time, people would 
have had time to raise objections within the period set by the first government 
notice.  
(d) Instead of taking the hints about affected right-holders in the above-mentioned 
meetings seriously and trying to get a clearer basis for the rest of the process, the 
district government interpreted the VA meeting as a sign of approval for the land 
deal. 
(e) The village government did not react in a timely manner to clarify and report the 
problems when doubts regarding the size of the land and compensation were 
raised at a VA meeting in March 2009, and when villagers from Kidabaga and 
Kiwalamo complained in different ways. By the time they finally looked into the 
matter, the land transfer had become effective.  
(f) When the claims of the affected people were finally accepted, one legal 
requirement for the land transfer – namely the agreement on compensation by all 
affected stakeholders – was no longer fulfilled. One could argue that the basic 
requirement – the VA recommendation to approve the land transfer – had also 
become weak or void, as the VA decision had been taken on the basis of missing 
and false assumptions. However, instead of restarting the whole process, the 
district protected the investor’s land claim and strove to delivering the legal 
basis for the land transfer as quickly as possible by asking the former 
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landholders to agree to the compensation. The fact that NFC had already planted 
on the land – with the go-ahead of the district government – helped to strengthen 
the company’s claim and stir up a belief among local people that the land 
transfer could not be undone.  
Other influential issues in the process are related to the VC’s role and to unequal 
knowledge among the stakeholders. These issues do not conflict with legal regulations 
regarding the land transfer, but had an impact nonetheless.  
Only affected people were invited to the March 2010 meeting at which the 
former landholders were requested to sign the acceptance of compensation, not the 
entire VA. Some interviewees, including a well-informed businessman who was not 
personally affected, felt that the village government had done this intentionally. Without 
the support of the other villagers, some of whom were more educated, the landholders 
had less power to resist such a request. Overall, villagers’ respect for the VC influenced 
the decision-making at the VA. This was illustrated when I asked about their first 
meeting with NFC. Most of the interviewees in Kidabaga did not feel that they had 
taken the decision of giving Witamasiva to NFC, despite having participated in the 
respective VA. In their view, the VC had already taken the decision and presented it to 
the village meeting. 
Perhaps the most important weakness in the process was the unequal knowledge 
among the stakeholders involved. The land law foresees that villages should benefit 
from information provided by district officials when deciding about land transfers. In 
Kidabaga, the villagers and their representatives had an opportunity to question the 
district officials during at least two meetings of both the VC and the VA. The district 
officer confirmed that he had presented the necessary information about the procedure 
and the villagers’ rights during the meetings. Yet villagers and village government 
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generally had a very low level of awareness and knowledge about statutory law and 
formal procedures to defend their land rights. I observed this throughout the interviews 
and the Kiwalamo villagers’ failed attempt to put pressure on the investor by refusing to 
show their burial places before receiving the compensation is a good illustration. 
Consequently, several people in Kidabaga blame the village government and the 
government in general for not having informed them properly about their land rights. 
This is even more the case in Kiwalamo, where people were not involved in formal 
meetings at all. An elder villager claimed: 
The government should have informed us people about land rights and rules before 
the company came. Everybody has rights. But the government just forced us. 
5.3 Flaws in the law 
It is unclear whether the customary land rights in Kidabaga and Kiwalamo would have 
been protected, even if the process had followed legal procedure as laid down in 
statutory law from the outset. In any case, the decision – or rather the recommendation 
to the Ministry for approval or rejection of the land transfer – could lawfully only be 
made by the VA of Kidabaga. And even if the people of Kiwalamo had been invited to 
the VA meeting, it would still not have been formally possible for them to take part in 
the decision, as they were not residents of that village. Even if the affected villagers of 
Kidabaga had realised the imminent loss of land, they could not have decided whether 
to accept the investor or not on their own. The law does not stipulate that affected 
individuals or households have the sole decision-making power or a right to veto; they 
can only contribute to the decision as VA members. Hence affected individuals could 
have been overruled. But at least their objections would have been included in the 
minutes and taken into account during decision-making at different levels. Further, 
affected landholders from Kidabaga and Kiwalamo could theoretically have delayed 
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and hampered the land transfer by not agreeing to the compensation. It would ultimately 
have been up to the High Court to decide on compensation but not on the transfer of 
Village Land to General Land as such.55 
One further issue relates to potential relocation. Although the transfer of land did 
not lead directly to resettlement, it might de facto have led to landholders of Kiwalamo 
having to move to other villages due to lack of sufficient land for their livelihoods. The 
Village Land Act does not foresee such a case of ‘collateral compulsory resettlement’, 
and no related compensation was paid in the examined case. Both points – affected 
villagers potentially being overruled by VA decisions, and resulting resettlement not 
being compensated in any case – can thus be identified as weaknesses in Tanzanian law. 
6 Discussion and conclusion 
This study examined the process of transferring village land to an investor against the 
backdrop of an analysis of the local land tenure regime. It focused on the example of a 
UK-based forestry company that acquired land in Tanzania – a country with a legal 
framework that is considered one of the best in Africa in terms of its protection of 
customary rights. 
The case of Kidabaga and its neighbouring village Kiwalamo I have presented 
illustrates the importance of a legal pluralism perspective both in research and policy if 
one wishes to understand the complexity of such land transactions and their immediate 
implications for local livelihoods. It was found that customary rights only have some 
standing vis-à-vis external stakeholders when they are backed by statutory law. In 
Tanzania, statutory law protects customary law, but only as long as the latter does not 
go beyond village boundaries, as the statutory regulations are based on villages as units. 
Yet, as we have seen, for historical reasons – namely the villagization process – 
customary tenure regimes are not limited to areas within village boundaries. A second 
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limitation on statutory law’s protection of customary rights is that it expects the 
collective decision-making of Village Assemblies to consider the customary rights of 
individuals, but this is not necessarily the case. The people who are affected in a 
particular village can co-decide, but they might be overruled, and people from 
neighbouring villages who are affected are not even allowed to take an active part in the 
decision-making. 
When customary law conflicts with statutory law, the people who represent 
statutory law – government officers for example – and people who rely on statutory law, 
for example foreign investors, are more successful at imposing their views and claims. 
This is because the institution behind the statutory law, i.e. the state and its 
representatives, is more powerful than the collectivity behind customary law, namely 
individual villagers. 
Along with flaws in the statutory law, which could arguably be overcome, the 
case study also detected weaknesses in the implementation of legal procedure. These are 
related to: 
• The difficulty of identifying local land orders in complex land tenure regimes; 
this is because of the specific nature of customary regimes based on individual 
arrangements, but also because of insufficient dedication by government 
officials and village governments to identify such rights. This was also shown in 
other cases.56 Village land use planning, as foreseen by the more recent Land 
Use Planning Act of 2007 would be helpful in this regard. In a participatory 
process, each village is supposed to develop its own plan which should include 
an analysis of the current use and the future community needs.57 Yet 
implementation is a challenging task in itself and in mid-2010, only about 10 per 
cent of all Tanzanian villages had a village land use plan.58 
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• Unequal social relations between government authorities and villagers and 
between members of VC, other villagers and non-village members; they lead not 
only to statutory law being stronger than customary law when there are doubts, 
but also to VA decisions being influenced or pre-decided. Hence there is a risk 
that powerful village members will take decisions that elide interests of weaker 
villagers and non-village members. Other studies also report the strong influence 
of government authorities on land deals.59 
• Unequal knowledge about land rights of local people compared to 
representatives of the district and the investor; though local people respect 
statutory law, they have little knowledge of it.60 Thus, when there are mistakes 
during the land transfer process, it is difficult for affected local people to defend 
their rights. Obviously, these knowledge inequalities cannot be balanced out 
during the process, although state regulations contain certain provisions. 
Considering the complexity of land law and the relatively low level of formal 
education overall, it is not surprising that the information shared at a few public 
meetings is insufficient for the majority to fully understand the legal process. 
All of the flaws in law and in its implementation may have adverse implications for the 
affected villagers, such as major delays in compensation payments and the hardship this 
causes.61 In the most extreme cases, as this study illustrates, this may include people 
losing their land against their will and even having to relocate their households due to a 
shortage of land in the area. Finally, the challenges of a land transfer process may affect 
not only local landholders and land users, but may also have negative consequences for 
the government officials involved and for the investor in terms of increased costs, time 
and workload. 
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Overall, the example from Tanzania shows us that even statutory land law that 
supposedly offers relatively good protection for customary rights does not do so in a 
foolproof manner. For investors, relying on the procedural steps as defined in law and 
on the respective village representatives is no guarantee of a conflict-free land 
transaction. This is because of weaknesses in the law, but more importantly because 
several errors can occur at different levels during implementation. The claim that 
transnational land deals can be disciplined by improved regulations is therefore 
questionable.62 Some of the flaws in implementation are related to unequal social 
relations between actors who back different laws. Less knowledgeable people and 
people living in complex land tenure settlements – arguably a significant share of the 
population of the Global South – are particularly at risk. 
If foreign investors are to continue acquiring land in Tanzania and elsewhere – 
though this study does not advise this – then the following points are recommended. 
Strengthening local people’s and village governments’ knowledge of land rights under 
statutory law in advance could considerably improve a land deal process. It is also 
important to carry out a more detailed analysis of the local property regime – as 
stipulated in the more recently enacted law on participatory village land use planning. In 
this context, it would also be advisable to promote the recognition of legal pluralism and 
customary law among investors. Furthermore, some adjustments should be considered 
to the Tanzanian laws regarding decision-making about land transfers and potential 
‘collateral forced resettlements’. 
In sum, my analysis raises severe doubts as to whether large transnational land 
deals can be conducted in a way that fully respects existing land rights. The findings of 
this study support voices that call for alternative pathways of agrarian development that 
do not affect people’s land rights. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Land grabbing, investment principles and plural legal orders of 
land use 
 
Martina Locher, Bernd Steimann and Bishnu Raj Upreti 
 
Recently, foreign direct investment in land, also termed ‘land grabbing’, has 
increased significantly in developing countries. In response to growing concerns 
about its detrimental impacts, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the 
World Bank and other multilateral organizations have come forward with two 
proposals, namely the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security 
(FAO 2012, FAO guidelines), to protect people's rights, and the Principles for 
Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and 
Resources (FAO et al. 2010, RAI principles), to make such investments more 
responsible. One of their central tenets is that investors and host governments 
respect local people’s existing property rights over land by formalising them in a 
transparent and participatory manner. 
 
The article challenges the two proposals – and thus much of the recent land grab 
debate – from a legal pluralism perspective, by showing that they do not adequately 
consider the existence of plural legal orders over land and the dynamics of power 
and everyday practices inherent in property relations. Referring to empirical 
evidence from Tanzania, Nepal, and Kyrgyzstan, we raise three fundamental 
concerns about the formalization of property rights. First, we demonstrate that the 
recognition of customary rights is a very complex and delicate endeavour, which 
risks neglecting existing property claims and rights. Neither of the proposals 
addresses this in a satisfactory way. Second, we understand that formalization by 
state intervention is sometimes necessary, but in those circumstances we cannot 
recommend the centralist approach of formalizing property rights, as proposed in the 
RAI principles. In many contexts, this approach has resulted in adverse effects for 
local communities rather than strengthening their rights. Third, a more rights-based 
vision as brought forward by the FAO guidelines still bears the risk of reinforcing 
unequal local power structures. Yet, this vision leaves it to local communities to 
decide whether their land should become a marketable good to outsiders or not. 
However, the introduction of such a property regime requires fundamental changes 
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in governance. This cannot be addressed adequately within the framework of 
guidelines alone. Instead, more long-term strategies for the protection of customary 
rights are required. Thus, from an analytical perspective, a moratorium on ‘land 
grabs’ would be most appropriate. From a more pragmatic perspective though, we 
acknowledge the FAO guidelines and – to a much lesser extent – the RAI principles 
as more immediate efforts to reduce negative effects of 'land grabs'. However, 
investors and host governments should not mistake these guidelines as guarantors of 
ostensibly harmless land acquisitions. Finally, this article concludes that employing 
a legal pluralism perspective is very helpful in gaining a more holistic understanding 
of potential effects and proposed measures in the context of 'land grabs'. 
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LAND GRABBING, INVESTMENT 
PRINCIPLES AND PLURAL LEGAL 
ORDERS OF LAND USE1 
 
 
Martina Locher, Bernd Steimann and Bishnu Raj Upreti 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, foreign direct investment in land has increased significantly in 
developing countries. Land acquisition in a developing context by foreign investors 
is often referred to as 'land grabbing'. In response to the growing concerns about the 
effects of land grabbing, various multilateral organizations including the UN Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank have recently come 
forward with guidelines and principles to make such investments more responsible 
and transparent. One of the central tenets in the Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of 
National Food Security (FAO 2012, in short 'FAO guidelines') and the Principles 
for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and 
Resources (FAO et al. 2010, in short 'RAI principles') is that investors and involved 
host governments recognize and respect local people's existing property rights over 
land and other natural resources. To this end, it is suggested that prior to any large-
scale land deals, existing property rights should be formalized in a transparent and 
participatory manner. Thus, the two proposals build on the assumptions that all 
kinds of property rights over land can be formalized, and that such formalization is 
required in order to support the interests of local stakeholders. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1
 This article is partially based on work conducted within the framework of the 
'Special Research Project: Transnational Pressure on Land' of the Swiss National 
Centre of Competence in Research North-South (NCCR North-South): Research 
Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change. We would like to thank 
Norman Backhaus, Thomas Breu, Boniface Kiteme, Peter Messerli and Oliver 
Schönweger from the 'Malindi team', Craig Hatcher and the anonymous reviewers 
for their contributions and constructive feedbacks on the paper.  
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In this article we want to critically examine and challenge these assumptions from a 
legal pluralism perspective. Referring to the four layers of social organization 
brought forward by F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann (1999; see also F. von Benda-
Beckmann et al. 2006), we first show that the proposed guidelines and principles – 
and thus much of the recent land grab debate – do not adequately account for the 
existence of plural legal orders over land and other natural resources, and that they 
largely ignore the dynamics of power and everyday practices inherent to property 
relations. Based on this, we raise three fundamental concerns about the idea of 
formalizing property rights in a legal pluralism context, and discuss them in the light 
of empirical evidence of competing claims over land resources from Tanzania, 
Nepal, and Kyrgyzstan. 
 
The article demonstrates that the identification and recognition of customary group 
or individual rights is a very complex and delicate endeavour, which entails the risk 
of neglecting existing claims and rights of local people (this is our first concern). 
Neither of the proposals addresses this in a satisfactory way. Nevertheless, there are 
cases where formalization by state intervention is necessary, namely when local 
individuals and communities2 are at risk of losing their rights against their will, or if 
it is their own wish to enter deals with outsiders. In such cases, from a legal 
pluralism perspective, a centralist approach to formalizing customary land rights as 
proposed in the RAI principles cannot be recommended. In many contexts, it has 
resulted in adverse effects for local communities rather than strengthening their 
rights (our second concern). A more "security and rights-based vision" (Assies 2009: 
586) as brought forward by the FAO guidelines still bears the risk of reinforcing 
unequal power structures within local communities (our third concern). Yet, we 
argue, this approach is more promising in terms of leaving it to local communities to 
decide whether their land and natural resources should become a marketable good to 
outsiders or not. However, the introduction of such a property regime requires broad 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2
 We use the term 'local community' interchangeably with 'local people' or 'local 
stakeholders'. However, we are aware that local communities are by no means 
homogenous and do not necessarily experience the same consequences when 'land 
grabs' take place. In this article, we only distinguish between local elites and 
'common' members of local communities. Other important characteristics in the 
context of 'land grabbing' include gender (see Behrman et al. 2011) and indigeneity 
(Sawyer and Gomez 2008). For critical thoughts on the notion of 'community' 
related to natural resource management and land reforms, see Sikor and Müller 
(2009: 1310f). 
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changes in governance. This cannot be addressed satisfactorily within the 
framework of investment guidelines. Instead, more long-term strategies on how to 
protect customary rights are required. 
 
 
Foreign direct investments in land and current proposals for a 'Code of Conduct' 
 
In recent years, foreign direct investments in land have become a key factor of rural 
transformation in the Global South. Based on a new database it is estimated that 
between 2000 and April 2012, foreign land purchases and leases amounted to more 
than 80 million hectares (Anseeuw et al. 2012: 3). Deininger refers to 57.8 million 
hectares of intended or actual land deals in the year 2009 alone (Deininger 2011: 
220). So far, most of these deals have taken place in Sub-Saharan Africa, yet large 
agricultural land reserves are also at stake in post-Soviet Eurasia, Latin America and 
Asia (Visser and Spoor 2011; Borras and Franco 2010; World Bank 2010; GRAIN 
2008). Foreign investors often belong to either emerging and highly dynamic 
economies such as those of China or the Gulf states, or to developed economies 
from Europe and the US. The actual transaction of farmland usually happens in 
close collaboration with respective national governments in the host countries 
(Deininger 2011: 224; Borras and Franco 2010; GRAIN 2009). Some of the key 
drivers behind these investments are an increasing demand for food and non-food 
agro-products, such as biofuels, due to an ever-growing world population, changing 
nutrition patterns, and climate change and energy supply concerns. As a 
consequence, and in addition, land itself is also increasingly viewed as a central 
commodity and an object of speculation (Gonzalez 2010; Zoomers 2010; Cotula et 
al. 2009).  
 
Along with the increasing pace and extent of these investments or 'land grabs', a 
growing number of observers started to raise concerns about their environmental, 
economic and socio-political consequences. The main points of critique pertain to 
the detrimental effects of large-scale plantations if compared to smallholder 
agriculture. These include impacts on natural resources such as water, soils, and 
biodiversity, but also on the livelihoods of the affected population, e.g. through 
reduced food security or income opportunities (de Schutter 2011; Cotula et al. 
2009). Considerable attention has also been paid to the consequences of such 
investments for local people's property rights over land and other natural resources, 
and thus their capacity for self-determination (Borras and Franco 2010). In recent 
years, civil society organizations have documented numerous cases where local 
people's property rights were ignored and violated by investors and involved 
government agencies alike, sometimes even leading to forced displacements (see 
e.g. GRAIN 2009). Also the World Bank (2010) has reported such cases. In 
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addition, recent analyses suggest that a weak general recognition of land rights at 
country level correlates with high levels of foreign demand for that land (Alden 
Wily 2011; Deininger 2011: 218; Visser and Spoor 2011: 319f; Mann and Smaller 
2010). 
 
While certain sectors such as the extractive industry have taken up these concerns by 
agreeing on (voluntary) principles for responsible investment, no global consensus 
has been reached yet in terms of land- and water-intensive agro-investments. 
However, at the international level, two prominent proposals for such a Code of 
Conduct have been released, which have been subject to a more or less broad 
consultation process among multilateral organizations, national governments, and 
civil society organizations. 
 
A first initiative was taken by the FAO, which brought forward the "Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests 
in the Context of National Food Security" (FAO 2012). They build on the final 
declaration of the 2006 International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development, which emphasized the importance of secure and sustainable access to 
land, water and other natural resources, as well as of economic, social and cultural 
rights of marginalized and vulnerable groups in terms of land and natural resource 
issues (FAO 2006). To carry the dialogue further, the FAO initiated a broad, 
participatory process to develop practice-oriented, voluntary guidelines on the 
responsible governance of natural resource tenure. More than 90 FAO member 
countries, several UN agencies and other international organizations, farmer 
associations, representatives from the private sector as well as civil society 
organizations (CSOs) participated in the process, which consisted of three rounds of 
negotiations facilitated by a working group of the Committee on World Food 
Security (CFS). The active involvement of CSOs seems particularly noteworthy; not 
only did they participate in the official negotiations, but they additionally held a 
series of regional civil society consultations, which were facilitated by the 
International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC). Thus, the FAO's 
consultation process developed into a highly contentious debate, but in return was 
positively acknowledged by a broad range of stakeholders. In their final version 
endorsed by the CFS on May 11, 2012, the guidelines mainly address potential host 
states rather than investors. Consequently, they refer explicitly to existing binding 
international law such as the universal declaration on human rights or international 
conventions on indigenous people or biodiversity. This is also why they gained the 
support of several important international agrarian movements such as La Via 
Campesina, the IPC, and others (Borras et al. 2011). 
 
In a second initiative, the World Bank Group, the FAO, the International Fund for 
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Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) joined to propose Principles for Responsible Agricultural 
Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (FAO et al. 2010). 
Being the result of negotiations among officials of the involved organizations rather 
than of a broad consultation process, these so-called 'RAI principles' have been 
promoted since early 2010, most prominently in the World Bank's report on land-
related investments (World Bank 2010). Their intention is to provide guidance for 
host countries and investors on how to prepare strong domestic legislation and carry 
out socially responsible investments respectively (FIAN 2010a). They consist of 
seven key principles addressing the issues of property rights, food security, 
transparency, participation, economic viability, as well as social and environmental 
sustainability. However, unlike the FAO guidelines, and despite a consultation 
process initiated in early 2010, some of the governments most directly concerned as 
well as civil society organizations have repeatedly denounced the RAI initiative for 
a striking lack of consultation in its early stages. In addition, it has been criticized 
for its reliance on the mainstream tools of 'good governance' and on corporate social 
responsibility frameworks rather than on binding human rights obligations. So far, it 
has also remained unclear as to how the RAI principles will be linked to the FAO 
guidelines (de Schutter 2011; Li 2011; FIAN 2010a). 
 
 
The Notion of 'Property Rights' in the FAO Guidelines and the RAI 
Principles from a Legal Pluralism Perspective 
 
Proponents of large-scale investments in land have often argued that they invest in 
'unused land', 'reserve agricultural land' or 'idle land' only, i.e. land which was not 
used for any form of production and for which no local claims existed whatsoever 
(World Bank 2010; Woertz et al. 2008). Critics have remarked, however, that much 
of this seemingly 'unused land', which is usually in the formal ownership of the 
state, is subject to long-standing, often vague and informal tenure rights of the local 
population, be it individuals or groups, and that the neglect of such rights may 
trigger conflict and undermine effective land use and management (Cotula et al. 
2009; Haralambous et al. 2009). Both the FAO guidelines and the RAI principles 
have taken up this concern. In principle, both proposals demand that governments 
and investors recognize and respect existing property rights to land and associated 
natural resources, namely by demarcating and formalizing these rights prior to any 
investment-related land transfer. For the detailed formulations in both proposals 
regarding the notion of property rights see Table 1. 
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Table 1: Selected main elements of the FAO guidelines and the RAI principles 
 
 FAO guidelines: Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food 
Security (FAO 2012) 
RAI principles: Principles for 
Responsible Agricultural 
Investment that Respects Rights, 
Livelihoods and Resources (FAO 
et al. 2010) 
Main 
demands 
"Where informal tenure to land, 
fisheries and forests exists, States 
should acknowledge it in a 
manner that respects existing 
formal rights under national law 
and in ways that recognize the 
reality of the situation..." (16). 
"Existing use and ownership 
rights to land, whether statutory 
or customary, primary or 
secondary, formal or informal, 
group or individual, should be 
respected." (First of the seven 
RAI principles: 2) 
 
Procedure "States should allocate tenure 
rights and delegate tenure 
governance in transparent, 
participatory ways, using simple 
procedures that are clear, 
accessible and understandable to 
all, especially to indigenous 
peoples and other communities 
with customary tenure systems" 
(13). 
 
Investors and government 
agencies must identify all right 
holders and legally recognize, 
demarcate and register their 
existing rights and uses. This is 
followed by "negotiation with 
land holders/users, based on 
informed and free choice" (2). 
 
Demarcation should be done "in 
a participatory and low-cost way 
that can be implemented quickly" 
(4). 
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Objective, 
expected 
outcome 
States should "protect tenure 
right holders against the arbitrary 
loss of their tenure rights" and 
"[p]romote and facilitate the 
enjoyment of legitimate tenure 
rights" (3). 
 
Ultimately "These Voluntary 
Guidelines seek to improve 
governance of tenure of land [...] 
with the goals of food security 
[...], poverty eradication, 
sustainable livelihoods, social 
stability, housing security, rural 
development, environmental 
protection and sustainable social 
and economic development" (1). 
Recognition of land rights "can 
greatly empower local 
communities and such 
recognition should be viewed as 
a precondition for direct 
negotiation with investors" (2). 
 
Ultimately, the objective is to 
avoid "[l]oss of land and other 
resource rights to an investment 
project without recognition of 
quite valid sensitivities and 
without full compensation" and 
"...the disruption of livelihoods 
and the dislocation of 
communities" (3). Further, 
another objective seems to be to 
prevent "public criticism of 
large-scale investment" due to 
such neglects (3). 
 
Other 
comments 
"States should, in drafting tenure 
policies and laws, take into 
account the social, cultural, 
spiritual, economic and 
environmental values of land, 
fisheries and forests held under 
tenure systems of indigenous 
peoples and other communities 
with customary tenure systems" 
(15). 
Recognizing other than central 
state practices: "States should 
respect and promote customary 
approaches used by indigenous 
peoples and other communities 
with customary tenure systems to 
resolving tenure conflicts within 
communities..." (15). 
Acknowledging that the formal 
recognition of group rights may 
be difficult and may foster 
individualisation of former 
common property (3). 
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Challenging the two proposals from a legal pluralism perspective 
 
Since the consultation processes began in 2010, much criticism has been raised 
against the two proposals, not least regarding their approach to property rights. 
Many observers consider it naive to believe that legal recognition of land rights can 
guarantee their protection from 'unfriendly takeovers'. It has also been remarked that 
the simplistic focus on 'existing land rights' disregards the resource needs of future 
generations, thus underestimating new local claims that may arise in future (Borras 
and Franco 2012: 54, 2010: 517; de Schutter 2011; Li 2011; FIAN 2010a: 3; 
Scoones 2010). 
 
In addition to these legitimate points of critique, a closer look at the two proposals 
from a legal pluralism perspective raises a number of further caveats and concerns. 
These mainly pertain to their somewhat simplistic notion of 'property rights' and the 
measures proposed to strengthen and protect them. We have chosen the legal 
pluralism perspective, because we consider it particularly useful for analysing the 
complexity of land tenure in contexts where different understandings of property 
converge.3 First of all, legal pluralism accounts for the co-existence of parallel legal 
systems or institutions (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1999). This is in contrast to 
a legal centralist perspective, where "law is and should be the law of the state, (…) 
exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state institutions" (J. 
Griffiths 1986: 3). The debate on whether and how non-statutory legal systems 
should be formalized (e.g. Fitzpatrick 2005; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2008; 
Assies 2009) will be taken up towards the end of this article. Second, from a legal 
pluralism perspective, engaging with property means to acknowledge that it 
encompasses more than (private or common) ownership of a resource (Wiber 1992: 
470). Instead, property rights are better understood as bundles of rights (or "web of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3
 Borras and Franco claim that it would be more appropriate to focus on "rural poor 
people’s effective control" – in Ribot's and Peluso's words 'access' – instead of 
property, and thus on the question of which people have "the ability to benefit from 
things" – in this case land – by drawing on different "bundles of powers" (Borras 
and Franco 2012: 55, following Ribot and Peluso 2003: 153, 154). While we agree 
with this view to some extent, we also see some challenges related to the use of this 
concept in this context (particularly in cases where people have rights to land, but 
too little power and thus no ability to use it). We have chosen the perspective of 
legal pluralism, as we consider this framework with its broad definition of property 
as useful for analytical purposes in relation to the FAO guidelines and particularly 
the RAI principles, which focus on land (tenure) rights (not land access).  
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interests", see Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2008), since different individuals or 
groups can have different rights over the same resource at the same time. The 
different types of rights can be broadly grouped into two categories, i.e. use rights 
(the rights to access and use or withdraw a resource) and control rights (the rights to 
manage a resource, to exclude others from using it, or to alienate it to others through 
sale, rental, or gift) (Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006; Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001; 
J. Griffiths 1986; see Ostrom 2003 for a detailed categorization of different property 
rights). Third, legal pluralism means to acknowledge that property is not just a 
specific right or relation, but "concerns the ways in which the relations between 
society's members with respect to valuables are given form and significance" 
(Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006: 14; see also Sikor and Müller 2009: 1311; Meinzen-
Dick and Mwangi 2008: 36). Consequently, property is always seen as embedded in 
a specific social and political context, encompassing a wide variety of different 
arrangements at different levels. These can include more formal aspects such as 
written rules, less formal ones such as people's beliefs and values, but also concrete 
practices related to property (Mehta et al. 2001; Wiber 1992; A. Griffiths 1998). The 
work of Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006), who distinguish four 'layers of social 
organization', helps to analytically grasp this plurality behind property relations. The 
first layer includes ideologies and culture, where neoliberal concepts of private 
property may collide with traditional or religious concepts of common property. The 
second layer focuses on legal regulations, which are usually directly related to 
ideologies and culture, but are more specific in the sense that they define concrete 
rules and procedures. This includes state law, but also customary or religious law. 
The third layer refers to people's actual social relations related to property. These 
are often multifunctional and reflect local power relations shaped by community and 
kin or by social, political or economic dependencies (e.g. patron-client relations), 
rather than abstract norms defined by state, customary or religious law. Thus, 
disputes over land tenure can only be understood within a wider socio-political 
context (Lund 1998). The fourth layer emphasizes that it is in people's concrete, 
everyday property practices (e.g. fencing or paying land rent) where ideologies, 
laws, and social relationships regarding property are reflected, negotiated, 
reproduced, and eventually transformed. In this context, we consider 'forum 
shopping' (Meinzen-Dick 2009: 3; Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001: 11; cf. K. von 
Benda-Beckmann 1981) a useful concept4. It describes the practice of certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4
 When introducing the concept termed 'forum shopping' in her work in 1981, K. 
von Benda-Beckmann described it as the practice of certain stakeholders appealing 
to different institutions (i.e. forums) representing different legal systems in order to 
solve conflicts in their favour. In this article, we use the concept in a broader sense 
for the practice of using different norms and regulations to support claims over 
resources, without necessarily appealing to conflict resolution forums. While a 
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stakeholders manoeuvring between different norms and regulations to secure their 
claims over resources. Consequently, property rights and the ways in which 
resources are used do not simply derive from statutes or formal rules, but "should be 
understood as negotiated outcomes" (Meinzen-Dick 2009: 3).  
 
To some extent, the examined guidelines and principles account for these aspects of 
legal pluralism in property rights. The FAO guidelines state explicitly that resources 
have not only an economic and a political value, but that they can also have social, 
cultural, and spiritual values (see Table 1 above). In this way, they refer at least 
indirectly to the layer of ideas and ideologies related to resource property. The RAI 
principles distinguish not only between use and ownership rights, but refer explicitly 
also to statutory and customary, primary and secondary, formal and informal, as 
well as group and individual forms of property (see Table 1). They thus 
acknowledge that property rights over resources can take multiple forms and that 
there may be other layers of legal regulation besides statutory law. Nevertheless, 
both documents still build on a rather static understanding of property, since they 
largely ignore the dynamics of concrete social relationships and property practices. 
Neither the FAO guidelines nor the RAI principles acknowledge that property 
regimes may be contested, that they may be subject to ambiguous rules, and that 
especially powerful rights holders may draw on different legal systems to legitimize 
their property claims. In short, the social embeddedness of property and related 
aspects of power are largely absent from these documents. This is particularly 
problematic because both proposals seem to assume that property rights over land 
and other natural resources can and should be formalized, and that such 
formalization necessarily supports the interests of all local stakeholders.  
 
In the following, we raise three fundamental concerns from a legal pluralism 
perspective, focusing on the identification of plural legal arrangements (our first 
concern) and the process as well as potential consequences of the proposed 
formalization (our second and third concerns). We will discuss our concerns in light 
of empirical evidence from three different regional contexts, i.e. Kyrgyzstan, 
Tanzania, and Nepal. Only part of this evidence (i.e. the evidence from Tanzania) 
stems from explicit empirical research on what is now called 'land grab'. We 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cognate term such as 'shopping for normative orders' or 'shopping for legal systems' 
would be more precise for this broader concept, we use 'forum shopping' by 
referring to Meinzen-Dick who describes it as a process in which "individuals and 
groups make use of one or another of these legal frameworks as the basis for their 
claims on a resource" (Meinzen-Dick 2009: 3; see also Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 
2001: 11). 
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intentionally use material from other contexts in which existing patterns of land 
rights have changed and resource claims of various actors compete with each other. 
We are convinced that much can be learnt about the complexity of dealing with 
multiple socio-legal arrangements in land issues and the potentials and pitfalls of 
formalization procedures also from other (and earlier) cases, as has been argued and 
demonstrated also by Hall (2011) and Li (2011: 285f). 
 
 
First Concern: Non-Statutory Legal Orders of Land Use are Difficult 
to Identify  
 
Our first concern is that the formalization of property rights is a very delicate 
endeavour. Formalization as a first step requires the identification of claims 
(Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2008: 38). Claims are based on legal orders, and these 
are expressed in ideas and ideologies, concrete social relationships, and property 
practices, particularly where property rights are not (only) defined through statutory 
law. Elements in these layers of social organization are often difficult to identify and 
recognize, as we will show in the following two examples. 
 
 
Tanzania: Challenges in identifying customary property rights 
 
The example of a UK-based forestry company acquiring land in Tanzania illustrates 
challenges for outsiders to identify customary property rights during the land 
acquisition process (Locher 2011). In this case, a village assembly in the Southern 
Highlands had decided to hand over a certain area of reserve village land to the 
investor (Chachage and Baha 2010). The land is far from the core settlement and at 
present not used by the villagers. It is known under a specific name given by local 
people who had been living there before they were resettled by the socialist 
government during the 1970s. The decision was recorded in the meeting minutes 
accordingly, and a committee was formed to show the area to the district officials so 
that they would demarcate it for the land transfer. However, as Locher (2011) 
illustrates, the committee was headed by the village chairman who did not originate 
from that particular area. Since he did not know the exact boundaries of the 
respective area, he only showed it roughly to the district officials by pointing at it 
from afar. Hence, a considerably bigger area than what the village assembly had 
agreed upon was transferred, and several parcels, which according to customary law 
belonged to local households, were transferred, too. Further, some of those parcels 
were used by households from a neighbouring village, who had been provided use 
rights by the landholders. Unfortunately, the concerned households only realized 
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that their land was transferred to the investor once the deal was made. They had to 
struggle for more than a year until their claims became formally accepted. They did 
not succeed, however, to revoke the transfer and finally felt forced to agree on the 
offered compensation. The example shows that detailed knowledge about complex 
customary property rights is not shared by everyone in a village, not even 
necessarily by elected village representatives. This lack of specific knowledge is 
likely to be more pronounced in respect of secondary property rights. In such cases, 
sometimes only those directly involved know their property arrangements and exact 
boundaries. Boundaries of individual property are not visibly marked, but are both 
conveyed verbally by referring to natural landmarks and reproduced through regular 
use such as planting crops. However, some land is not used intensively and there are 
also fallow periods. This makes it particularly difficult for outsiders to physically 
detect customary property rights in short visits.  
 
 
Nepal: Dispute over ownership of a land pooling Joint Venture Project 
 
In Nepal, particularly in the capital and big cities, real estate companies have 
emerged as key players in the housing sector market. They acquire fertile 
agricultural lands from farmers at cheap rates and sell high priced houses or house 
construction sites, thus earning huge profit margins (Shrestha 2011; Upreti et al. 
2008; Upreti 2004b). In order to prevent such exploitation, the Bhaktapur 
Municipality together with the Kathmandu Valley Town Development Plan 
Executive Committee recently initiated a Joint Venture Project (JVP). In 2009, they 
accumulated approximately 30 ha of land from different landowners. The objective 
of this land pooling JVP was to improve the housing standards in the residential 
areas by providing basic requirements such as open spaces, food paths, drinking 
water, electricity, waste collection points, children's play areas. Once the land was 
endowed with all these facilities, the JVP intended to sell it for fixed prices, whereas 
the former landowners were provided right of pre-emption. However, the land soon 
became a major source of contestation among the involved stakeholders. While the 
JVP claimed full control rights (including access, withdrawal, management, 
exclusion and alienation rights; see Ostrom 2003; Schlager and Ostrom 1992), the 
original land contributors argued that the JVP had no exclusive alienation rights, 
even if the project was exercising other control rights. In addition, many 
landowners, farmers, bureaucrats and politicians, who had not directly contributed 
their land to the JVP, have started to object to the JVP work by claiming different 
rights such as their freedom to use the surrounding open spaces for cultural, 
religious and social activities, which was altered after the land was taken by the 
JVP. The affected people cite their historical association, cultural and religious  
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values, as well as their land use practices in order to oppose the provisions of the 
JVP.  
 
 
Conclusions from the presented cases 
 
The two cases from different contexts illustrate that 'existing property rights' over 
land resources can only be understood if conceptualized as overlapping 'bundles of 
rights'. Local claims and rights often coexist and overlap in terms of scale and time, 
and build on a broad variety of normative and cognitive frameworks as well as 
resource-related practices of access and use. Tanzanian smallholders convey their 
right to use certain land parcels from long-standing social relations and regular use 
practices, and Nepali land users interpret the rights to the JVP land according to 
their own customary and religious frameworks. Thus, local claims and rights not 
only build on different legal regulations but are also superimposed and further 
adapted by individual social relations, beliefs and practices. 
 
Consequently, local people's perceptions of 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' property 
rights often differ and even conflict with each other. The example from Tanzania 
shows that elected representatives (who are usually among the first ones to be 
involved in a participatory planning process) are not necessarily aware of all the 
flexible and often-changing tenure arrangements. In both cases, these coexisting and 
competing claims have become publicly contested in the course of an external 
intervention, such as the appearance of an investor seeking to acquire arable land in 
Tanzania and the municipality authorities acquiring land for a housing improvement 
project in Nepal. Apparently, both interventions have failed to sufficiently account 
for existing claims and rights, even when they tried to do so in a participatory 
manner (as in Tanzania) or sought to make access to land resources more equal (as 
in Nepal). This raises the question, whether and how locally existing claims and 
rights can be 'recognized' in the course of a large-scale investment in land. The 
complex endeavour is even more delicate for investors that usually deal with formal 
authorities who often themselves do not know or recognize the plural legal 
arrangements at the local level.  
 
In any case, trying to identify existing rights by adopting a 'quick' and 'simple' 
procedure (as suggested in the two proposals) seems not only unrealistic but also 
irresponsible, given the conflicts and displacements that this may cause. We will 
take up this thought again towards the end of this article.  
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Second Concern: Centralist Approaches to Formalizing Property 
Rights Allow the State Administration to Expand its Influence at the 
Cost of Local Communities 
 
Our second concern is that the formalization of hitherto non-formalized property 
rights allows superior levels of the state administration to expand their influence and 
increase their control over subordinate levels of the administration as well as over 
local communities and individual resource users. While this is not negative per se, 
under certain circumstances it can result in adverse political and financial pressure 
upon local communities and resource users. Thus, land titling may run counter to the 
declared intention of the FAO guidelines and the RAI principles to strengthen local 
communities and to ensure the effective use of scarce natural resources. 
 
 
Nepal: Formalization and legalization of property rights as a means to expand state 
influence and control 
 
Until 1950, land rights in Nepal were shaped by various cultural, social and 
normative practices and plural legal arrangements such as state, folk, customary, 
indigenous, and religious law (Upreti 2004a). In 1951, Nepal started a land reform 
to formalize and legalize property rights, which has been a major agenda for six 
decades. In the course of the reform the state changed all existing forms of land 
ownership into the Raikar ownership system. Raikar denotes an ultimate state 
ownership over all land, which is then cultivated by individuals as direct tenants of 
the state. The reform thus did away with six existing different forms of land control 
rights (Pyakuryal and Upreti 2011; Alden Wily et al. 2009; Caplan 2000; Thapa 
2000; Regmi 1999). Studies show that at the operational level such expansion of 
state control and influence created numerous complications and led to many local 
conflicts (Upreti 2010; Upreti et al. 2008). The government argued though, that it 
was necessary to merge all land tenure systems in the country into one form of 
ownership in order to reach the declared objectives of improving land management, 
increasing agricultural production and productivity, and ensuring access to land for 
the landless (Kshetry 2011; Shrestha 2011). However, the reform provided a 
conducive (and to some extent manipulative) framework for a close nexus between 
the bureaucracy of government land administration and powerful elites to reap the 
benefits of the reform (Pyakuryal and Upreti 2011; Alden Wily et al. 2009). Basnet 
documents that when the land reform was implemented through the Lands Act 1964, 
the poorest 65 percent of the total population held 15 percent of land as opposed to 
3.7 percent of the population, the rich peasants and feudal lords, who held 39.7 
percent of land (Basnet 2011: 143). After the reform, according to the UNDP 
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(2004), the 5 wealthiest percent of the people in Nepal own 37 percent of all arable 
land, whereas the poorest 47 percent own only 15 percent of all land. Though these 
figures show a gradual improvement over time they also demonstrate that the poor, 
marginalized and landless were not among the main beneficiaries of the most hyped 
land reform programme in Nepal. However, government officials not only gained 
control over land resources, but greatly expanded their influence over local 
communities. By using their authority, connection and influences, political and 
bureaucratic elites manipulated the provisions of the different land-related acts and 
regulations in order to exploit local people. This has also created problems in food 
production and security (Ghale 2011; Upreti et al. 2008), as it altered the existing 
agricultural practice, moving away from food production to non-agricultural 
commercial activities, and consequently food insecurity became more prevalent 
(Khatri and Upreti 2012).    
 
 
Kyrgyzstan: Private arable land as a liability for the less wealthy 
 
Agrarian reforms in Kyrgyzstan gained momentum in late 1993, when in view of the 
rapid impoverishment of the rural population, the central government declared the 
de-collectivization of former collective and state farms compulsory. Consequently, 
most of the hitherto state-owned arable land within these farms had to be equally 
distributed on an individual basis to all current and former farm employees and their 
family members. The land was first distributed in the form of land-use rights, which 
were converted into private ownership rights in 1998. However today, less wealthy 
households are often unable to cultivate all the land they received (Steimann 2011). 
They either lack the financial and technical means or the skills and knowledge 
required to do so. In addition, many irrigation schemes are in bad shape, and the 
allocation of water by local committees is often subject to arbitrariness and 
corruption (Lindberg 2007). At the same time, selling land is difficult because the 
concerned plots are usually far from the village and of bad quality; further, a 
nationwide moratorium on land sales was not lifted before 2001, this seriously 
slowed down the emergence of a functioning land market in rural Kyrgyzstan. 
Returning the land to the state is also not possible. As a consequence, a great deal of 
arable land has fallen out of production in recent years (Mamytova and 
Mambetalieva 2008). Nonetheless, irrespective of whether rural households use all 
their arable land or not, they are obliged to pay land taxes to the communal 
authorities. In addition, arable land serves as a basis for assessing a household's 
entitlement to state child allowances. This means that rural Kyrgyz households are 
taxed and assessed on the basis of land assets that many of them can neither use nor 
sell. In this way, private land ownership has turned into a liability for many among 
the less wealthy. At the same time, it has given the state an opportunity to exert 
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pressure upon the local population. For instance, communal authorities use the threat 
of tax increases as an effective means to get their way in the course of local conflicts 
(Steimann 2011: 182). 
 
 
Conclusions from the presented cases 
 
The two examples may illustrate very different processes, yet they both show how 
legal centralist approaches, which define statutory law as the main or only normative 
framework (J. Griffiths 1986), inevitably lead to the expansion of power of the state 
administration. In many cases, this happens at the expense of local communities and 
resource users. Political elites in Nepal capitalize on the land reform by adjusting 
certain provisions of the new land acts and regulations to expand their influence and 
power at the local level. The Kyrgyz state endowed rural people with private 
property over land but not the means and structures required to effectively use it; 
since land is subject to taxes it has become a liability for many. 
 
This raises considerable doubts as to whether a centralist approach can really do 
justice to legal plural orders over land property. It seems instead that the statutory 
recognition (or redefinition) of existing claims and rights strengthens the state 
administration rather than local communities. This confirms again that property is 
not just about questions of legal regulation and economic efficiency, but is always 
embedded in a concrete social and political context and is thus closely linked to 
issues of power and domination. In other words and with reference to the four layers 
of social organization of Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006), by enforcing statutory law 
as the dominant or only normative framework, the state gains authority over the 
layer of ideologies and culture and the layer of legal regulations. Hence, it 
automatically gains considerable control over the layers of social relations and 
people's property practices and thus over local patterns of power and domination.  
 
 
Third Concern: Formalizing Property Rights Bears the Risk of 
Reinforcing Unequal Local Power Structures 
 
Our third concern is that even if the central state introduces formalized property 
rights with the best intentions, it still runs the risk of reinforcing unequal local power 
structures. The implementation and maintenance of a respective regime and thus the 
expansion of state authority to the local level in a way that supports local people is 
complex and often beyond the state's capacity. The new legal provisions may be 
difficult to understand and become commingled with previous property regimes, 
thus providing ground for contestation. In such situations, local elites may benefit 
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much more from formalization procedures than the poor. Since property regimes are 
always embedded in networks of dominance and dependence, local elites are usually 
in a better position than the less wealthy and less powerful to get their existing 
claims recognized, or to defend them towards external actors. To a large extent, this 
is to do with the practice of 'forum shopping' (see text and footnote on page 9), 
which allows especially wealthier and well informed people to manoeuvre between 
various normative and cognitive orders to defend their claims over resources. 
 
 
Kyrgyzstan: Privatization of arable land and redefinition of pasture use rights 
 
In rural Kyrgyzstan, the rapid privatization of state-owned farmland contributed to 
the reproduction of existing disparities between rural elites and ordinary workers 
(Steimann 2012). In most cases, the distribution of land and other farm assets was 
carried out by a local commission consisting of former farm leaders, agronomists, 
local elders, and other well-respected people. Building on two case studies from 
Central Kyrgyzstan, Steimann shows that the result was often a land distribution that 
was equal in a quantitative, but not in a qualitative sense (Steimann 2011). In fact, 
many among the local elite managed to secure undivided land parcels close to their 
own house, while less well informed people – mostly ordinary farm workers and 
their family members – often received their land share in the form of several divided 
parcels. Since these were usually far from the village and difficult to access and 
irrigate, this has seriously hampered people's ability to benefit from their land in the 
long run. The same study shows how new claims to farmland emerged once the 
official privatization procedure was over. In view of their ever-increasing flocks, 
wealthier local households were soon in need of additional arable land for the 
production of sufficient winter forage. To this end, many of them have begun to 
irrigate and cultivate land from a communal land fund. They claim rights to these 
areas based on arrangements during the Soviet times, yet they use the land without 
the consent of the communal authorities in charge of the fund and thus without 
paying any use fees. Such illicit appropriation has become possible because 
communal control over this land has always been very weak. However, in cases 
where the local authorities detected such practice, the concerned households usually 
formalize their claim ex post by concluding a lease contract. Wealthy rural 
households thus make use of their possibilities of 'forum shopping' – i.e. 
manoeuvring between non-formal appropriation (based on an earlier normative 
order) and formal recognition – to secure their private claims over land resources. 
Bichsel et al. emphasize that the new Kyrgyz land property regime thus continues to 
be conditioned by its preceding regime and by related social relations and local 
power disparities – irrespective of a seemingly clear allocation and legal recognition  
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of private and common property rights over land and other natural resources 
(Bichsel et al. 2010: 264f). 
 
Another example of the central state's incapacity to fully implement formalized land 
rights is the case of the Kyrgyz pastures. Unlike arable land or livestock, pastures 
were not privatized after the Soviet collapse, but remained in the ownership of the 
state. In the late 1990s, a legal framework for pasture use and management was put 
in place, which allowed individuals and groups to lease pastures from the state. 
However, the law left many loopholes, and the state authorities were neither able nor 
willing to enforce it. The result is that pastures have remained highly contested 
between different actors at various levels (Steimann 2011). At the local level, 
households have repeatedly secured their access to pastures either by abiding by 
state law (i.e. conclusion of a formal lease contract), or by negating it. In the latter 
case, this mainly happened with reference to individual customary use rights 
(usually based on pasture use practices from Soviet times), or by insistence on often-
vague notions of pastures as a common pool resource. This coexistence of norms 
and claims has repeatedly led to conflicts when leaseholders tried to bar non-
leaseholders from using 'their' pastures. Again, in the course of these conflicts, the 
wealthier leaseholders are usually in a better position than their less wealthy 
competitors due to their ability to practice 'forum shopping'. 
 
 
Tanzania: Knowledge and power differences in defending and registering customary 
land rights 
 
The Tanzanian land law (URT 1999a, 1999b) is praised for respecting customary 
rights and providing management responsibility over rural areas to village bodies 
(Knight 2010; Alden Wily 2003). Evidence from two case studies, based on 
qualitative interviews conducted by Locher shows, however, that the law is complex 
and difficult to understand for many among the local population and even for 
government officials. It is thus a challenging task for district officials to teach the 
often-illiterate local population the necessary knowledge on defending and 
registering non-formal rights. Village leaders – who are usually more educated and 
have more regular contacts with district officials and better access to the relevant 
legal documents – often have a lead over other villagers in terms of relevant 
knowledge and may be able to take advantage of that situation. The formalization of 
land property also requires registration at village and district level and includes 
certain costs for landholders. Thus, it might be less accessible for poor people 
(personal communication by Locher 2011; see also Knight 2010; Pedersen 2010; 
Odgaard 2006). Also when it comes to defending customary rights, local elites are 
often in a better position than other villagers, as one example related to the above 
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mentioned case in the Tanzanian Southern Highlands (see first concern) shows: 
When district officials by mistake were in the process of demarcating an area which 
was used by several villagers under customary law, a well situated businessman, 
who has considerable knowledge about the statutory land law, stopped the officials 
from surveying his plot. Realising that the village council was the proper authority 
to impede the demarcation process, he managed to get support from council 
members (personal communication by Locher 2011). At the same time, other 
villagers failed to defend their customary rights and lost them to the investor against 
their will (Locher 2011). 
 
 
Conclusions from the presented cases 
 
The cases from Kyrgyzstan and Tanzania show that the redefinition of land 
ownership or use rights by the state may create situations in which legal provisions 
are unclear or not implemented strictly (for Tanzania see also Pedersen 2010, 2011). 
The presented examples show that in such situations, even under very different 
circumstances, local elites often benefit disproportionately from land titling 
processes. They either build on good connections with state representatives, use 
their economic potential to practice 'forum shopping', or benefit from the fact that 
they are more knowledgeable in terms of rules and procedures than other people. 
That way, former Soviet elites directed the Kyrgyz land privatization according to 
their own needs, wealthier Kyrgyz households refer to either statutory or customary 
law to claim access to communal land and pastures, and Tanzanian village leaders 
can register their land rights easier than poor or vulnerable groups. Also during the 
land reform in Nepal (see our second concern), a similar process was observed. 
Local elites who had access to the state power centres and privileges managed to 
leverage the land-related state structures, institutions, acts and regulations. Thus, 
despite the declared objective of a more equitable land distribution, mostly large 
landowners (who frequently control more land than the legal maximum) have 
benefited from the land reform, while the poor, marginalized and lower sections of 
society were often badly affected (Kshetry 2011; Pyakuryal and Upreti 2011; Alden 
Wily et al. 2009; Upreti et al. 2008). All this again illustrates how strongly social 
power relations determine property regimes. As Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan point 
out, property rights "are only as strong as the institutions or collectivity that stands 
behind them" (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001: 11). Consequently, socioeconomic 
disparities and the resulting power relations have a considerable influence on what 
people can or cannot do to claim and secure property rights over resources. This 
becomes particularly problematic in the case of secondary use rights of landless 
people, who are often unable to secure their already weak claims in the course of a 
land titling process (see also FIAN 2010b: 3). The evidence presented here also 
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suggests that even well intended participatory processes can hardly avoid being 
strongly influenced or captured by local elites. 
 
 
Discussion  
 
Already before the recent rise of foreign direct investments in land, there has been 
much debate on the use of formalizing poor people's property rights over land and 
other resources as a means to reduce poverty. In reaction to the wave of neoliberal 
(land) reforms in the wake of the Washington Consensus, land titling was promoted 
as the 'silver bullet' for the poor (de Soto 2003). Yet, critics have repeatedly 
remarked that formalized property rights are no guarantee that poor people can 
actually access and cultivate land, or can derive any other benefit from it, e.g. 
through land markets (Borras and Franco 2010; Sikor and Müller 2009: 1309; 
Cotula et al. 2006; Fitzpatrick 2005). Assies shows for instance that the expectation 
that formal land titles facilitate access to credit often does not hold true in practice, 
either because banks are not interested in the provision of small loans to poor 
people, or because smallholders fear using their land as mortgage security (Assies 
2009: 582). 
Besides the debate on the use of land titling, there is also some debate on different 
ways of formalizing customary rights and the related overall objectives. Focusing on 
the formalization of existing property rights over land and other resources as 
suggested by the FAO guidelines and the RAI principles we have raised three 
concerns by arguing from a legal pluralism perspective and building on evidence 
from Kyrgyzstan, Nepal and Tanzania. In the following, we discuss our concerns in 
light of the existing debate.  
 
 
Centralist approaches to formalization of existing tenure rights 
 
Assies shows that in principle, the whole formalization debate has evolved around 
two contrasting objectives or visions (Assies 2009: 574f, referring to Payne 2000), 
he names them legal centralist, "marketability-based vision" (where formalization 
mainly serves to turn land into a marketable good), and "security and rights-based 
vision" (which aims at strengthening local people's rights and self-determination). 
According to John Griffiths, notions such as 'recognition' or 'formalization' of 
existing rights are typical reflections of a legal centralist approach, because they 
imply that customary laws must ultimately be recognized by a single validating 
source, i.e. statutory law (J. Griffiths 1986: 8). Such an approach is suggested by the 
RAI principles. However, a centralist or 'state-led' land reform does not only have 
important limitations in achieving its targets (Sikor and Müller 2009) but – as we 
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argue in our second concern – it also inevitably strengthens the state administration 
at the expense of local communities and individuals. While this is not negative per 
se, our examples have shown how involved state representatives can leverage their 
position in a formalization procedure to lead reforms astray. Whereas the RAI 
principles largely ignore this apparent problem, the FAO guidelines propose a series 
of measures that states can take to recognize property rights in a fair and transparent 
manner. They thus rather suggest an orientation towards a security and rights-based 
vision. 
 
 
Approaches that recognize pluralism and their implementation challenge 
 
The FAO guidelines propose that: "States should consider adapting their policy, 
legal and organizational frameworks to recognize tenure systems of indigenous 
peoples and other communities with customary tenure systems" (FAO 2012:14). 
They are thus in line with what Assies suggests for the implementation of a security 
and rights-based vision (Assies 2009: 586). Assies proposes to 're-institutionalize' 
existing property regimes wherever possible, i.e. to allow for an overall legal 
recognition of plural customary tenure regimes, rather than to forcefully subject 
them to a single, national property system under statutory law (Assies 2009: 586, 
referring to Bruce 1998). This approach "does not prescribe a specific approach to 
land reform" but is based on pluralism (Toulmin and Quan 2000: 5, cited in Ubink 
2009: 9). An approach that "accommodate[s] the complexity of rights and practices 
at multiple levels, including especially the local level" (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 
2008: 43) may also allow recognizing overlapping bundles of rights or protecting 
existing common property rights from the risk of being privatized in the course of a 
formalization procedure.5 We conclude that formalization of land tenure needs to be 
anchored at the local level. The example of Tanzania, whose Village Land Act of 
2001 provides customary rights – be they registered or not – the same legal status as 
statutory rights under the Land Act 2001, is an attempt in that direction. However, 
the implementation of such types of land reforms faces its own challenges (Sikor 
and Müller 2009; for Tanzania see Pedersen 2010, 2011). First, there is often a lack 
of commitment on different state levels to fully implement respective laws and 
allocate the necessary means to the local level (Knight 2010: 258). After all, letting 
others participate in the formalization of property rights means sharing power over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5
 On the complexity of formal recognition of group rights in general see Alden Wily 
2006 and Fitzpatrick 2005, and for Nepal see Alden Wily et al. 2009 and Upreti et 
al. 2008.   
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resources.6 Knight thus concludes that if a reform is not to "face a kind of subtle 
bureaucratic mutiny" (Knight 2010: 259), it requires broad changes in governance: 
"state officials need new powers, roles and responsibilities if a new law strips them 
of their previously-held authority" (Knight 2010: 258).  
 
Second, as we have demonstrated in our examples related to the third concern, and 
as Wiber states: "The consequences of the introduction of state law into minority 
regions are not, however, always those planned by state bureaucrats" (Wiber 1992: 
487). Formalization processes can be very complex endeavours, which may kindle 
latent conflicts (Assies 2009: 584; see also Cotula et al. 2006: 20). Hence, they 
require, besides political will, considerable capacities on the part of the involved 
state authorities – capacities lacking in many of the countries affected by large-scale 
foreign investments in land (see also Li 2011; Pedersen 2011). As a consequence, 
local elites outside the state institutions or certain skilful groups often benefit 
disproportionately from land titling processes, while claims and rights of the less 
wealthy and powerful are infringed upon (see also Ubink 2009; Meinzen-Dick and 
Mwangi 2008; Sawyer and Gomez 2008; Cotula et al. 2006). Since wealth and 
power disparities are essential constituents of property regimes, even participatory 
approaches cannot always avoid 'elite capture' or other types of struggles within 
local communities. Thus, even a clear political will for 're-institutionalization' 
cannot ensure that all people get treated in a fair manner.  
 
 
Avoid legal intervention whenever possible 
 
Due to the outlined challenges, Fitzpatrick suggests that the extent of external legal 
intervention in customary land systems "should be determined by reference to the 
nature and causes of any tenure insecurity" and intervention should be avoided 
whenever possible (Fitzpatrick 2005: 449). This means that in those cases where 
customary property regimes have worked considerably well so far and where local 
individuals and communities show no interest in selling their rights to outsiders, the 
state's role should be limited to recognising existing customary rights as a whole and 
protecting them against external threats. Thus, existing claims and rights would 
remain embedded in a given social context and not be incorporated into the 
mainstream market system. Land would thus remain out of reach for investors. This 
is much in line with the demands of global farmer organizations such as La Via 
Campesina who have been fighting for an overall recognition of customary property 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6
 For a conceptual analysis of the reciprocal constitution of property and authority 
see Sikor and Lund 2009.  
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regimes beyond statutory law since the 1990s (La Via Campesina 2011). It is 
certainly not in line, however, with the intentions of the RAI principles, which – 
even more than the FAO guidelines – emphasize the ostensible advantages of land 
as a marketable good. 
 
 
The complexities of participatory land titling 
 
Nevertheless, there may be justified needs for state interventions at the local level. 
Customary property regimes may fail to de-escalate local resource conflicts, or – 
more essential in the context of foreign investments – communities may explicitly 
wish to create marketability for their land resources. In these situations, Fitzpatrick 
recommends certain forms of state regulation. However, he also warns of "quick-fix 
attempts to impose formalized titles on fluid customary interests" (Fitzpatrick 2005: 
472). In such cases, participatory approaches are a must. Yet, as we argue in our first 
concern and unlike suggestions by the FAO guidelines and the RAI principles, these 
can neither be 'simple' nor 'quick'. Identifying customary property rights is a delicate 
endeavour, because it usually concerns overlapping bundles of rights, which are 
embedded in a social and political context and constantly reproduced through 
people's relations and everyday practices. Our example from Tanzania shows that 
even elected village leaders are not always aware of all existing claims and 
(secondary) rights. Yet if common knowledge regarding detailed property rights is 
absent within a community, it can take a lot of time and money to identify different 
groups of stakeholders, to understand local patterns of domination and dependency, 
and to carefully select adequate representatives. In cases where certain land rights 
are held by external actors (e.g. in the form of patron-client relations), participation 
may even need to be scaled up beyond the local level. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
When analyzing potential economic and socio-political effects and proposed 
measures in the context of 'land grabs' it is crucial to gain a holistic understanding of 
land tenure systems. This article concludes that employing a legal pluralism 
perspective is very helpful in this regard. Adapting this perspective and using also 
empirical cases beside the classical examples of 'land grabbing', we have 
demonstrated that the identification and recognition of customary property rights 
over land is a very complex and delicate endeavour, which risks neglecting locally 
existing property claims and rights. Unfortunately, neither the RAI principles nor the 
FAO guidelines address this challenge in a satisfactory way. First, both initiatives 
propose to identify existing rights in a participatory manner, an approach that is 
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certainly indispensable yet anything but 'quick' and 'simple'. Second, the centralist 
approach to land tenure in the RAI principles does not allow acknowledging legal 
plural orders and the social embeddedness of local property regimes. Third, even a 
more security and rights-based vision as brought forward by the FAO guidelines 
entails the risk of elite capture and of reinforcing unequal power structures within 
local communities. To some extent, however, it allows for the incorporation of land-
related cultural, social and normative practices and of plural legal arrangements and 
thus for the protection of locally existing tenure rights. It further leaves it to local 
communities to decide whether their land and natural resources should become a 
marketable good to outsiders or not. However, in many countries the realization of 
this vision would require the adaptation of whole legal regimes and national 
regulations which takes, besides political will, a lot of time for implementation and 
involves fundamental changes in governance. Further, careful participatory land use 
planning at the local level could prove to be an additional tool to reduce negative 
effects of foreign land acquisitions. Completed before any external interests arise, it 
serves as a basis for local communities to take decisions regarding the availability of 
land for potential investors. However, the introduction of meaningful nationwide 
land use planning is a major endeavour. All of these challenges cannot be addressed 
adequately and convincingly within the framework of such guidelines alone. 
Instead, more long-term strategies for the protection of customary rights are 
required. Thus, from an analytical perspective, a moratorium on 'land grabs' as 
postulated by some civil society organizations (IPC 2011) would be most 
appropriate. From a more pragmatic perspective though, we acknowledge the FAO 
guidelines and – to a much lesser extent – the RAI principles as more immediate 
efforts to reduce negative effects of 'land grabs'. However, investors and host 
governments should by no means mistake these guidelines as guarantors of 
ostensibly harmless land acquisitions, as the complexity of plural land orders cannot 
be underestimated. Even when following the guidelines the risk of infringing upon 
local people's land rights continues to be very high. 
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   and	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   in	   reporting	   the	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   land	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observations	  from	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Abstract	  Since	   international	   awareness	   of	   a	   global	   rush	   for	   land	   has	   grown	   from	   2008	   onward,	  various	   databases	   and	   reports	   have	   attempted	   to	   provide	   an	   overview	  of	   the	   situation	  by	  compiling	   information	   on	   individual	   land	   deals.	   While	   providing	   such	   an	   overview	   is	  challenging	   owing	   to	   the	   dynamic	   and	   untransparent	   nature	   of	   the	   investments,	   flawed	  methods	  of	  using	  and	  citing	  data	  are	  aggravating	  that	  challenge	  and	  allowing	  dissemination	  of	   inaccurate	   information.	   The	   consequences	   are	   an	   unnecessarily	   blurred	   picture	   of	   the	  land	   deal	   situation	   and	   thus	   an	   inadequate	   basis	   for	   related	   political	   decisions	   or	   social	  actions	   and	   a	   misleading	   starting	   point	   for	   new	   research	   projects.	   In	   this	   article	   we	  demonstrate	   some	   of	   the	   flaws	   in	   the	   use	   of	   data	   and	   their	   consequences	  with	   examples	  from	   fieldwork	   and	   literature	   on	   Tanzania.	   The	   paper	   illustrates	   and	   contributes	   to	   the	  evolving	  debate	  on	  appropriate	  research	  methodologies	  for	  studying	  the	  global	  land	  rush.	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Introduction	  Acquisitions	   of	   land	   by	   foreign	   and,	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent,	   domestic	   investors	   for	   agricultural	  purposes	  have	   increased	  rapidly	   in	  the	   last	   few	  years,	  particularly	   in	  countries	   in	  the	  global	  South.	  This	  phenomenon,	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘land	  grabbing’	  (for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  term	  see	  Hall	  2011a,	  ILC	  2011)	  or	   ‘the	  global	   land	  rush’	  (e.g.	  Li	  2012,	  Scoones	  et	  al.	  2013a),	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  intense	  research	  and	  debate	  since	  around	  2008.	  Relevant	  literature	  comprises	  numerous	   articles	   and	   special	   issues	   in	   academic	   journals,	   reports	   by	   research	   institutions	  and	   activist	   groups	   and	  multitudinous	   conference	   papers1.	   Thus,	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   recent	  land	   rush,	   a	   ‘literature	   rush’	   (Oya	   2013)	   has	   emerged.	   Besides	   in-­‐depth	   case	   studies	   and	  thematic	   analyses2,	   the	   burgeoning	   literature	   includes	   several	   reports	   and	   databases	   that	  intend	   to	   give	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   land	   rush	   by	   providing	   compilations	   of	   land	   deals.	   Such	  compilations	   are	   produced	   by	   scholars	   and	   non-­‐academic	   institutions,	   such	   as	   NGOs	   and	  international	  agencies.	  They	  exist	  both	  on	  a	  global	  scale	  (von	  Braun	  and	  Meinzen-­‐Dick	  2009,	  Deininger	  and	  Byerlee	  2011,	  GRAIN	  2012,	  Land	  Matrix	  2014)	  and	  for	  specific	  countries	  (e.g.	  for	  Tanzania	  see	  Kamanga	  2008,	  Songela	  and	  Maclean	  2008,	  Bengesi	  et	  al.	  2009,	  Mwamila	  et	  
al.	   2009,	   Sulle	   and	   Nelson	   2009,	   Oakland	   Institute	   2011a).	   These	   more	   numerical	  representations	   of	   the	   land	   rush	   are	   increasingly	   criticised	   and	   questioned	   in	   a	   scholary	  debate.	  Critical	  voices	  express	  an	  urgent	  need	  to	  address	  issues	  around	  the	  way	  in	  which	  data	  on	  land	  deals	  are	  collected	  and	  reported.	  The	  discussion	  on	  ‘one	  of	  the	  most	  complicated	  and	  debated	   issues	   in	   global	   land	   grabbing	   today’	   (Edelman	   et	   al.	   2013,	   1529,	   note	   3)	   is	   taking	  place	   informally	   on	   blogs	   (Bräutigam	   2013b,	   Collin	   2013a,	   2013b),	   but	   recently	   also	   in	  academic	  publications	  such	  as	  Bräutigam	  and	  Zhang	   (2013),	  Edelman	  et	  al.	   (2013),	   the	   ‘JPS	  Forum	  on	  Global	  Land	  Grabbing	  Part	  2:	  on	  methods’,	  and	  related	  commentaries	  to	  the	  latter	  (e.g.	  Rulli	  and	  D’Odorico	  2013,	  Scoones	  et	  al.	  2013b).	  Edelman	   (2013)	   and	   Oya	   (2013),	   for	   example,	   direct	   strong	   criticism	   at	   existing	   research	  practices.	   Oya	   highlights	   the	   representation	   of	   ‘false	   precision’	   in	   well-­‐known	   databases,	  where	  ‘sources	  and	  reports	  of	  unknown	  reliability	  are	  opportunistically	  combined’	  (Oya	  2013,	  506,	   referring	   to	   Reddy	   and	   Pogge	   2005,	   4).	   Edelman	   (2013,	   497,	   referring	   to	   Bräutigam	  2013a)	   describes	   a	   ‘process	   of	   “solidification”	   and	   fact	   creation’,	   which	   takes	   place	   when	  ‘preliminary,	  anecdotal,	  unverified	  and	  moribund	  cases’	  (Edelman	  2013,	  497)	  are	  included	  in	  databases.	  From	  there,	  despite	  disclaimers	  about	  the	  shaky	  quality,	  data	  are	  being	  spread	  in	  a	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1	  See	  for	  example	  a	  collection	  of	  articles	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  Peasant	  Studies	  (JPS	  Forum	  on	  Global	  Land	  Grabbing	  Part	  1,	  
Borras	  et	  al.	   2011)	  and	  numerous	   special	   issues	   in	   the	   JPS	  and	  other	   journals;	   the	  Global	  Commercial	  Pressures	  on	  
Land	   Research	   Project	   (Anseeuw	   et	   al.	   2012a);	   several	   reports	   by	   the	   International	   Institute	   for	   Environment	   and	  
Development	   (IIED)	   (Cotula	  et	  al.	   2009,	  Cotula	  and	  Vermeulen	  2009,	  Cotula	  2011),	  by	   the	  Oakland	   Institute	   (Daniel	  
and	   Mittal	   2009),	   and	   by	   the	   NGO	   GRAIN	   (GRAIN	   2008,	   2010),	   and	   conference	   papers	   of	   two	   international	  
conferences,	  namely	  the	  LDPI	  (Land	  Deal	  Politics	  Initiative)	  Global	  Land	  Grabbing	  Conference	  I	  at	  University	  of	  Sussex	  
in	  2011	  and	  the	  LDPI	  Global	  Land	  Grabbing	  Conference	  II	  at	  Cornell	  University	  in	  2012.	  	  
2	   In-­‐depth	   case	   studies	   include	   e.g.	   Schoneveld	   et	   al.	   2011;	   thematic	   analyses	   are	   provided,	   amongst	   others,	   by	  
Margulis	  et	  al.	  2013	  and	  Wolford	  et	  al.	  2013	  on	  governance,	  Fairhead	  et	  al.	  2012	  on	  ‘green	  grabs’,	  Behrman	  et	  al.	  2012	  
on	  gender,	  Locher	  et	  al.	  2012	  on	  initiatives	  to	  regulate	  the	  phenomenon.	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‘circularity	   of	   referencing’	   (Scoones	   et	   al.	   2013a,	   475).	   Bräutigam	   and	   Zhang	   (2013,	   1680)	  observed	  for	  the	  reporting	  on	  Chinese	  land	  deals	  that	  ‘the	  nature	  of	  circulation	  is	  such	  that	  the	  first	   papers	   written	   on	   the	   initial	   analysis	   of	   (problematic)	   data	   often	   have	   much	   greater	  impact	   than	   papers	   written	   later,	   with	   revised	   and	   better	   data’.	   Some	   problems	   are	   also	  related	  to	  the	  various	  and	  sometimes	  vague	  definitions	  of	  ‘land	  grab’	  or	  ‘land	  deal’	  (Borras	  et	  
al.	   2012a,	   Cotula	   2012,	   652,	   Scoones	   et	   al.	   2013a).	   As	   a	   consequence,	   ‘non-­‐equivalent	   data	  [are]	  aggregated	  because	  we	  are	  not	  agreed	  on	  what	  is	  being	  counted’	  (Scoones	  et	  al.	  2013a,	  475).	   Lastly,	   Evers	   (2012),	   Edelman	   (2013)	   and	   Oya	   (2013)	   discuss	   underlying	  methodological	   and	   epistemological	   issues,	   such	   as	   researchers’	   basic	   assumptions,	  preconceptions	   and	   ideological	   biases	   as	   well	   as	   their	   positionality	   and	   intentions	   that	  influence	   what	   they	   see	   and	   how	   they	   interpret	   it	   (for	   an	   example	   of	   a	   clearly	   expressed	  political	  agenda	  see	  GRAIN	  2013).	  All	  of	  this	  contributes	  to	  biased	  data	  that	  are	  characterized	  by	  questionable	  accuracy	  and	  reliability.	  	  In	  Tanzania,	  the	  picture	  of	  the	  land	  deal	  situation	  is	  incomplete	  and,	  we	  argue,	  distorted.	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  are	  various.	  First,	   the	  phenomenon	  is	  by	   its	  nature	  dynamic.	  For	   instance,	  a	  number	   of	   investing	   companies	   are	   being	   driven	   out	   of	   business	   (particularly	   biofuel	  investors,	  see	  Hultman	  et	  al.	  2012,	  Locher	  and	  Sulle	  2013).	  Other	  companies	  are	  sold	  to	  new	  owners	   and	   change	   their	   names	   (Chachage	   2012,	   Locher	   and	   Sulle	   2013).	   Second,	   the	  exploration	   of	   the	   global	   land	   rush	   is	   hindered	   by	   opaque	   practices	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  investors	  and	  the	  reluctance	  or	  inability	  of	  involved	  parties,	  including	  the	  host	  government,	  to	  provide	   information	   (GRAIN	   2010,	   Cotula	   2011,	   Deininger	   and	   Byerlee	   2011,	   145,	   Cotula	  2012,	   for	   Tanzania	   see	   Mwami	   and	   Kamata	   2011,	   TNRF/REPOA/IIED	   2012).	   Lastly	   and	  importantly,	  as	  we	  argue	  in	  this	  paper	  in	  line	  with	  the	  ongoing	  debate,	  researchers	  sometimes	  use	  questionable	  methods	  when	  documenting	  and	  reproducing	  data	  on	  land	  acquisitions.	  	  The	   resulting	   lack	   of	   clear	   data	   is	   reflected,	   for	   example,	   in	   the	   Land	   Matrix	   Global	  Observatory,	  the	  widely	  cited	  online	  global	  database	  of	  large-­‐scale	  land	  acquisitions	  (Anseeuw	  
et	  al.	  2013,	  Land	  Matrix	  2014).	  The	  Land	  Matrix	  draws	  on	  data	  from	  several	  sources	  including	  other	   Internet	  portals	   (ILC	  2013,	  GRAIN	  2014).	   It	   is	  used	  as	  basis	   for	  scientific	  articles	   (e.g.	  Rulli	   et	   al.	   2013)	   and	   policy	   briefs	   (e.g.	   GRID	   Arendal	   2013).	   In	   the	   beta	   version	   of	   this	  database,	  launched	  in	  April	  2012	  (then	  called	  ‘Land	  Matrix	  Database	  Number	  1’,	  see	  Anseeuw	  
et	  al.	  2012b),	  even	  among	  the	  data	  that	  were	  classified	  as	  verified	  and	  reliable,	  we	  were	  able	  to	   find	  a	   land	  deal	  attributed	   to	  a	  company	   that	  no	   longer	  exists	   (Svensk	  Etanolkemi	  AB,	   in	  short:	   SEKAB)	   and	   a	   land	   deal	   that	   is	   reported	   twice	   under	   two	   different	   names	   (AGRICA,	  formerly	  InfEnergy	  Co.	  Ltd).	  While	  these	  data	  have	  been	  updated	  in	  the	  re-­‐launched	  version	  of	  the	  Land	  Matrix	  in	  June	  2013,	  we	  still	  noted	  some	  tricky	  issues	  (see	  below).	  The	  blurred	  picture	  of	   the	   land	  deal	   situation	   in	  Tanzania	  provides	  an	   inadequate	  basis	   for	  related	  political	  decisions	  and	  social	  actions	  and	  a	  misleading	  or	  at	  least	  unfavourable	  starting	  point	  for	  new	  research	  projects.3	  Further,	  as	  stated	  by	  Edelman	  (2013,	  488),	  the	  spreading	  of	  inaccurate	  data	  threatens	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  activists	  relying	  on	  those	  data	  to	  campaign	  against	  land	  deals,	  and	  –	  as	  we	  argue	  –	  also	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  research	  community	  and	  institutions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  motivation	  for	  this	  article	  and	  particularly	  for	  the	  data	  compilation	  in	  the	  underlying	  LDPI	  working	  paper	  31	  
came	  during	  a	  workshop	  where	  Locher	  met	  other	  scholars	  starting	  a	  research	  project	  in	  Tanzania.	  Locher	  realised	  that	  
these	  scholars	  had	  spent	  considerable	  time	  and	  resources	  –	  like	  she	  had	  done	  before	  –	  to	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  
the	  status	  of	  certain	  land	  investment	  projects	  in	  Tanzania	  in	  order	  to	  choose	  their	  case	  studies.	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publishing	   such	   data.	   With	   this	   article	   we	   aim	   to	   give	   recommendations	   and	   stimulate	  consideration	  of	  appropriate	  data	  (re)production.	  We	  add	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  methodologies	  used	  for	  investigating	  the	  global	  land	  rush	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  We	  provide	  insights	  into	  the	  challenges	   of	   data	   collection	   (related	   to	   the	   way	   the	   Tanzanian	   government	   handles	   land	  deals).	  We	  illustrate	  the	  difficulty	  of	  describing	  the	  status	  of	  land	  deals	  with	  a	  single	  term	  (as	  done	   in	   databases).	  We	   discuss	   biases	   related	   to	   information	   from	   investors’	  websites	   and	  media,	   and	   we	   elaborate	   specific	   flaws	   of	   data	   presentation	   and	   reproduction,	   such	   as	  inadequate	   citation,	   leading	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   traceability	   and	   further	   consequences.	  At	   the	   same	  time	  our	  work	  provides	  an	  update	  of	  the	  land	  deal	  situation	  in	  Tanzania	  and	  discusses	  the	  gap	  between	  announced	  and	  realized	  investments.	  	  The	  article	  draws	  on	  a	  Land	  Deal	  Politics	   Initiative	   (see	   footnote	  1)	  working	  paper	   (Locher	  and	  Sulle	  2013)	   in	  which	   an	  updated	   compilation	  of	   land	  deals	   in	  Tanzania	   is	   presented	   in	  several	   tables.	   This	   compilation	   is	   based	   on	   a	   review	   of	   the	   literature	   and	   on	   our	   own	  fieldwork	   conducted	   in	   Tanzania	   between	   2008	   and	   2013.	   We	   considered	   land	   leases	   by	  foreign	   investors	  with	   the	   purpose	   of	   agricultural	   production,	   be	   it	   for	   food	   or	   biofuels,	   or	  forestry	   plantations	   for	   timber	   and	   carbon	   credit	   trading.	   Deals	   for	   mineral	   extraction,	  conservation	   and	   tourism	  were	   not	   included4.	   As	   in	   the	   Land	  Matrix	   database,	   deals	   below	  200	  ha	  in	  size	  were	  not	  considered.	  Deals	  that	  involve	  exclusively	  domestic	  investors	  were	  not	  our	   initial	   focus;	   however,	   as	   we	   had	   gathered	   related	   data	   during	   the	   fieldwork,	   we	  presented	  some	  limited	  information	  on	  domestic	   land	  deals	  as	  well.	   In	  the	  following	  section	  we	  provide	  insights	  into	  the	  challenges	  of	  gaining	  information	  on	  land	  deals	  in	  Tanzania.	  We	  then	   highlight	   some	   of	   the	   flaws	   in	   the	   use	   of	   data	   so	   far	   and	   discuss	   their	   consequences.	  Thereafter,	  we	  present	  experiences	  from	  our	  own	  attempt	  of	  a	  careful	  data	  compilation.	  We	  conclude	  the	  article	  with	  some	  observations	  regarding	  the	  land	  deal	  situation	  in	  Tanzania	  and	  with	  considerations	  on	  adequate	  data	  presentation	  and	  traceable	  data	  reproduction	  regarding	  the	  land	  rush	  phenomenon.	  
	  
Situation	  of	  foreign	  land	  deals	  in	  Tanzania	  Tanzania	   is	   one	   of	   many	   African	   countries	   that	   have	   received	   investors	   from	   all	   over	   the	  world	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  obtaining	  long-­‐term	  leases	  for	  several	  thousand	  hectares	  of	  land.	  The	  rise	  in	  interest	  in	  Tanzania's	  land	  and	  related	  concerns	  about	  the	  consequences	  for	  local	  people	   and	   the	   environment	   have	   been	   widely	   discussed,	   not	   only	   among	   academics	   (e.g.	  Mwamila	  et	  al.	  2009,	  Sosovele	  2010,	  Locher	  2011,	  Mshandete	  2011,	  Oakland	  Institute	  2011a,	  Havnevik	  et	  al.	   2012,	  Hultman	  et	  al.	   2012,	  Nelson	  et	  al.	   2012,	  Neville	   and	  Dauvergne	  2012,	  Sulle	   and	   Hall	   2013)	   and	   advocacy	   groups	   (e.g.	   Haki	   Ardhi/Land	   Rights	   Research	   and	  Resources	   Institute	   (LARRRI),	  Tanzania	  Natural	  Resource	  Forum	  (TNRF),	  Oxfam,	  ActionAid,	  WWF	   Tanzania,	   Legal	   and	   Human	   Rights	   Centre	   (LHRC),	   Lawyers’	   Environmental	   Action	  Team	   (LEAT),	   the	   platform	  Let’s	   Talk	   Land	  Tanzania	   2014),	   but	   also	   in	   Tanzanian	   political	  circles.	  A	  private	  motion	  tabled	  by	  the	  Member	  of	  Parliament	  Halima	  Mdee	  in	  November	  2012	  allegedly	   caused	   a	   hot	   debate	   in	   Parliament	   (Luhwago	   2012a).	   The	   motion	   asked	   that	  Parliament	   direct	   the	   government	   to	   collect	   and	   provide	   up-­‐to-­‐date	   information	   on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  While	  we	  are	  aware	  that	  land	  deals	  for	  mineral	  extraction,	  conservation,	  tourism	  and	  other	  purposes	  are	  also	  
relevant	  and	  deserve	  scientific	  attention,	  our	  research	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years	  (and	  hence	  our	  collected	  data)	  has	  focused	  
on	  the	  recent	  wave	  of	  land	  deals	  triggered	  by	  ‘”the	  triple-­‐F	  crisis”:	  food,	  fuel	  and	  finance’	  (Hall	  2011b).	  Forestry	  
investments	  were	  included	  due	  to	  their	  growing	  relevance	  in	  Tanzania	  in	  the	  same	  period.	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amount	  of	  land	  transferred	  to	  foreign	  investors.	  In	  reply,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Lands,	  Housing	  and	  Human	  Settlements	  Development	  (hereinafter	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Lands)	  declared	  that	   the	  government	  would	   thoroughly	  assess	   the	   situation	  and	  provide	   the	   requested	  data	  (Luhwago	  2012b).	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  the	  government	  was	  yet	  to	  release	  the	  final	  report	  on	   this	   assessment;	   however,	   the	   main	   opposition	   party	   (Chama	   cha	   Demokrasia	   na	  Maendeleo,	   in	  short:	  CHADEMA)	  has	  already	  challenged	  the	  initial	   findings	  of	  the	  study	  (see	  below).	  The	  process	   for	   foreign	   investors	   to	   acquire	   land	   in	  Tanzania	   is	   complex	   and	   lengthy.	  Non-­‐citizens	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  acquire	  land	  from	  villages	  (which	  falls	  under	  the	  category	  of	  Village	  Land)	  directly.	  A	  non-­‐citizen	   investor	  has	   two	  options.	  He	  or	  she	  can	  obtain	  derivative	   land	  rights	   –	   that	   is	   a	   long-­‐term	   lease	   of	   up	   to	   99	   years	   –	   from	   the	  Tanzania	   Investment	  Centre	  (TIC);	  but	  this	  rarely	  happens	  due	  to	  the	  limited	  scope	  of	  the	  TIC	  land	  bank.	  Alternatively,	  an	  investor	  can	  obtain	  granted	  rights	  of	  occupancy	  (long-­‐term	  leases)	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Lands.	  This	  usually	  requires	  a	   transfer	  of	   land	   from	  the	  category	  of	  Village	  Land	  to	   the	  category	  of	  General	  Land,	  which	  is	  a	  time-­‐consuming	  process	  that	  can	  take	  several	  years.	  More	  details	  on	  how	  village	  land	  and	  general	  land	  gets	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  foreign	  investors	  are	  summarised	  in	  studies	   by	   Isaksson	   and	   Sigte	   (2009),	   Sulle	   and	   Nelson	   (2009),	   LEAT	   (2011),	   and	  Makwarimba	  and	  Ngowi	  (2012).	  	  	  
The	  challenges	  of	  collecting	  data	  on	  land	  deals	  in	  Tanzania	  
Lack	  of	  central	  government	  database	  In	   Tanzania,	   various	   government	   institutions	   at	   different	   levels	   are	   involved	   in	   the	   land	  acquisition	   process,	   but	   it	   seems	   that	   there	   is	   no	   coordinated	   storage	   or	   exchange	   of	   data	  (Oakland	   Institute	  2011a).	  When	  asked	  by	   the	   authors	   for	  data,	   representatives	   of	   national	  government	  offices	  often	  either	  referred	  to	  each	  other	  or	  told	  us	  to	  contact	  district	  offices,	  as	  accurate	  information	  would	  be	  available	  only	  there.	  In	  some	  cases	  we	  may	  have	  experienced	  limited	  cooperation	  on	  part	  of	  our	  interviewees.	  However,	  in	  many	  cases	  it	  appeared	  that	  the	  officials	   we	   approached	   were	   willing	   to	   help,	   but	   they	   themselves	   did	   not	   have	   a	   full	  understanding	  of	  the	  situation	  (field	  research	  by	  Sulle	  in	  2008,	  2009,	  2011	  and	  2012	  and	  by	  Locher	   in	   2010,	   2011	   and	   2013).	   Thus,	   Mdee’s	   parliamentary	   motion,	   implying	   that	   the	  government,	  including	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Lands	  itself,	  currently	  has	  no	  clear	  overview	  on	  foreign	  land	   acquisition,	   mirrors	   the	   view	   held	   by	   the	   authors	   and	   by	   other	   researchers	   (Oakland	  Institute	  2011a,	  16,	  Haki	  Ardhi	  2013).	  	  This	   view	   is	   further	   confirmed	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Lands	   commissioned	   the	  University	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam’s	  economics	  department	  to	  conduct	  an	  assessment	  of	  ownership	  of	  farms	  –	  both	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  –	  on	  the	  Tanzanian	  mainland	  (unpublished	  report5	  cited	  in	   Mdee	   2013),	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   answer	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   parliamentary	   motion.	  According	   to	   information	   the	   contracted	   researchers	   received	   from	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Lands,	  only	  10%	  of	  the	  total	  land	  in	  Tanzania	  has	  been	  surveyed	  and	  titled	  so	  far,	  making	  it	  difficult	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  A	  draft	  report	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Economics,	  University	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Tanzania,	  titled	  'Consultancy	  services	  to	  
conduct	  an	  assessment	  and	  evaluation	  of	  ownership	  of	  farms	  above	  50	  acres	  in	  Tanzania	  Mainland	  2013'	  was	  made	  
available	   to	   the	   authors,	   but	   is	   not	   publicly	   accessible.	   Although	   the	   results	   of	   this	   study	   were	   expected	   to	   be	  
discussed	  in	  the	  parliamentary	  meeting	  of	  April	  2013	  (Luhwago	  2012b),	  no	  report	  has	  been	  published	  yet.	  However,	  
the	  Member	  of	  Parliament	  Halima	  Mdee	  referred	  to	  this	  study	  in	  her	  blog	  entry	  in	  May	  2013	  (Mdee	  2013).	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for	  researchers	  to	  identify	  the	  ownership	  of	  land	  plots.6	  This	  confirms	  the	  observation	  made	  by	  various	  researchers	  that	  unavailability	  of	  data	  is	  a	  concern.	  The	  situation	  might	  be	  partly	  explained	  by	  a	  staff	  shortfall	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Lands	  as	  claimed	  in	  a	  report	  by	  the	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	   Organisation	   (FAO	   2012)	   and	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   ‘Central	   Land	   Registry	   still	  operates	  largely	  as	  a	  paper-­‐based	  system’	  (FAO	  2012,	  76).	  	  
The	  complexity	  and	  untransparency	  of	  the	  land	  deal	  process	  The	   complex	   process	   of	   acquiring	   land	   adds	   to	   the	   challenge	   of	   gaining	   an	   up-­‐to-­‐date	  understanding	  of	   land	  deals	   in	   the	  country.	  Even	   if	   it	  could	  be	  assumed	  that	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Lands	  had	  all	  relevant	  data	  on	  investors	  holding	  derivative	  rights	  and	  rights	  of	  occupancy,	  the	  long	  process	  that	  investors	  must	  go	  through	  before	  obtaining	  such	  titles	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  documented	   in	   a	   central	   institution.	   While	   the	   TIC	   is	   supposed	   to	   guide	   and	   support	   any	  investor	   in	   the	   land	   acquisition	   process,	   it	   cannot	   oblige	   investors	   to	   approach	   it.	   Many	  investors	   seem	   to	   approach	   district	   or	   village	   authorities	   without	   contacting	   the	   TIC	  beforehand.	   An	   example	   is	   the	   case	   of	   the	   New	   Forests	   Company,	   which	   allegedly	   became	  active	  in	  Kilolo	  District	  through	  contact	  with	  the	  district's	  Member	  of	  Parliament	  (interviews	  with	  district	   land	  official	  and	  several	  village	   leaders	  by	  Locher	   in	  2011).	  The	  TIC	  is	  thus	  not	  aware	   of	   all	   ongoing	   investment	   processes.	   Yet,	   it	   would	   be	   important	   to	   know	   about	  investments	  in	  their	  early	  stages	  ‒	  not	  only	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  having	  the	  whole	  picture,	  but	  also	  because	   it	   seems	   to	  be	   a	   common	  practice	   among	   investors	   to	   start	   activities	   on	   their	   land	  before	   completing	   all	   of	   the	   paperwork	   (interviews	   with	   TIC	   and	   district	   land	   officials	   by	  Locher	  in	  2010	  and	  2011).	  BioShape	  in	  Kilwa	  district,	  for	  example,	  went	  ahead	  with	  logging	  of	  natural	   forest	   found	   in	   the	   land	   allocated	   to	   it	   before	   securing	   a	   timber-­‐harvesting	   licence	  from	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Natural	  Resources	  and	  Tourism	   (Songela	  and	  Maclean	  2008,	   Sulle	   and	  Nelson	   2009).	   The	   company	   was	   never	   held	   responsible	   for	   these	   activities,	   rather	   it	   was	  awarded	  a	  timber	  harvesting	  license	  and	  it	  established	  a	  sister	  company	  to	  process	  timber	  in	  Arusha	  (Sulle	  and	  Nelson	  2013).	  	  	  
Flaws	  in	  the	  documentation	  and	  reproduction	  of	  data	  As	   elaborated	   above,	   to	   a	   certain	   degree,	  misleading	   data	  might	   be	   unavoidable	   due	   to	   the	  changeable	   nature	   and	   lack	   of	   transparency	   of	   many	   land-­‐based	   investments.	   However,	  inaccuracies	  are	  also	  created	  during	  the	  research	  and	  reporting	  process.	  Several	  flaws	  can	  be	  found	  in	  existing	  publications	  on	  land	  deals	  in	  Tanzania,	  related	  to	  both	  the	  documentation	  of	  primary	  data	  and	  their	  reproduction.	   In	   the	   following	  section	  we	  present	   the	  most	  common	  flaws	   and	   discuss	   their	   potential	   consequences.	   Though	   we	   quote	   existing	   reports	   for	   the	  purpose	   of	   illustrating	   our	   observations,	   we	   do	   not	   intend	   to	   criticise	   individual	   authors.	  Rather	  we	  seek	  to	  demonstrate	  by	  example	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  lax	  standards	  in	  reporting	  of	  land	  deals	  that	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  established	  over	  the	  last	  few	  years.	  	  
Imprecise	  indication	  of	  status	  of	  land	  deals	  The	  data	  that	  are	  provided	  in	  reports	  and	  databases	  are	  often	  insufficiently	  specific	  in	  terms	  of	   the	  stage	  of	   land	  acquisition.	  Some	  datasets	  do	  not	  distinguish	  between	  announced	  plans	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  ‘Unsurveyed	  land’	  means	  that	  the	  government	  has	  not	  conducted	  a	  proper	  legal	  designation	  of	  borders	  and	  has	  not	  
registered	  the	  use	  and	  category	  of	  ownership	  for	  this	  plot.	  However,	  unsurveyed	  land	  managed	  under	  customary	  law	  
can	  still	  be	  owned	  and	  considered	  legal	  property	  by	  Tanzanian	  citizens	  (Village	  Land	  Act,	  see	  URT	  1999).	  Unsurveyed	  
land	  cannot	  be	  allocated	  to	  foreign	  investors	  directly,	  but	  to	  domestic	  ones.	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and	   initiated	   or	   completed	   land	   deals	   (e.g.	   GRAIN	   2008,	   Land	   Matrix	   2012).	   Others	   give	  indications	  such	  as	   ‘planned’,	   ‘signed’	  or	   ‘implemented’	   (e.g.	   in	  Görgen	  et	  al.	  2009,	  Friis	  and	  Reenberg	  2010).	  However,	  without	  a	  detailed	  description	  this	  information	  does	  not	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  actual	  status	  of	  a	  land	  acquisition	  project.	  For	  example,	  investors	  might	  ‘sign’	  an	   expression	   of	   interest	   (e.g.	   in	   village	   meeting	   minutes)	   and	   start	   to	   plant	   their	   crops	  (‘implemented’),	  before	  having	  finalised	  the	  formal	  land	  acquisition	  process,	  thus	  not	  having	  any	   rights	   to	   this	   land	   according	   to	   state	   law.	   This	   example	   highlights	   the	   challenges	   of	  presenting	  a	   complex	  phenomenon	   in	  a	  generalised	  way	  with	  summarised	  short	   texts,	   as	   is	  often	  done	  in	  inventories	  of	  land	  deals.	  	  One	  can	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  different	  stages	  of	  a	  land	  deal	  if	  the	  intention	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  investors'	  interest	  in	  (Tanzanian)	  land	  (see	  also	  Anseeuw	  et	  
al.	   2013).	   However,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   implications	   of	   land	   deals,	   there	   is	   a	   significant	  difference	  between	  a	  land	  deal	  that	  was	  merely	  announced	  and	  withdrawn	  before	  any	  action	  on	  the	  ground	  was	  taken,	  and	  an	  investment	  project	  that	  has	  been	  partly	  or	  fully	  realised.	  The	  precise	  information	  regarding	  the	  stage	  of	  a	  project	  can	  also	  be	  relevant	  for	  decisions	  on	  new	  research.	  	  Whereas	  this	  first	  flaw	  is	  related	  to	  the	  specific	  content	  of	  a	  dataset,	  the	  two	  following	  issues	  concern	  scholarly	  practices	  of	  dealing	  with	  sources	  of	  data.	  
	  
Presentation	  of	  data	  sources:	  aggregated	  and	  thus	  untraceable	  One	   of	   the	   most	   common	   and	   significant	   flaws	   created	   by	   researchers	   is	   related	   to	   the	  documentation	  of	   data.	  While	   it	   is	   an	   established	   standard	   in	   academic	   literature	   to	   clearly	  and	   precisely	   provide	   the	   sources	   for	   presented	   data,	   in	   the	   –	   often	   grey	   –	   literature	   that	  addresses	   large-­‐scale	   land	   deals	   it	   has	   become	   common	   practice	   to	   provide	   sources	   for	  information	  regarding	  land	  deals	  in	  an	  aggregated	  way.	  Information	  on	  multiple	  land	  deals	  is	  usually	  presented	  as	  a	  list	  of	  investors	  in	  a	  table	  or	  in	  small	  paragraphs.	  The	  sources	  for	  the	  data	  are	  then	  given	  as	  a	  whole	  for	  the	  total	  compilation,	  either	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  table	  or	  in	  the	  methodology	  (or	  another	  similar)	  chapter.	  The	  sources	  typically	  comprise	  empirical	  data	  collected	   by	   the	   authors	   from	   several	   sources	   as	   well	   as	   data	   from	   other	   literature.	   An	  example	  of	  such	  a	  table	  is	  provided	  in	  a	  report	  by	  the	  Oakland	  Institute	  (2011a,	  17f),	  where	  the	  sources	  given	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  table	  include	  fieldwork,	  three	  government	  institutions	  and	   four	   earlier	  publications.	  Other	   examples	   are	  provided	   in	   Songela	   and	  Maclean	   (2008),	  Görgen	   et	   al.	   (2009),	   Mwamila	   et	   al.	   (2009),	   Sulle	   and	   Nelson	   (2009),	   and	   Kashaigili	   and	  Nzunda	   (2010).	   A	   recent	   publication	   by	   the	   FAO	   (2012)	   provides	   a	   table	   with	   partially	  outdated	   information	  on	  the	   ‘status	  of	  recent	   investments’	  with	  the	  following	  weak	  citation:	  ‘Compiled	  by	  authors	  from	  various	  sources’	  (FAO	  2012,	  77).	  	  The	  practice	  of	  giving	  sources	  in	  an	  aggregated	  form	  creates	  problems.	  It	  makes	  the	  source	  of	  information	  and	  details	   regarding	   individual	   land	  deals	  difficult	  or	   impossible	   to	   trace.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  judge	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  single	  piece	  of	  information.	  For	  example,	  looking	  at	  such	  a	  table	  alone,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  know	  whether	  information	  on	  a	  given	  deal	  is	  recent	  and	  confirmed	  by	   the	  authors	  or	  whether	   it	   is	  based	  on	  one	  of	   the	  other	   indicated	  sources,	  which	   may	   be	   older	   or	   considered	   less	   reliable.	   It	   is	   also	   not	   possible	   to	   follow	   up	   the	  development	  of	  a	  land	  deal	  by	  contacting	  the	  same	  source	  of	  information	  or	  to	  triangulate	  the	  data	  by	  deliberately	  choosing	  a	  different	  source	  (as	  opposed	  to	  choosing	  it	  by	  chance,	  where	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there	   is	   the	   risk	   that	   one	   could	   draw	   on	   the	   same	   source	   again).	   Another	   potential	  consequence	  of	  this	  practice	  is	  described	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  
	  
Reproduction	  of	  data:	  incomplete	  citations	  Publications	  that	  rely	  on	  data	  from	  earlier	  compilations	  (as	  described	  above)	  often	  cite	  only	  the	  authors	  of	  those	  compilations	  and	  omit	  the	  primary	  data	  sources.	  Examples	  include	  reports	  from	  the	  Deutsche	  Gesellschaft	  für	  Internationale	  Zusammenarbeit	  (GIZ,	  formerly	  Deutsche	  Gesellschaft	  für	  Technische	  Zusammenarbeit	  GTZ;	  see	  Görgen	  et	  al.	  2009),	  Kashaigili	  and	  Nzunda	  (2010)	  and	  the	  Oakland	  Institute	  (2011a).	  All	  of	  them	  rely	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  on	  the	  IIED	  (International	  Institute	  for	  Environment	  and	  Development)	  report	  of	  Sulle	  and	  Nelson	  from	  20097	  and	  quote	  it	  accordingly,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  acknowledge	  the	  original	  sources	  of	  data	  which	  Sulle	  and	  Nelson	  give	  in	  their	  compilation,	  namely	  own	  fieldwork	  and	  information	  from	  three	  other	  publications:	  Kamanga	  (2008),	  Kulindwa	  (2008),	  and	  Songela	  and	  Maclean	  (2008).	  Also	  Sulle	  and	  Nelson	  applied	  this	  practice:	  they	  quoted	  Kamanga	  (2008)	  and	  the	  other	  authors	  in	  a	  table,	  but	  did	  not	  provide	  those	  authors’	  sources	  of	  information.	  For	  readers	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  more	  recent	  publications	  (such	  as	  the	  GIZ/GTZ	  report),	  it	  thus	  appears	  that	  Sulle	  and	  Nelson	  collected	  all	  the	  given	  data	  themselves	  in	  2009,	  while	  in	  fact	  the	  data	  stem	  from	  several	  sources,	  including	  the	  sources	  used	  by	  Kamanga	  (2008)	  and	  the	  other	  authors.	  Aside	  from	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  acknowledgment	  of	  intellectual	  property,	  this	  practice	  can	  imply	  that	  certain	  data	  are	  newer	  than	  they	  actually	  are.	  In	  the	  presented	  examples,	  the	  data	  are	  apparently	  from	  the	  2009	  IIED	  report	  (Sulle	  and	  Nelson	  2009),	  whereas	  some	  of	  them	  are	  in	  reality	  from	  the	  three	  reports	  of	  2008,	  on	  which	  Sulle	  and	  Nelson	  rely.	  Such	  a	  time	  difference,	  be	  it	  only	  one	  or	  two	  years,	  can	  be	  significant	  in	  the	  area	  of	  fast-­‐moving	  land	  deals.	  Another	  consequence	   is	  again	  –	  as	   for	   the	  problem	  of	   the	  aggregated	  provision	  of	  sources	  –	  related	  to	  the	   judgment	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  published	  sources.	  However,	   in	  the	  case	  of	  omitted	  sources	   it	   is	   even	  more	   critical,	   as	   the	   readers	   are	   not	  made	   aware	   that	   the	   given	   sources	  provide	   secondary	  data	  only.	  Readers	   are	  not	  provided	   the	   chance	   to	   judge	   for	   themselves,	  unless	   they	  are	  willing	  and	  able	   to	  scrutinise	   the	  quoted	  publications.	  Hence,	   readers	  might	  assume	  a	  certain	  quality	  that	  is	  not	  necessarily	  given.	  Later	  publications	  might	  quote	  sources	  that	   seem	   reliable,	   though	   they	   might	   be	   based	   mainly	   on	   weak	   data	   (for	   example	   when	  quoting	  the	  GIZ/GTZ	  report	  by	  Görgen	  et	  al.	  2009,	  which	  is	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  based	  on	  media	  articles).	  
	  
Misleading	  information:	  reporting	  of	  dead	  deals	  and	  duplication	  As	   a	   consequence	   of	   methodological	   flaws	   –	   we	   argue	   –	   the	   Tanzanian	   literature	   contains	  several	  instances	  where	  land	  deals	  that	  have	  ceased	  or	  been	  aborted	  continue	  to	  be	  reported	  and	  where	  the	  same	  deal	  is	  reported	  twice.	  	  The	  Oakland	  Institute	  report	  (2011a,	  18)	  lists	   in	  its	  compilation	  of	  Tanzanian	  land	  deals	  the	  investor	  Korean	  Rural	  Community	  Cooperation	  (KRC)	  as	  having	  acquired	  15,000	  ha	  of	  land	  in	  Rufiji	   district8	   (in	   accordance	  with	   respective	   announcements	   in	   the	  media:	  TanzaniaInvest	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Görgen	  et	  al.	   (2009)	  do	  not	  explicitly	   refer	   to	  Sulle	  and	  Nelson	   (2009),	  but	   to	  Cotula	  et	  al.	   (2009),	  whose	  data	   for	  
Tanzania	  are	  based	  on	  the	  data	  published	  in	  Sulle	  and	  Nelson	  (2009).	  
8	   In	   the	   Oakland	   Institute	   report	   (2011a)	   the	   KRC	   is	   named	   Korean	   Rural	   Development	   Cooperation,	   deviant	   from	  
other	  sources	  that	  name	  it	  Korean	  Rural	  Community	  Cooperation.	  The	  publication	  provides	  some	  detailed	  and	  more	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2009,	   Ng’wanakilala	   2010,	   Rugonzibwa	   2010).	   However,	   according	   to	   recent	   information	  from	  an	  official	   at	   the	  Rufiji	  Basin	  Development	  Authority	   (RUBADA)9	   the	  project	  had	  been	  based	  on	  a	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  (MoU)	  only	  and	  no	  land	  was	  acquired.	  The	  MoU	  expired	  in	  August	  2012	  before	  the	  company	  had	  begun	  any	  operations	  aside	  from	  conducting	  a	   feasibility	   study.	   RUBADA	   is	   currently	   looking	   for	   a	   new	   investor	   for	   this	   area	   (RUBADA	  official,	  personal	  communication	  by	  Sulle	  in	  2013).	  	  Friis	  and	  Reenberg	   (2010),	  Kaarhus	  et	  al.	   (2010)	  and	  FAO	  (2012)	  all	   list	  a	  project	   from	  the	  Dutch	  company	  BioShape,	  which	  ceased	  its	  activities	  in	  Tanzania	  in	  2009	  and	  went	  bankrupt	  in	  2010	  (Chachage	  and	  Baha	  2010,	  Valentino	  2011).	  Of	  course,	  reporting	  the	  deal	  is	  justified,	  as	   there	   had	   been	   a	   land	   acquisition	   process	   and	   initial	   activities	   were	   implemented;	  implications	   for	   local	   people	   might	   still	   be	   relevant	   (particularly	   if	   the	   project	   is	   to	   be	  continued	   by	   a	   future	   new	   owner,	   see	   Valentino	   2011).	   However,	   the	  way	   that	   the	   case	   is	  reported	  should	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  company	  BioShape	  is	  still	  active.	  	  The	   Oakland	   Institute	   (2011a),	   probably	   referring	   to	   a	   figure	   obtained	   in	   Kaarhus	   et	   al.	  (2010),	   lists	   the	   Swedish	   company	   EcoEnergy	   (formerly	   SEKAB)	   as	   active	   in	   a	   process	   to	  acquire	  200,000	  ha	   in	  Rufiji	  District	  while	  according	   to	   indications	   from	  our	   sources	   (Rufiji	  District	  Natural	  Resources	  Officer	  interviewed	  by	  Sulle	  in	  November	  2012,	  company	  manager	  interviewed	  by	  Locher	  in	  2010,	  Agro	  EcoEnergy	  Tanzania	  Ltd	  2013),	  the	  company	  ‒	  with	  full	  name	  Agro	  EcoEnergy	  Tanzania	  Ltd.	  ‒	  has	  been	   focusing	  on	  developing	   its	   land	  plots	   in	   the	  district	  of	  Bagamoyo	  since	  around	  2010,	  and	  there	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  plans	  for	  securing	  land	   in	   Rufiji	   District	   at	   the	   time	   of	   writing.	   Nevertheless,	   news	   on	   the	   United	   Nations	  Research	   Institute	   for	  Social	  Development	   (UNRISD)	  website	   in	  November	  2011	  stated	   that	  ‘SEKAB	  has	  already	  planted	  20,000	  ha	   in	  Tanzania’s	  coastal	  region	  and	  has	  plans	   to	  expand	  this	  to	  400,000	  ha’	  (Chinweze	  et	  al.	  2011,	  para.	  6).	  The	  FAO	  publication	  of	  2012	  also	  mentions	  SEKAB	   as	   requesting	   250,000–500,000	   ha.	   This	   was	   after	   the	   company	   named	   ‘SEKAB	  Bioenergy	  Tanzania	  Ltd’	  had	  ceased	  to	  exist	  and	  the	  activities	  had	  been	  handed	  over	  to	  Agro	  EcoEnergy	   Tanzania	   Ltd	   in	   October	   2009.	   Agro	   EcoEnergy	   Tanzania	   Ltd	   founded	   a	   new	  company	   ‘Bagamoyo	   EcoEnergy	   Ltd’	   in	   2010	   (Agro	   EcoEnergy	   Tanzania	   Ltd	   2013,	   BRELA	  2013).	  Further,	  according	  to	  our	  sources	  (see	  above),	  the	  project	  has	  planted	  a	  maximum	  of	  around	  8,000	  ha	  so	  far,	  if	  at	  all	  (not	  20,000	  ha).	  In	  Bagamoyo,	  the	  company	  has	  a	  maximum	  of	  about	  8,000	  ha	  suitable	  for	  sugarcane	  plantation	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  12,000	  ha	  is	  expected	  to	  remain	  a	  buffer	  zone	  (district	  official	  interview	  by	  Sulle	  in	  2012).	  	  There	  is	  also	  a	  deal	  reported	  twice	  under	  different	  names:	  the	  Land	  Matrix	  in	  its	  beta	  version	  (Land	   Matrix	   2012)	   reported	   the	   InfEnergy	   Company	   Ltd	   as	   a	   separate	   company	   from	  AGRICA;	  in	  fact	  the	  former	  is	  the	  earlier	  name	  for	  the	  latter	  (in	  both	  cases	  the	  local	  subsidiary	  is	  Kilombero	  Plantations	  Limited).	  In	  principle,	  InfEnergy	  changed	  its	  business	  plan,	  and	  thus	  its	   name,	   from	   oil	   palm	   for	   biodiesel	   production	   to	   the	   production	   of	   rice	   for	   local	   and	  international	  markets	  (Chachage	  2012).	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
precise	   information	  about	   the	   investor's	  plans	   in	  a	  separate	  box	  on	  page	  21;	  however,	   the	   information	   in	   the	   table	  
suggests	  that	  said	  land	  is	  already	  acquired.	  
9	  RUBADA	  is	  a	  statutory	  organ,	  established	  in	  1975,	  that	  manages	  several	  plots	  of	  land	  in	  the	  Rufiji	  Basin	  (Mwami	  and	  
Kamata	  2011:18).	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Attempt	  at	  a	  careful	  compilation	  of	  land	  deals	  in	  Tanzania	  	  In	   Locher	   and	   Sulle	   (2013)	   we	   provide	   an	   inventory	   of	   known	   land	   deals	   in	   Tanzania,	  compiled	  in	  a	  number	  of	  tables.	  Data	  in	  these	  tables	  are	  based	  on	  our	  own	  field	  research	  from	  2008	   to	   2013	   and	   on	   a	   thourough	   study	   of	   academic	   and	   grey	   literature.	  While	  we	   do	   not	  claim	  to	  present	  a	  complete	  picture	  of	  all	   information	  available,	  we	  have	  made	  considerable	  efforts	   to	   collect	   relevant	   literature	   from	  different	   sources,	   including	   from	  our	   interviewees	  from	  Tanzanian	  academia	  and	  NGOs.	  	  This	  compilation	  differs	  from	  other	  reports	  in	  the	  following	  ways	  (for	  an	  illustration	  see	  table	  
1).	  First,	  the	  status	  of	  a	  land	  deal,	  if	  known,	  is	  indicated	  as	  precisely	  as	  possible.	  Second,	  where	  possible,	  information	  on	  the	  earlier	  legal	  status	  and	  use	  of	  the	  land	  in	  question	  in	  given.	  Third,	  as	  sources	  for	  our	  compilations,	  we	  used	  primary	  data	  only.	  We	  define	  these	  as	  data	  collected	  by	  an	  author	  or	  authors	  based	  on	  materials	  from	  involved	  government	  offices	  (e.g.	  Kaarhus	  et	  
al.	  2010	  use	  a	  table	  on	  companies	  involved	  in	  biofuels	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Energy	  and	  Minerals)	  or	   information	   from	   interviews	   with	   involved	   government	   officials,	   local	   key	   persons	   or	  representatives	  of	  the	  investing	  company,	  or	  direct	  observations	  in	  the	  field.	  Secondary	  data	  (data	   from	   reports	   quoting	   other	   publications)	   are	   not	   included	   in	   our	   tables.	   As	   a	  consequence,	  for	  example,	  the	  widely	  cited	  IIED	  report	  by	  Cotula	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  is	  not	  used	  for	  our	  compilation,	  as	  its	  information	  on	  Tanzania	  is	  entirely	  based	  on	  a	  then	  unpublished	  study	  by	  Sulle,	  commissioned	  by	  IIED,	  which	  was	  soon	  after	  released	  by	  Sulle	  and	  Nelson	  (2009)	  as	  an	  IIED	  report.	  	  Often,	  the	  compilations	  of	  data	  in	  other	  publications	  do	  not	  allow	  the	  reader	  to	  distinguish	  the	  primary	  data	  from	  the	  secondary	  data	  easily	  (looking	  at	  the	  tables	  alone).	  In	  many	  cases	  it	  is	  possible,	   though,	   to	   draw	   assumptions	   about	   the	   primary	   data	   from	   the	   chapters	   on	  methodology	  (e.g.	  by	  considering	  the	  districts	  visited	  by	  authors).	  We	  generally	  also	  assumed	  that	   data	   from	   presented	   case	   studies	  were	   primary	   data.	   Further,	  we	   tried	   to	   identify	   the	  original	  data	  by	   filling	   in	  our	   tables	   in	   chronological	  order	  of	  publication	  dates	   (or	  dates	  of	  data	   collection),	   starting	   with	   the	   oldest	   reports.	   We	   could	   thus	   see	   which	   information	  provided	  by	  a	  more	  recent	  report	  was	  new	  and	  which	  information	  seemed	  to	  be	  copied	  from	  an	  older	  source.	  In	  the	  last	  column	  of	  our	  tables,	  we	  give	  the	  precise	  source	  of	  data	  for	  each	  land	  deal,	  and	  we	  refer	  to	  that	  source	  in	  a	  short	  version	  in	  brackets	  for	  detailed	  information	  in	  the	  other	  columns	  of	  the	  tables.	  This	   is	  particularly	   interesting	  in	  the	  case	  of	  contradictions.	  This	  procedure,	  though	  laborious	  and	  less	  easy	  to	  read,	  ensures	  that	  the	  given	  information	  is	  traceable.	  	  Media	   reports	   proved	   to	   be	   an	   unreliable	   source	   and	  were	   only	   used	   exceptionally	   in	   our	  tables.	   Information	  from	  investors’	  websites	   is	  partly	   included,	  but	  needs	  to	  be	  treated	  with	  caution	   as	   well.	   The	   problem	   of	   bias	   in	   media	   articles	   has	   been	   reported	   elsewhere	   (see	  discussion	   below).	   Additionally	   we	   found	   that	   media	   articles	   often	   report	   the	   stated	  intentions	  of	  investors	  as	  if	  they	  were	  established	  land	  deals.	  The	  same	  applies	  to	  investors'	  websites.	   However,	   such	   announcements	   do	   not	   necessarily	   materialise	   as	   projected.	  Examples	   are	   the	   investor	   CAMS	   Agri-­‐Energy	   Tanzania	   Ltd	   reducing	   its	   plans	   to	   acquire	  208,000	  ha,	  as	  announced	  in	  the	  media	  in	  2008	  (Obulutsa	  2008),	  to	  18,000	  ha	  or	  even	  less	  (a	  plan	  which	  is	  as	  yet	  unrealised)	  and	  the	  investment	  plans	  of	  Saudi	  Arabian	  investors,	  reported	  by	   Reuters	   in	   2009	   (Karam	   2009),	   which	   so	   far	   seem	   to	   remain	   just	   an	   intention.	   Green	  Resources	   AS,	   while	   having	   closed	   its	   subsidiary	   Tanga	   Forests	   in	   Pangani	   District	   in	   July	  2012,	  was	  still	  reporting	  land	  acquisitions	  and	  plantations	  of	  9,500	  ha	  on	  its	  website	  in	  June	  
	  
Locher	  and	  Sulle	  2014	  –	  Accepted	  Manuscript	  
	  
	  
	  
11	  
	  
	  
Table	  1:	  	  Deals	  by	  foreign	  investors	  and	  joint	  ventures	  by	  Tanzanians	  and	  foreigners	  (extract	  for	  illustration)	  
	  
No.	   Investor	  (nationality,	  
contact	  details)	  
Location	  
(district)	  
Product	  and	  
purpose	  
Acquired	  land	  and	  
planned	  total	  size	  (ha)	  
Land	  status	  before	  
acquisition	  
Status,	  business	  model,	  additional	  information	   Sources	  of	  information	  
1	   30	  Degree	  East	  
	  
Partnership	  between	  
Mauritian	  (holding	  
90%)	  and	  Tanzanian	  
investor	  (10%)	  
	  
Formally	  known	  as	  
Sun	  Biofuels	  
owned	  by	  an	  investor	  
from	  the	  UK	  
	  
sold	  to	  the	  new	  
investor	  probably	  in	  
2011	  	  
Kisarawe	   Jatropha	  for	  
vegetable	  oil	  
and	  biodiesel	  
8,211	  (derivative	  right:	  
Sulle	  and	  Nelson	  2009,	  
Oakland	  Institute	  
2011a)	  
	  
11,226	  (village	  
negotiations,	  Songela	  
and	  Maclean	  2008)	  
	  
8,000	  (Maltsoglou	  and	  
Khwaja	  2010,	  Kashaigili	  
and	  Nzunda	  2010)	  	  
	  
9,000	  (granted,	  final	  
stage	  of	  acquisition,	  
Bengesi	  et	  al.	  2009,	  
Mwamila	  et	  al.	  2009)	  
	  
9,000	  acquired	  (LEAT	  
2011)	  
	  
Requested:	  18,000	  
(Songela	  and	  Maclean	  
2008,	  Maltsoglou	  and	  
Khwaja	  2010,	  Oakland	  
Institute	  2011a)	  
	  
50,000	  (Bengesi	  et	  al.	  
2009,	  Mwamila	  et	  al.	  
2009)	  
Village	  land	  
	  
from	  10	  villages	  
(LEAT	  2011)	  
	  
11	  villages	  (Theting	  
and	  Brekke	  2010,	  
Oakland	  Institute	  
2011a)	  
	  
Muhaga	  village	  
provided	  1,500	  ha	  
of	  their	  total	  5,000	  
ha	  to	  the	  company	  
(Theting	  and	  Brekke	  
2010)	  
	  
The	  following	  information	  is	  for	  the	  earlier	  company	  Sun	  Biofuels:	  
	  
Plan	  to	  create	  5,000	  jobs	  (Bengesi	  et	  al.	  2009,	  Songela	  and	  
Maclean	  2008)	  
	  
Compensation	  intended:	  just	  over	  35,000	  TSh/ha	  (Songela	  and	  
Maclean	  2008)	  
	  
Acquired	  8,000	  ha	  of	  land	  at	  a	  lease	  of	  99	  years.	  Work	  com-­‐
menced	  on	  the	  clearing	  of	  land	  in	  June	  2009	  in	  preparation	  for	  
planting.	  The	  company	  planted	  the	  first	  600	  ha	  of	  jatropha	  in	  
November	  2009	  (Kashaigili	  and	  Nzunda	  2010)	  
	  
Conflicts	  about	  compensation;	  salary	  above	  minimum	  wage,	  but	  
questionable	  working	  conditions	  (Theting	  and	  Brekke	  2010)	  
	  
Procedures	  of	  land	  acquisition	  not	  adhered	  to,	  manipulation;	  
employment	  provided;	  access	  to	  land	  and	  water	  resources	  denied	  
(LEAT	  2011)	  
	  
Started	  in	  2009,	  land	  not	  all	  yet	  planted	  (Oakland	  Institute	  2011a)	  	  
	  
Jatropha	  plantation	  and	  envisioned	  out-­‐grower	  scheme.	  The	  latter	  
wasn’t	  implemented	  until	  its	  collapse	  in	  2011	  (Haki	  Ardhi	  2013)	  
	  
The	  company	  went	  bankrupt	  in	  early	  2012.	  It	  has	  laid	  off	  overnight	  
about	  750	  workers	  and	  failed	  to	  fulfil	  its	  socio-­‐economic	  promises.	  
The	  company	  was	  also	  reported	  to	  be	  in	  the	  process	  of	  selling	  its	  
properties	  to	  new	  investor	  (The	  Guardian	  2011)	  	  
	  
‘A	  British	  biodiesel	  company	  (...)	  The	  project	  was	  suspended	  in	  
2011,	  and	  sold	  to	  a	  new	  owner	  who	  is	  planning	  to	  continue	  with	  
the	  investment.	  There	  has	  arisen	  a	  lot	  of	  issues	  on	  compensation	  
for	  the	  loss	  of	  lands	  and	  assets	  on	  that	  land.’	  (Havnevik	  et	  al.	  
2012)	  
Songela	  and	  Maclean	  2008	  
	  
Mwamila	  et	  al.	  2009	  (fieldwork	  Jul/Aug	  
2009)	  
	  
Sulle	  and	  Nelson	  2009	  (Sulle	  field	  visit	  
March	  2009)	  
	  
Bengesi	  et	  al.	  2009	  (data	  from	  Ministry	  
of	  Agriculture,	  Food	  Security	  and	  
Cooperatives)	  	  
	  
Maltsoglou	  and	  Khwaja	  2010	  (source	  
unclear)	  
	  
Kaarhus	  et	  al.	  2010	  (data	  from	  Ministry	  
of	  Energy	  and	  Minerals,	  July	  2010)	  
	  
Kashaigili	  and	  Nzunda	  2010	  (fieldwork)	  
	  
Theting	  and	  Brekke	  2010	  (fieldwork,	  
probably	  in	  April	  2010)	  	  
	  
LEAT	  2011	  (fieldwork	  in	  May/June	  
2011)	  
	  
Oakland	  Institute	  2011a	  (fieldwork	  in	  
Dec	  2010)	  
	  
Carrington	  2011	  (media	  article	  in	  The	  
Observer)	  
	  	  
The	  Guardian	  2011	  
	  
Havnevik	  et	  al.	  2012	  (fieldwork)	  
	  
Haki	  Ardhi	  2013	  	  
2	   Africa	  Biofuel	  &	  
Emission	  Reduction	  
Company	  (Tanzania)	  
Bihara-­‐
mulo	  
Croton	  
megalocar-­‐
pus	  (planned)	  
60,000	  (Kamanga	  
2008)	  
	  
	   Initial	  plan:	  plantation	  and	  collaboration	  with	  independent	  
growers	  (providing	  them	  with	  education	  and	  technical	  support);	  
but	  lack	  of	  funds,	  not	  operational,	  probably	  abandoned	  plans	  
Kamanga	  2008	  (field	  research,	  data	  
from	  Ministry	  of	  Energy	  and	  Minerals,	  
Ministry	  of	  Agriculture,	  Food	  Security	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No.	   Investor	  (nationality,	  
contact	  details)	  
Location	  
(district)	  
Product	  and	  
purpose	  
Acquired	  land	  and	  
planned	  total	  size	  (ha)	  
Land	  status	  before	  
acquisition	  
Status,	  business	  model,	  additional	  information	   Sources	  of	  information	  
Ltd	  	  
(Tanzanian,	  USA)	  
	  
Africa	  Biofuel	  &	  
Emission	  Reduction	  
(East	  Africa)	  Ltd	  
(ABEA)	  
www.africabiofuel.co
m	  	  
	  
Joint	  venture	  between	  
TTT	  (Tucson	  
Transatlantic	  Trade	  
Holding	  Group,	  Inc)	  
Wilma	  Biofuel	  and	  
Emission	  Reduction	  
Company,	  part	  of	  US	  
Wilma	  (World	  
Institute	  for	  
Leadership	  and	  
Management	  in	  
Africa)	  Group	  and	  
National	  Investment	  
Company	  Ltd	  (NICO),	  
Tanzania	  (Wilma	  
2006)	  
	  
Managing	  Director	  
Christine	  Adamow	  	  
	  
P.O.	  Box	  14317,	  
Kagera	  
(Kaarhus	  et	  
al.	  2010)	  
	  
For	  biofuels	  
and	  carbon	  
credits	  
Planned:	  
20,000	  (Songela	  and	  
Maclean	  2008)	  
(Songela	  and	  Maclean	  2008)	  
	  
In	  2008,	  the	  company	  won	  the	  World	  Bank	  Development	  
Marketplace	  Award,	  a	  competitive	  grant	  program	  for	  innovative,	  
early	  stage	  development	  projects	  (DM	  2008)	  
	  
Acquisition	  under	  process,	  contracts	  expected	  in	  2010	  (Managing	  
Director	  Christine	  Adamow,	  in	  a	  mail	  to	  Locher	  on	  30	  April	  2010)	  
	  
According	  to	  a	  government	  official,	  the	  company	  was	  stopped	  by	  
the	  Vice-­‐President	  Office	  due	  to	  a	  land-­‐related	  issue	  
(Commissioner	  of	  Ministry	  of	  Energy	  and	  Minerals,	  interviewed	  by	  
Locher	  in	  July	  2012)	  
	  
TIC	  officials	  have	  no	  recent	  information	  about	  this	  company	  (TIC	  
officials,	  interviewed	  by	  Sulle	  in	  Dec	  2012)	  
	  
The	  company's	  website's	  latest	  news	  is	  dated	  Nov	  2011;	  no	  clear	  
information	  about	  status	  in	  Tanzania	  (ABEA	  website)	  
	  
Two	  mail	  requests	  in	  Nov	  and	  Dec	  2012	  to	  the	  Managing	  Director	  
(by	  Locher)	  were	  not	  replied	  
	  
Registered	  in	  BRELA	  (2013)	  as	  incorporated	  on	  11	  Aug	  2006	  
and	  Cooperatives)	  
	  
Songela	  and	  Maclean	  2008	  (probably	  
based	  on	  interviews	  with	  government	  
officials)	  
	  
Kaarhus	  et	  al.	  2010	  (data	  from	  Ministry	  
of	  Energy	  and	  Minerals,	  July	  2010)	  
	  
Mail	  contact	  by	  Locher	  with	  company’s	  
Managing	  Director	  Christine	  Adamow	  
on	  30	  April	  2010	  
	  
Interview	  with	  Commissioner	  of	  
Ministry	  of	  Energy	  and	  Minerals	  by	  
Locher	  in	  July	  2012	  
	  
Officials	  of	  Tanzania	  Investment	  Centre	  
(TIC)	  interviewed	  by	  Sulle	  in	  Dec	  2012	  
	  
Development	  Marketplace	  (DM)	  2008	  
	  
Wilma	  2006	  (investor's	  brochure)	  
	  
BRELA	  2013	  
	  Source:	  Extract	  of	  table	  1	  in	  Locher	  and	  Sulle	  (2013,	  7f),	  slightly	  adapted;	  sources	  for	  the	  information	  in	  the	  table:	  fieldwork	  by	  the	  authors	  and	  several	  publications	  providing	  primary	  data	  (see	  column	  ‘Sources	  of	  information’	  for	  short	  indication	  and	  the	  reference	  list).	  Please	  note:	  Information	  is	  given	  as	  per	  December	  2012.	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2013,	  even	  though	  the	  land	  acquisition	  process	  was	  never	  fully	  completed	  and	  the	  plantations	  have	  been	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  district	  administration	  (interview	  with	  former	  Town	  Planner	  of	  Pangani	  by	  Locher	  in	  2013).	  	  	  
Updated	  summary	  of	  large-­‐scale	  land	  acquisition	  in	  Tanzania	  After	   an	   extensive	   literature	   review,	   online	   research	   and	   fieldwork	   in	   several	   districts,	   we	  were	   able	   to	   update	   and	   improve	   the	   accuracy	   of	   information	   on	   large-­‐scale	   land	   deals	   in	  Tanzania.	  However,	   there	   remain	   a	   high	   number	   of	   projects	   for	  which	   data	   are	   scanty.	   For	  many	   projected	   land	   deals	   it	   is	   still	   not	   possible	   to	   say	   whether	   they	   are	   only	   announced	  intentions,	   which	   might	   have	   been	   withdrawn	   already,	   or	   whether	   they	   are	   about	   to	   be	  realised	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  	  
Large	  differences	  between	  numbers	  of	  announced	  and	  realized	  land	  deals	  Based	  on	  the	  tables	  in	  Locher	  and	  Sulle	  (2013)	  we	  make	  the	  following	  observations.	  A	  total	  of	  62	   land	   investment	   projects	   of	   foreign,	   domestic	   and	   unknown	   origins	   are	   listed;	   of	   these,	  only	  around	  30%	  (18	  deals)	  have	  reportedly	  concluded	  their	  land	  deals	  so	  far10.	  About	  half	  of	  the	  deals	  are	  so	  far	  only	  announced	  or	  with	  ongoing	  land	  acquisition	  processes,	  thus	  their	  fate	  is	  still	  unclear.	  12	  projects	  have	  been	  ceased.	  If	  we	  look	  at	  foreign	  investments	  solely	  and	  only	  consider	  the	  more	  reliable	  information,	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  concluded	  out	  of	  the	  listed	  projects	  is	  10	  to	  26;	   five	  projects	  have	  ceased	  (more	  detailed	  figures	  see	  below).	  Hence,	   the	  number	  of	  failed	  and	  not	   (yet)	   concluded	   land	  deal	  projects	   is	  high.	  The	  reasons	   for	   the	  abandoned	  or	  never-­‐realized	  projects	  are	  mainly	   related	   to	  challenges	  during	   the	   land	  acquisition	  process	  (half	  of	  the	  listed	  projects).	  Investors	  face	  problems	  in	  acquiring	  the	  full	  amount	  of	  land	  they	  require,	   they	   encounter	   disputes	   around	   local	   land	   rights	   that	   cannot	   be	   solved	   within	  reasonable	  time	  or	  they	  do	  not	  agree	  with	  additional	  fees	  they	  would	  need	  to	  pay,	  e.g.	  for	  land	  use	   planning.	   The	   other	   major	   reason	   given	   is	   financial	   difficulty.	   This	   is	   sometimes	  intertwined	   with	   the	   costs	   and	   long	   duration	   of	   the	   land	   acquisition	   process,	   or	   investors	  claim	  general	  funding	  problems.	  Also	  for	  the	  announced	  or	  ongoing	  projects,	  of	  which	  the	  land	  deal	   is	   not	   concluded	   yet,	   major	   problems	   related	   to	   the	   land	   transfer	   are	   reported.	   This	  suggests	   that	  although	   foreign	   land	  deals	   in	  Tanzania	  are	  promoted	  by	   the	  government	  and	  much	   debated	   in	   the	   public	   and	   in	   academia,	   the	   realization	   of	   these	   investments	   faces	  challenges	  and	  is,	  so	  far,	  going	  on	  at	  a	  very	  limited	  pace	  and	  scope.	  	  This	   also	   holds	   true	   for	   investments	   in	   the	  most	   prominent	   sector	   of	   recent	   land	   deals	   in	  Tanzania,	   those	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	   producing	   biofuels	   (mainly	   jatropha).	   Many	   of	   these	  projects,	   announced	   around	   2005–2008	   and	   reported	   in	   2008	   and	   2009,	   have	   not	   become	  operational	  so	  far.	  Besides	  seven	  projects	  that	  we	  list	  as	  ceased	  or	  not	  having	  started	  the	  land	  deal	  process	  at	  all,	  we	  list	  25	  biofuel	  projects	  as	  (potentially)	  ongoing.	  However,	  the	  majority	  of	   them	   are	   reported	   by	   a	   number	   of	   studies	   (see	   Locher	   and	   Sulle	   2013)	   to	   be	   having	  problems	  with	  funding	  or	  with	  the	  land	  acquisition	  process	  as	  outlined	  above,	  or	  there	  is	  only	  little	   information	   available	   even	   from	   the	   district	   officials,	   which	  might	   indicate	   that	   these	  land	  deals	  are	  not	  being	  persued	  yet	  or	  anymore.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  we	  have	  indication	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  As	  we	  stated	  above,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  get	  detailed	  information	  about	  the	  formal	  status	  of	  an	  individual	  land	  deal.	  
Hence,	  our	  figures	  here	  are	  rather	  estimates,	  based	  on	  the	  indications	  we	  have.	  The	  actual	  number	  of	  legally	  
concluded	  land	  deals	  might	  be	  even	  smaller,	  as	  according	  to	  our	  experience	  land	  deals	  are	  often	  reported	  as	  
concluded	  before	  they	  actually	  are. 
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only	   one	   biofuel	   investment	  with	   an	   active	   plantation	   (30	   Degree	   East	   in	   Kisarawe11).	   The	  global	   financial	   crisis	  of	  2007–2008	  and	  a	  poor	  understanding	  of	   energy	   feedstocks,	   among	  other	   reasons,	  have	  driven	  a	  number	  of	   companies	   such	  as	  BioShape	  Tanzania	  Ltd	  and	  Sun	  Biofuels	  out	  of	  business	  (Sulle	  and	  Nelson	  2013).	  	  
Recent	  trends	  in	  land	  deals	  As	   stated	   above,	  most	   of	   the	   biofuel	   projects,	  which	   consistuted	   the	  major	   part	   of	   the	   first	  wave	   of	   recent	   land	   deals	   in	   Tanzania	   and	   some	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   globe,	   have	   not	   been	  realized	  yet.	  Furthermore,	   there	   seems	   to	  have	  been	   little	  new	   interest	   in	   this	   sector	   in	   the	  past	   few	   years.	   The	   decreased	   interest	   can	   be	   ascribed	   to	   the	   limited	   economic	   viability	   of	  some	  envisioned	  biofuel	  crops	  and	  also	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  policy,	  institutional	  and	  legal	  frameworks	  in	  Tanzania	  (Hultman	  et	  al.	  2012,	  Sulle	  and	  Nelson	  2013).	  Our	  analysis	  shows	  that	  the	  most	  recent	  land-­‐based	  investments	  mainly	  concentrate	  on	  food	  production,	  particularly	  rice,	  sugar	  and	  palm	  oil.	  Some	  of	  these	  projects	  have	  already	  become	  operational.	  We	  also	  observed	  that	  forestry	  plantations	   account	   for	   a	   considerable	   portion	  of	   approved	   land	  deals	   and	  planted	  area.	  As	  observed	  during	  our	  own	  data	  collection,	  apart	  from	  the	  production	  of	  soft	  and	  hard	  wood,	   investors	   in	   forestry	  plantations	   target	  additional	   income	   from	  carbon	  sequestration,	  so	  far	  mainly	  on	  the	  voluntary	  market,	  but	  also	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  getting	  registered	  under	  the	  Clean	  Development	  Mechanism	  (CDM),	  a	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  measure	  developed	  under	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC).	  This	  corresponds	  to	  the	  analysis	  by	  Deininger	  and	  Byerlee	  (2011)	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  forestry	  plantations	  globally	  (see	  also	  Cotula	  2012,	  651,	  on	  his	  assumption	  that	  forestry	  projects	  might	  be	  under-­‐represented	  in	  the	  Land	  Matrix	  –	  and	  probably	  also	   in	  other	  compilations,	  as	  we	  would	  assume).	  However,	  the	   largest	   forest	   investor	   in	   Tanzania	   so	   far,	   Green	   Resources	   SA,	   has	   closed	   one	   of	   its	  subsidiaries	  and	  might	  withdraw	  some	  of	   its	  other	  investment	  plans	  (interview	  with	  former	  Tanga	  Forests	  Ltd.	  Plantation	  Operations	  Manager	  by	  Locher	   in	  February	  2013).	  Hence,	   the	  relevance	  of	  this	  sector	  in	  Tanzania	  remains	  uncertain.	  
	  
Comparing	  land	  deals	  	  Based	  on	  our	  analysis,	  the	  following	  estimates	  of	  the	  extent	  of	  land	  deals	  in	  Tanzania	  can	  be	  given.	   Land	   deals	   by	   foreign	   investors	   (and	   joint	   ventures	   between	   Tanzanian	   and	   foreign	  investors),	  whether	  announced,	  ongoing	  or	  concluded	  land	  acquisition	  processes,	  number	  34	  deals	  and	  amount	   to	  a	   total	  area	  of	  around	  1,000,000	  ha.	  However,	  of	   this	  amount,	  only	  21	  deals	  with	  totally	  around	  555,000	  ha	  are	  reported	  by	  at	   least	   two	  different	  sources	  and	  can	  thus	  be	  considered	  as	  verified	  with	   certain	   reliability.	   Information	  on	   the	   remaining	  area	   is	  based	  on	  one	   source	  only,	   or	   there	   is	   conflicting	   information	   from	  different	   sources.	  Of	   the	  verified	  deals,	  an	  area	  of	  30,000	  ha	  derives	  from	  three	  deals	  that	  are	  so	  far	  only	  announced	  (i.e.	  according	  to	  our	  sources,	  the	  land	  acquisition	  process	  has	  not	  been	  initiated	  yet).	  An	  area	  of	  around	  380,000	  ha	  derives	   from	  eight	   land	  deals	  with	  ongoing	   land	  acquisition.	  Of	   these,	  325,000	  ha	  stem	  from	  the	  AgriSol	  Energy	  deal;	  although	  its	  land	  acquisition	  process	  seems	  to	  be	   initiated	   (Oakland	   Institute	   2011b),	   the	   deal	   seems	   contested	   and	   its	   continuation	  questionable	   (Ruhiye	  2012).	  Finally,	   according	   to	  our	  analysis,	  10	  deals	  with	  a	   total	  area	  of	  145,000	   ha	   can	   be	   considered	   as	   concluded	   deals.	   These	   figures	   are	   lower	   than	   the	  comparable	   figures	   (i.e.	   land	   deals	   by	   foreign	   investors	   with	   indication	   ‘land	   acquired’	   or	  ‘concluded	  deal’)	  presented	  in	  other	  recent	  compilations.	  The	  Oakland	  Institute	  (2011a,	  17f)	  compiles	  18	  deals	  summing	  up	  to	  around	  275,000	  ha,	  GRAIN	  (2012)	  lists	  10	  deals	  with	  a	  total	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  30	  Degree	  East	  has	  reportedly	  bought	  major	  shares	  of	  Sun	  Biofuels	  to	  develop	  biodiesel	  from	  jatropha	  (Locher	  and	  
Sulle	  2013).	  To-­‐date,	  communities	  in	  Kisarawe	  still	  call	  the	  investor	  Sun	  Biofuels.	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of	  542,000	  ha	  and	  the	  recent	  Land	  Matrix	  (2014)	  shows	  28	  deals	  amounting	  to	  281,777	  ha12.	  Although	  it	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  some	  of	  the	  currently	  ongoing	  land	  deals	  will	  be	  concluded	  –	  and	  hence	  the	  figures	  of	  our	  compilation	  will	  get	  closer	  to	  what	  other	  databases	  present	  –,	  our	  analysis	  also	  shows	  that	  started	  land	  acquisition	  processes	  do	  not	  necessarily	  succeed.	  Our	   compilation	   of	   ceased	   or	   aborted	   deals	   (table	   4	   in	   Locher	   and	   Sulle	   2013)	   lists	   12	  projects13	  with	  a	  total	  area	  of	  around	  300,000	  ha.	  Around	  half	  of	   these	  projects	  had	  already	  started	  the	  land	  acquisition	  process;	  the	  others	  were	  just	  ‘intended’	  investments.	  In	  addition	  to	   these	   are	   projects	   that	   had	   temporarily	   ceased	   all	   of	   their	   activities	   (regarding	   land	  acquisition	  and	  land-­‐based	  investments)	  and	  been	  sold	  to	  other	  investors,	  and	  projects	  given	  up	  in	  a	  district,	  but	  continuing	  in	  another	  district,	  which	  are	  not	  included	  in	  this	  figure.	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   land	   deals	   by	   foreign	   investors,	   investments	   of	   unclear	   origin	   amount	   to	  around	   37,000	   ha	   (seven	   deals),	   of	   which	   most	   are	   based	   on	   rather	   vague	   data	   sources.	  Domestic	  deals	  amount	  to	  approximately	  20,000	  ha	  for	  nine	  deals	  (tables	  3	  and	  2	   in	  Locher	  and	   Sulle	   2013).	   It	  was	   not	   our	   original	   aim	   to	   focus	   on	   land	   deals	   by	   domestic	   Tanzanian	  investors.	  That	  is	  one	  reason	  for	  our	  table	  in	  Locher	  and	  Sulle	  (2013)	  on	  domestic	  deals	  being	  rather	  short.	  The	  other	  reason	  is	  that	  we	  included	  only	  deals	  above	  200	  ha	  in	  our	  inventory,	  and	   the	   size	   of	   purely	   domestic	   deals	   tends	   to	   be	   much	   smaller	   than	   deals	   involving	  transnational	   investors	   (for	   a	   list	   of	  domestic	  deals,	   see	  Bengesi	  et	  al.	   2009,	  Mwamila	  et	  al.	  2009,	   for	   a	  detailed	  overview	  of	   the	  Tanzanian	  owners	  of	   former	  National	  Agricultural	   and	  Food	   Corporation	   (NAFCO)	   farms	   and	   other	   land	   portions	   accumulated	   by	   local	   elites	   see	  Chachage	  and	  Mbunda	  2009).	  This	  was	  also	  confirmed	  by	  the	  recent	  report	  produced	  by	  the	  University	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  for	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Lands14	  (cited	  in	  Mdee	  2013),	  which	  focused	  on	  land	   deals	   above	   20	   ha.	   Although	   the	   average	   size	   of	   individual	   land	   deals	   by	   domestic	  investors	  is	  considerably	  smaller	  than	  the	  typical	  size	  of	  land	  deals	  by	  international	  investors,	  the	   number	   of	   domestic	   deals	  might	   be	   far	   higher	   than	   the	   number	   of	   transnational	   deals.	  Hence,	   in	   our	   view,	   this	   phenomenon	   deserves	  more	   public	   and	   academic	   attention	   in	   the	  near	  future.	  	  	  
Summarizing	  and	  discussing:	  how	  reliable	  are	  compiled	  data?	  	  Widespread	   debates	   on	   foreign	   (and	   domestic)	   land	   acquisitions	   and	   their	   potential	  consequences	  are	  going	  on	  globally	  among	  academia,	  political	  circles	  and	  civil	  society,	  yet	  the	  question	  of	  reliable	  data	  on	  the	  phenomenon	  remains	  a	  major	  concern.	  Taking	  the	  example	  of	  Tanzania,	   we	   have	   shown	   that	   even	   after	   intensive	   research	   by	   many	   individuals	   and	  institutions,	   it	   is	   still	   not	   possible	   to	   provide	   a	   clear	   picture	   on	   foreign	   and	   domestic	   land	  deals.	  Besides	  illustrating	  the	  challenges	  facing	  researchers	  in	  accessing	  relevant	  information,	  we	  have	  presented	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  presentation	  and	  reproduction	  of	  data	  on	  land	  deals.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Our	  own	  figures	  (Locher	  and	  Sulle	  2013)	  date	  from	  end	  of	  2012;	  for	  better	  comparison	  with	  the	  Land	  Matrix	  figures	  
one	  may	  consider	  the	  following:	  when	  we	  accessed	  Land	  Matrix	  data	  on	  4	  July	  2013,	  the	  re-­‐launched	  database	  listed	  
23	  deals	  amounting	  to	  285,000	  ha.	  Figures	  in	  the	  earlier	  Land	  Matrix	  beta	  version	  were	  even	  higher.	  
13	   Projects	   of	   the	   same	   company	   in	   different	   districts	   are	   counted	   as	   one	   –	   if	   every	   (projected)	   land	   deal	   in	   every	  
district	  is	  counted	  separately,	  the	  total	  figure	  of	  ceased	  or	  aborted	  deals	  amounts	  to	  17	  projects.	  
14	  See	  footnote	  5.	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In	  the	  case	  of	  several	  publications	  on	  land	  deals	  in	  Tanzania,	  sources	  are	  given	  in	  aggregated,	  incomplete	  and	  inaccurate	  ways.	  This	   is	  comparable	  to	  the	   ‘reporting	  problem	  in	  databases’	  that	   Oya	   (2013,	   509)	   found	  with	   the	   Land	  Matrix	   and	   the	   GRAIN	   compilation.	   The	   related	  problem	   of	   readers	   being	   unable	   to	   trace	   the	   original	   sources	   of	   information	   results	   in	  neglected	  quality	  checks,	  ‘recycling	  of	  facts	  long	  after	  their	  sell-­‐by	  date’	  (Scoones	  et	  al.	  2013a,	  475),	  hence	   reporting	  of	   ceased	  or	  never	   realized	   land	  deals,	   and	  double	   reporting	  of	  deals	  under	   different	   names.	   Thus,	  we	   have	   illustrated	  with	   examples	   from	  Tanzania	   that	   ‘“data”	  compiled	   in	   a	   “base”,	   “set”,	   or	   table	   has	   a	   way	   of	   assuming	   a	   credibility	   that	   may	   not	   be	  merited	  when	  its	  origins	  are	  examined	  more	  closely’	  (Edelman	  2013,	  495).	  	  Another	  major	  problem	  is	  related	  to	  the	  strong	  reliance	  on	  media	  sources	  in	  research	  on	  the	  global	   land	   rush.	  Media	   reports,	   at	   least	   if	   taken	  alone,	  provide	  a	  distorted	  picture	   in	  many	  ways.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  identified	  selection	  biases	  summarized	  by	  Scoones	  et	  al.	  2013a	  (e.g.	  by	  host	  region	  and	  country,	  by	  investor	  country,	  by	  foreign	  vs.	  domestic	  origin,	  by	  scale;	  see	  also	   Borras	   et	   al.	   2012b,	   Cotula	   2012,	   Oya	   2013),	   we	   assume	   that	   journalists	   focus	   on	  investments	  that	  provide	  exciting	  headlines,	  such	  as	  those	  that	  result	  in	  conflicts	  and	  protests.	  This	  bias,	  which	  could	  be	  called	   ‘bias	   towards	   land	  deals	  with	  spectacular	  outcomes’,	  might	  lead	  to	  an	  under-­‐reporting	  of	  deals	  that	  draw	  less	  public	  attention,	  namely	  deals	  that	  create	  fewer	   conflicts	   or	   perhaps	   even	   positive	   outcomes	   for	   local	   people.	   We	   have	   further	  illustrated	  that	   in	  Tanzania’s	  case,	  over-­‐reporting	  not	  only	  happens	  through	  the	  tendency	  of	  media	  reports	  to	  round	  up	  figures	  on	  acquired	  land	  sizes	  (Friis	  and	  Reenberg	  2010,	  Deininger	  and	  Byerlee	   2011,	   50),	   but	   also	  when	  media	   articles	   present	   investment	   projects	   as	   active,	  though	  they	  are	  just	  announced	  plans	  that	  might	  never	  be	  implemented.	  	  More	  importantly,	  we	  found	  that	  announcements	  made	  by	  investment	  companies,	  labelled	  as	  a	   ‘reliable	  source’	   in	  the	  Land	  Matrix’	  beta	  version	  (2012)15,	  are	  of	  similarly	  poor	  reliability.	  There	  are	  not	  only	  investors	  that	  seek	  to	  conceal	   information	  on	  land	  deals	  from	  the	  public,	  but	   also	   companies	   that	   announce	   land	   investment	   projects	   as	   operational	   (possibly	   in	   an	  attempt	   to	   attract	   investors)	  when	   in	   fact	   these	   projects	   have	   either	   already	   ceased	   or	   the	  land	  deals	  have	  not	  been	  started	  yet.	  Thus,	  both	  media	  reports	  and	  information	  by	  investors	  contribute	  to	  ‘under-­‐reporting’	  and	  ‘over-­‐reporting’	  (Pearce	  2013)	  of	  land	  deals	  alike.	  	  The	  re-­‐launched	  version	  of	  the	  Land	  Matrix	  database	  in	  June	  2013	  has	  considerably	  improved	  in	   several	   points.	   Yet,	   it	   continues	   to	   rest	   partly	   upon	   questionable	   sources	   such	   as	  media	  articles	  and	  research	  reports	  that	  do	  not	  include	  primary	  data,	  but	  are	  wholly	  based	  on	  other	  sources	  (e.g.	  Exner	  2011).	  Hence,	  general	  statements	  based	  on	  a	  sum	  of	  entries	   in	   the	  Land	  Matrix	   (2014),	   such	   as	   for	   example	   on	   the	   total	   number	   of	   concluded	   deals,	   remain	   vague	  estimates	  on	  shaky	  ground.	  	  While	  in	  this	  paper	  we	  have	  highlighted	  some	  methodological	  flaws	  in	  the	  way	  land	  deals	  are	  reported,	  we	  can	  only	  speculate	  about	  the	  reasons	  for	  these	  (at	  least	  for	  academic	  purposes)	  unusual	  practices.	  They	  might	  be	  partly	  ascribed	  to	   the	  challenges	  of	  getting	   information	  or	  related	  to	  the	  untransparent	  nature	  of	  the	  land	  rush	  phenomenon	  itself.	  The	  practices	  might	  also	  have	  to	  do	  with	  convenience	  and	  limited	  resources,	  as	  it	  is	  very	  time-­‐consuming	  to	  report	  details	  of	   the	  deals	  and	  data	  sources	  as	  precisely	  as	  we	  propose	  here.	  Moreover,	   they	  might	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  The	  description	  of	  the	  Land	  Matrix’	  reliability	  code	  1	  (out	  of	  a	  spectrum	  of	  0‒3)	  reads	  as	  follows:	  ‘Land	  transactions	  
reported	   in	   sources	   that	   we	   judge	   reliable	   including	   for	   example:	   research	   papers	   […],	   company	   websites	   […],	  
government	  records’	  (Anseeuw	  et	  al.	  2012b,	  48).	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also	   be	   related	   to	   the	   non-­‐academic	   nature	   of	   many	   reports,	   which	   are	   produced	   by	  representatives	   of	   NGOs	   or	   development	   agencies,	   sometimes	   under	   considerable	   time	  pressure	   and	   with	   a	   significant	   preference	   for	   presenting	   their	   findings	   in	   pleasant	  readability.	  These	  reports	  often	  have	  the	  advantage	  of	  being	  published	  quickly	  and	  reaching	  a	  broad	  audience	  ‒	  an	  important	  point	  in	  this	  fast-­‐moving	  field.	  Thus,	  some	  of	  these	  procedures	  might	  have	  been	  justified	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  land	  rush	  to	  quickly	  draw	  attention	  not	  only	  of	  activists,	  governments	  and	  the	  wider	  public	  through	  media,	  but	  also	  of	  concerned	  scholars	  (see	  also	  Scoones	  et	  al.	  2013a).	  However,	  we	  argue,	  now	  it	  is	  high	  time	  to	  place	  emphasis	  on	  sound	  research	  based	  on	  empirical	  evidence.	  	  	  
A	  way	  forward	  
Future	  compilations	  of	  data	  on	  land	  deals?	  We	  do	  not	  question	  the	  usefulness	  of	  compilations	  or	  inventories	  of	  land	  deals	  in	  general	  (in	  this	   point	  we	   agree	  with	   Rulli	   and	   D’Odorico	   2013).	   If	   understood	   as	   an	   imperfect	   pool	   of	  existing	   information	   about	   the	   land	   deal	   situation,	   and	   not	   as	   unbiased	   and	   accurate	  representations	   of	   the	   reality,	   they	   might	   be	   helpful	   starting	   points	   for	   further	   in-­‐depth	  research.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  alternatives	  they	  might	  also,	  to	  a	  limited	  extent,	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  political	  decisions	  and	  social	  actions,	   if	   consulted	  with	  due	  care.	  However,	   in	  any	  case,	   such	  compilations	  need	  to	  be	  drafted	  in	  a	  way	  that	  pays	  attention	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  and	  the	  related	  quality	  of	  the	  data.	  	  
Detailed	  information	  on	  processes,	  not	  simple	  figures	  The	  recent	   land	  rush	   is	   far	   too	  complex	  to	  be	  captured	  by	  simple	   figures	   in	  simple	   lists.	  We	  agree	   with	   McCarthy	   et	   al.	   (2012,	   523)	   that	   land	   acquisitions	   should	   be	   conceptually	  understood	  as	  a	  process	  with	  several	  stages	  (see	  also	  Anseeuw	  et	  al.	  2013,	  523ff,	  on	  different	  space-­‐related	  ways	  of	  measuring	  large-­‐scale	  land	  acquisitions,	  adapted	  from	  Chouquer	  2012,	  and	  Scoones	  et	  al.	   2013a,	  475).	  This	   is	  not	  only	  necessary	   to	  distinguish	  between	   ‘real’	   and	  ‘virtual	  land	  grabbing’16	  as	  McCarthy	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  do;	  it	  is	  a	  basic	  requirement	  to	  gain	  a	  more	  nuanced	   picture	   of	   the	   land	   rush.	   In	   this	   article	   we	   have	   argued	   that	   in	   future	   work,	  researchers	  should	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  acquiring	  detailed	  information	  on	  the	  status	  of	  land	  deals	  ‒	  information	  that	  is	  currently	  often	  vague	  or	  not	  available	  at	  all	  in	  compilations	  of	  land	  deals.	   Such	   information	   can	   contribute	   to	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   processes	   of	   land	  acquisition	  and	  the	  related	  behaviour	  of	  investors	  and	  other	  stakeholders.	  It	  is	  also	  potentially	  useful	  in	  interpreting	  contradictory	  data	  for	  a	  specific	  project.	  One	  of	  the	  major	  improvements	  to	   the	   re-­‐launched	  Land	  Matrix	   database	   is	   the	  new	  option	   to	   provide	   information	  on	   each	  land	  deal’s	  ‘negotiation	  status’	  (with	  six	  different	  categories	  for	  intended,	  concluded	  and	  failed	  deals)	  and	   ‘implementation	  status’	   (four	  categories	   from	   ‘not	  started’	   to	   ‘abandoned’)	  (Land	  Matrix	  2014).	  While	  this	  differentiation	  is	  welcome,	  some	  of	  the	  categories	  such	  as	   ‘contract	  signed’	  still	  provide	  wiggle	  room,	  as	  we	  have	  illustrated.	  The	  provided	  information	  still	  needs	  to	  be	  read	  with	  care	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  defined	  more	  specifically	  for	  each	  national	  context	  and	  each	  entry.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  McCarthy	  et	  al.	  (2012,	  523)	  define	  ‘virtual	   land	  grabbing’	  as	  ‘situations	  where,	  behind	  a	  façade	  of	  land	  acquisition	  
for	  a	  stated	  purpose,	  there	  lies	  an	  agenda	  to	  appropriate	  subsidies,	  obtain	  bank	  loans	  using	  land	  permits	  as	  collateral,	  
or	  speculate	  on	  future	  increases	  in	  land	  values’.	  They	  further	  state	  that	  ‘[i]n	  the	  case	  of	  “virtual	  grabbing”	  only	  a	  few	  
initial	  stages	  of	  land	  acquisition	  or	  enclosure	  processes	  occur;	  just	  sufficient	  to	  enable	  specific	  actors	  to	  pursue	  their	  
own	  interests,	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  depend	  upon	  land	  use	  changes	  actually	  taking	  place’	  (McCarthy	  et	  al.	  2012,	  523).	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  Further	   important	   information	  that	   is	  often	  missing	   in	  compilations	  of	   land	  deals	   is	  data	  on	  the	   earlier	   status	   of	   the	   land	   in	   question,	   in	   terms	   of	   property	   rights	   and	   usage.	   This	   is	  important	   if	   one	   wants	   to	   understand	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   and	   the	   potential	  consequences	  at	  local	  level	  in	  a	  specific	  case.	  It	   is	  also	  crucial	  for	  gaining	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  patterns	  of	  land-­‐use	  change	  induced	  by	  land	  acquisitions.	  	  
Traceable	  references	  to	  (good	  quality)	  primary	  sources	  We	   propose	   a	   more	   rigorous	   documentation	   of	   data,	   which	   allows	   for	   the	   tracking	   of	   the	  primary	   sources	  of	   all	   the	   information	  given	   in	   compilations	  of	   land	  deals.	  Primary	   sources	  must	  be	  verified	  and	  checked	  for	  their	  quality,	  if	  possible.	  Traceble	  references	  to	  the	  sources	  are	  needed	  for	  every	  detailed	  entry	  in	  a	  list17.	  Though	  laborious	  and	  less	  user-­‐friendly,	  this	  is	  the	  only	  way	  in	  which	  compilations	  can	  serve	  as	  appropriate	  databases	  that	  support	  further	  research	  and	  political	  and	  social	  responses.	  	  The	  new	  version	  of	  the	  Land	  Matrix	  (2014)	  has	  considerably	  improved	  on	  the	  first	  version,	  by	  providing	   direct	   online	   links	   to	   the	   sources	   for	   information	   about	   each	   land	   deal	   in	   the	  database.	  However,	  contrary	  to	  what	  was	  announced	  by	  Anseeuw	  et	  al.	  (2013),	  the	  database	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  exact	  source	  for	  each	  single	  piece	  of	   information	  (i.e.	   the	  land	  size,	  the	  status	   of	   the	   land	   acquisition	   process,	   the	   investment	   purpose).	   Hence,	   while	   the	   database	  provides	   the	  possibility	   to	   retrace	   the	   sources	   for	   each	   entry,	   it	   places	   the	   responsibility	   of	  checking	  the	  data’s	  quality	  on	  the	  user.	  The	  appropriate	  use	  of	   the	  database	  thus	  requires	  a	  well-­‐educated	  and	  well-­‐informed	  user,	  willing	  to	  invest	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  time.	  This	  is	  problematic,	  as	  many	  data	  users	  are	  inclined	  to	  make	  use	  of	  what	  is	  accessible	  without	  being	  able	  and/or	  willing	  to	  check	  the	  primary	  sources	  in	  each	  case.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  the	  Land	  Matrix	  and	  other	  existing	  databases	  are	  constantly	  fed	  with	  data	  that	  are	  as	  reliable	  and	  accurate	   as	  possible.	   Further,	   database	  providers	   are	   responsible	   for	  publishing	   statements	  about	  the	  data’s	  quality	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  making	  database	  users	  aware	  about	  important	  limitations,	  not	  just	  ‘disclaimers	  […]	  covering	  the	  authors’	  hindquarters’	  (Edelman	  2013,	  497).	  	  	  
Concluding	  remarks	  In	  sum,	  in	  this	  article,	  while	  acknowledging	  the	  challenges	  of	  representing	  a	  phenomenon	  as	  untransparent	  and	  dynamic	  as	  the	  global	  land	  rush,	  we	  propose	  a	  more	  specific,	  precise	  and	  rigorous	  way	  of	  collecting,	  presenting	  and	  reproducing	  data	   in	  order	   to	   improve	  the	  quality	  and	   detail	   of	   information.	   Our	   analysis,	   distinguishing	   between	   verified	   and	   unverified	  information	   and	   between	   announced,	   ongoing,	   concluded	   and	   ceased	   land	   deal	   processes,	  points	  out	   that	   the	  amount	  of	  unverified	   information	   is	  still	   considerable,	   the	  completion	  of	  announced	  and	  ongoing	  land	  deal	  processes	  is	  in	  many	  cases	  uncertain,	  and	  the	  relevance	  of	  domestic	  land	  investments	  is	  widely	  unknown.	  Academics	  and	  policymakers	  must	  realize	  that	  the	  knowledge	  about	  the	   land	  deal	  situation	   in	  Tanzania	   is	  still	   less	  clear	  than	  suggested	  by	  certain	  databases	  and	  needs	  further	  investigation.	  Improved	  research	  practices	  could	  help	  in	  representing	   the	   trend	   of	   large-­‐scale	   land	   acquisitions	   more	   credibly	   and	   in	   using	   the	  resources	  of	  researchers	  and	  activists	  more	  effectively	  in	  order	  to	  tackle	  the	  urgent	  concerns	  related	  to	  the	  global	  land	  rush.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  The	  compilation	  on	  land	  deals	  in	  Tanzania	  by	  Exner	  (2011,	  131ff),	  though	  based	  on	  secondary	  information,	  is	  a	  good	  
example	  regarding	  the	  exact	  provision	  of	  sources	  for	  detailed	  entries	  in	  a	  table.	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